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Abstract 
The issue of urban road pricing is currently receiving a great deal of attention. The 
subject matter has a long history, stretching back to the economic literature of the 
mid-19th century with a significant renewal of academic interest during the 1960's. 
Whilst the theoretical basis for urban road pricing has been cogently put forward, an 
apparent sound economic rationale does not, of itself, ensure political and public 
acceptance. How then should decision-making proceed if the aim is ultimately one of 
implementing an urban road pricing scheme in the UK? As such, the aim of this thesis 
is to analyse the process of decision-making with respect to urban road pricing, to 
develop a theoretical framework for the subsequent empirical research undertaken on 
road pricing, and to suggest policy options, thus informing the development of policy 
and furthering the debate among policy-makers. In effect, an incremental approach to 
urban road pricing decision-making is proposed, which stresses that decisions are 
generally taken in small adjustments from the existing state of affairs and invariably 
necessitate the attainment of agreement between the various stakeholders. 
Two empirical methods are used in order to analyse this framework. First, a national 
survey of key stakeholder groups (most notably decision-makers), who have an 
interest in urban road pricing; and, second, a local case study based on face-to-face 
interviews with decision-makers who had first-hand experience of the first ever trial 
of an urban road pricing scheme in the UK - namely congestion metering in the city of 
Cambridge. 
This research finds that an incremental approach to urban road pricing decision- 
making is the most appropriate. In order to increase the acceptance of urban road 
pricing, schemes should be designed so that the various interest groups can gradually 
adjust to the changes in an incremental way by starting with policies that are currently 
in force and then considering only step-by-step change. It is still possible however, for 
change to take place beyond that envisaged by the incremental approach. For this to 
occur, it would require factors such as the existence of a policy entrepreneur, in situ, 
who is able to drive the process forward. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
'Seldom has applied economics produced an idea with such unanimous professional 
conviction in both its validity and its political unacceptability. A. A. Walter's article on 
it congestion " in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics states flatly, "The best policy to 
deal with urban road congestion is likely to be somefonn of road pricing. However, road 
pricing is the exception rather than the rule. " The consensus among professional economists 
infavor of this approach on economic grounds is strong'. 
(Small et al 1989) 
1.0.0 Introduction 
The above suggests that professional economists would appear to be in favour of road pricing 
as a means of combating the problem of urban road traffic congestion. There are however 
only a few schemes in existence world wide, which as the epigraph suggests could be the 
result of it being politically unacceptable. In fact, political issues are as real and important for 
a programme's success as the economic and technical factors. Rom (1994) argues that 
research has concentrated primarily on the analytical soundness of urban road pricing and 
whilst important there is a need to make urban road pricing ideologically attractive. 
The aim of the thesis is to study the public policy decision-making process with respect to 
urban road pricing as a means of combating road traffic congestion in urban areas of the UK'. 
More specifically, it deals with how the decision-making process should be undertaken in 
order to achieve political acceptability and therefore overcome potential barriers to 
implementation. In particular, it investigates which model of decision-making is most useful: 
As stated by John (1998) 'while there are many difficulties that arise from studying the complex and diffuse 
policy-making relationships, the potential is for a richer account of political life than that offered by more 
discrete research topics'. This is certainly the case in terms of transport policy and more specifically urban 
road pricing. 
2 
e as an explanation of the situation with respect to urban road pricing; and 
9 in assisting practitioners in decision-making in the light of both the existing literature and 
the research findings. 
Given the fact that there are only a few schemes in existence world wide how should 
decision-making proceed, bearing in mind the public and political misgivings, if the aim is 
ultimately one of implementing road pricing in urban areas of the UK. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature in terms of the environment in which urban road pricing and 
decision-making take place. It deals with issues which require careful consideration at the 
decision-making stage if urban road pricing is to be acceptable or saleable (Ison 1998a). This 
literature can be divided intofive main areas, namely: 
the local environment in which urban road pricing is being considered; 
e -key issues of principle and practice with respect to urban road pricing. Issues such as the 
use of the revenue raised from an urban road pricing scheme, equity and road user's 
privacy; 
* the type of technology under consideration; 
the selling of the policy; 
9 the role of a catalyst. 
Urban road pricing appears to be economically beneficial and technically feasible and in fact 
most researchers have focused primarily on the analytical soundness of urban road pricing 
proposals (Rom 1994). It would ostensibly appear that issues need to be resolved in the 
political arena if urban road pricing schemes are to be adopted in the UK, and in fact other 
areas throughout the world. International experience suggests that winning approval for urban 
road pricing is a difficult task. It can arouse opposition simply because it represents a 
dramatic change in existing arrangements (Gomez-Ibanez and Small 1994). 
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Chapter 3 reviews the theory of decision-making. There are a number of schools of thought 
with regards to the analysis of decision-making. Analysis of decision-making are accounts 
which claim to explain or describe how a decision, or series of decisions, came to be made or 
are likely to be made. Of the array of models this thesis has identified the incremental 
approach as the most plausible account of what is happening in terms of urban road pricing 
decision-making and as a prescription to bring about the best outcome. The incremental 
model portrays decision-making as a process of bargaining and compromise among self- 
interested decision-makers. The decisions that are eventually made represent what is 
politically feasible rather than desirable. While the literature pertaining to urban road pricing 
decision-making (chapter 2) is rather general in nature it does imply an incremental, 
gradualist, step-by-step approach. As such, this approach forms the central tenet of the thesis. 
Chapter 4 provides the methodological underpinning of the thesis and from this, the basis for 
empirical investigations which have been carried out. These include a national urban road 
traffic survey and face to face interviews with Councillors and Officials who had first hand 
experience of the first ever trial of an urban road pricing scheme in the UK, namely 
congestion metering in the city of Cambridge. It concludes with the research objective, 
namely that 'An incremental approach is the most appropriate in terms of urban road pricing 
decision-making in the UK'. 
At the macro-level Chapter 5 draws on a national survey undertaken of 'key stakeholders' in 
the decision-making process at the local level, namely Officials and Councillors (County, 
Metropolitan Borough and London Borough). In addition, the survey targets those who have 
an influence on decision-making namely academics (Economists, Planners and Civil 
Engineers) and various road user interest groups. Does the evidence at the national level 
corroborate an incremental approach in terms of this area of public policy? 
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Chapters 6 and 7 concentrate more specifically at the micro-level, on an urban road pricing 
scheme, namely congestion metering, as trialled in the city of Cambridge. In terms of urban 
road pricing schemes and pricing road traffic in general, congestion metering represents only 
&one point in the matrix'. It was however the first ever trial of an urban road pricing scheme 
in the UK, being a sophisticated 'big-bang', high tech approach to the problem of urban 
traffic congestion. It provides an ideal basis from which to study decision-making and urban 
road pricing. It concludes with an appraisal of what lessons can be learrit in terms of decision- 
making and the eventual implementation of an urban road pricing scheme in the UK. 
Chapters 8,9 and 10 analyse the: 
9 findings, based on the research undertaken; 
e theoretical and empirical contributions and limitations to the debate on decision-making 
and urban road pricing: and the 
9 recommendations for further research. 
Finally, Chapter 11 assesses the conclusions for policy and how a model of decision-making 
can be useful both as an explanation of the situation with respect to urban road pricing and in 
assisting practitioners in decision-making in the light of the existing literature and these 
research findings. 
In the area of policy research it is possible to utilise the typology developed by Gordon et al 
(1977). This typology is useful in explaining the type of research undertaken as part of this 
thesis. The typology distinguishes between analysis for policy and analysis of policy and this 
can be viewed as a continuum as illustrated in Table 1.1. On the one hand, analysis for policy 
refers to the production of practical knowledge to be applied to actual policy contexts and 
situations. On the other, analysis of Policy refers to those analytical studies which attempt to 
understand policy from an academic perspective (Marinetto 1999). 
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Table 1.1 Typology of policy analysis 
Analysisfor policy Analysis (? f policy 
Policy Information Policy Analysis Analysis of 
advocacy for policy monitoring and of policy Policy 
evaluation determination content 
Source: Gordon et al (1977) 
As for the sub-headings given in Table 1.1, in terms of analysis. for policy: 
Policy advocacy: denotes research aimed at policy makers which could involve challenging 
existing policies. As such, the research findings toward a particular conclusion can be offered 
as a recommendation. 
Information fi)r policy: is a mode where the researcher's task is one of providing policy 
makers with information and perhaps advice. This involves research which intends to feed 
into policy making activities but it Is less narrowly prescriptive than policy advocacy. It 
assumes a case for action, either in terms of the introduction of a new policy or the revision 
of an existing one. The research inay suggest definite policy options, informing the 
development of policy. 
pojjtýy monitoring and eveduation: may involve analysis which examines how policies and 
programmes have performed against policy goals and what impact a policy may have on a 
particular problem. 
icy: In terms of analysis q 'poli 
Analysis qfpolicy dete"nination: involves analysis that is concerned with how policy is 
made, why, when and in whose interest. In other words, the emphasis here is upon the inputs 
and trans formational processes operating upon the construction of public policy. Focusing on 
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the factors that shape the development of a policy issue. As such, attempts to analyse the 
policy process are inescapably based upon explicit or implicit models of the policy system. 
Analysis of policy content. ý is a category of activity which may include a description of a 
particular policy and how it developed in relation to other earlier policies, or it may be 
informed by a value framework which seeks to offer a critique of policy. While the results 
may help inform. policy makers, this is not usually an explicit aim of the research since it is 
conducted for academic advancement. rather than public impact. 
The two fields of policy analysis, namely analysis for and analysis of policy are by no means 
mutually exclusive. As such, the thesis seeks to encompass two aspects of the continuum 
namely information for policy and an analysis of policy determination. This will involve: 
ea theoretical contribution through an analysis of how policy is made, based on the 
incremental model of decision-making; and 
* assisting policy makers with information via the research findings, informing the 
development of policy. 
1.1.0 Road traffic in urban areas. 
Urban traffic is currently a pressing problem and as such a key political issue in towns and 
cities throughout the UK, both in terms of congestion and its associated environmental effects 
(Button 1990, Jones 199 1, Jones and Hervik 1992, Ernmerink et al 1995). Jones (1998) states 
that 'various opinion surveys carried out in the UK in the last few years have confirmed that 
traffic congestion, and the road safety and environmental implications of traffic, are at the 
forefront of most people's minds. Nationally, around 80 per cent of adults regard current 
traffic levels in general as posing a 'Very' or 'Fairly Serious' problem. Concern about traffic- 
related problems rises to an overwhelming 95 per cent when people are asked about 
congestion and pollution in larger towns and cities'. Congestion is also a concern of the 
Government who state in a recent consultation paper that 'Congestion is a serious problem in 
7 
many towns and cities in the main morning and evening peak periods, and for much of the 
day in inner and central London' (DETR 1998a). 
An example of this is illustrated in Table 1.2 which shows that the average traffic speed in 
central London during the morning and evening peak periods was 14.2 mph and 13.2 mph 
respectively in 1974-1976. By 1996, the average speeds had fallen to 10.0 mph and 10.2 mph 
respectively. Such speeds have implications in terms of its cost to road users. Placing a 
monetary value on such costs and its environmental damage is however fraught with 
difficulty and as such any monetary estimates should be treated with caution. Even so, 
calculations have been attempted and they do provide a valuable, if broad, indicator of the 
costs involved. For example, in 1989 the Confederation of British Industry estimated that the 
delays on the M25 costs fI bn per annum and that London's inadequate transport system costs 
the nation in the region of E15bn per annurn, almost two thirds of which relates to London 
and the South East. 
Table 1.2 Average traffic speeds in the Central area of London: 1974-1996 (Miles per 
hour) 
Years Morning peak period Evening peak period 
1974-1976 14.2 13.2 
1977-1979 12.3 11.9 
1980-1982 12.1 12.2 
1983-1986 11.8 11.5 
1986-1990 11.5 11.0 
1990-1994 10.3 10.3 
1994-1996 10.9 10.8 
1996- 10.0 10.2 
Source: Adapted from Department of the Environment, Transport and the Region 
( 1998) Transport Statistics Great Britain 1999. 
more recent Report by NERA (1997) also provides estimates of' the cost of congestion to 
road users in Great Britain. It suggests that previous estimates are basically 'back-of-the- 
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envelope' calculations and according to NERA, the total cost of road congestion to road users 
was Obn in 1996. NERA disaggregate this figure to show f-5bn being borne by the private 
motorist, f 1.2bn by van and lorry operators and f700m by bus and coach operators and 
passengers. If wider environmental issues are considered then as expected the costs are much 
greater. For example, Table 1.3 shows broad estimates of social and environmental costs cited 
by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution - Eighteenth Report (1997). It reveals a 
wide range of estimates from f8bn to f 32bn per annum. 
Since urban traffic congestion and its related environmental effects are perceived as a 
problem, the question then arises as to what are the alternative constraining strategies? 
Table 1.3 Road Transport: quantified environmental and social costs 
f billion per annum in 1994 Eighteenth Newbery 2 Maddison and 
prices Great Britain Report' Pearce3 
" air pollution 2.0-5.2 2.8-7.4 19.7 
" climate change 1.5-3.1 0.4 0.1 
" noise & vibration 1.0-4.6 0.6 2.6-3.1 
total environmental costs 4.6-12.9 3.8-8.4 22.4-22.9 
e road accidents 5.4 4.5-7.5 2.9-9.4 
quantified social & 
environmental costs other than 10-0-18.3 8.3-15.9 25.3-32.3 
congestion costs 
congestion costs 4 110t IIICIU(ic(l 19.1 19.1 
Total road transport 27.4-35.0 44.4-51.4 
externalities 
Note: 
I. Royal Commission on Environment Pollution (1994), 
2. Newbery (1995) 
3. Maddi son et al ( 1996) 
4. The cost ot'delays to road users and operators and increased running costs at slow 
speeds in congested conditions. 
5. Not including the cost of darnage by vehicles to roads, which both Ncwbery and 
Maddison and Pearce included in the total; the Eighteenth Report showed separately 
the costs ol'providing, maintaining and operating roads. 
Source: Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Twentieth Report, Transport 
and the Environment - Developments Since 1994, (1997). 
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1.2.0 Policy instruments. 
In response to the growing problem of urban traffic congestion a number of policy options 
have been put forward to restrain traffic, most notably parking controls, public transport 
improvements and better traffic management. It is important to state at this point that 'they 
are often seen as instruments for tackling several problems rather than being directed 
specifically at traffic congestion' (Button 1998). Table 1.4 identifies a number of strategies 
which have been adopted or considered as a means of dealing with the demand- or supply- 
side of traffic growth in urban areas in the UK. Demand-side measures are designed to reduce 
the dependency on, and the demand to travel by, motor vehicles, through improved 
alternatives or market based instruments. Supply-side measures are intended to increase the 
existing capacity as a means of improving the flow of traffic for all modes (OECD 1994). 
Table 1.4 Classification of the major congestion management measures. 
Types of measure Strategy Classification Measures 
LAND-USE Land use & transportation str tegey 
COMMUNICATIONS Telecommuting 
SUBSTITUTES Tele-Conferencing 
Tele-Slio ping 
TRAVELLER INFORMATION Pre-Trip Travel Information 
SERVICES Regional Rideshare Matching 
Urban road pricing 
DEMAND -Sll)l, ', Parking pricing 0 
ECONOMIC MEASURF. S Transit & Rideshare Financial Incentives 
Public Transport Pass Programmes 
Increasing petrol prices 
ADMINISTRATIVI' Alternative Work Schedules 
MEASURES Auto Restricted Zones 
Parking Management 
ROADTRAFFIC Travc1lor Information Systems 
OPERATION Traffic Signalisation Ini rovernents 
Bus lanes 
SUPPLY-SIDE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT Bicycle & Pedestrian Facilities 
Bicycle Traffic Signal Pre-Eniption 
Selective Expansion of'Road Construction 
PUBLIC TRANSPORT Park & Ride Facilities 
OPERATIONS Service Improvements 
Public Transport linage 
Source: Adapted from the classiflications used by the OECD (1994) 
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Within the UK the measures iternised in Table 1.4 have been adopted or promoted, to a 
greater or lesser extent with the exception of urban road pricing. Each of these policies can 
produce important benefits but according to Small et al (1989) 'Numerous policies have been 
proposed to reduce urban highway congestion. Among them are ride sharing, operational 
improvements to road systems, higher parking fees, measures to encourage transit use, and 
better land-use planning. Each of these policies can produce important benefits, as several 
comprehensive and thoughtful analyses show. Nothing in our analysis refutes their value in 
improving urban life. But none of them will eliminate, or even substantially reduce, the 
severe congestion characterising most of the nation's economically vital urban landscape. 
This view is more and more frequently espoused by transportation experts, whose pessimism 
is beginning to pervade the news media as well'. 
This is the view currently put forward by the Government '... experience has shown that 
existing traffic management measures, whilst necessary, are not sufficient in many cases to 
tackle the problems of congestion and pollution, and the situation can only be expected to get 
worse given forecast traffic growth. ' They go on to say that 'In particular, traffic authorities 
do not currently have powers to charge motorists for driving on roads in their area.... (and) 
Road user charging will offer traffic authorities a means of reducing congestion and pollution 
directly through the price mechanism' (DETR 1998a). 
Increasingly therefore the issue of urban road pricing is receiving attention. As stated by 
Walters (1987) and quoted at the beginning of this chapter 'The best policy to deal with urban 
road congestion is likely to be some form of road pricing'. This is a view supported by Small 
et al (1989) who believe not only that urban road pricing 'will work but that the time may be 
right for a new political consensus incorporating it into a highway financing package'. 
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There is extensive literature by academics and transport practitioners as well as positional 
documents from professional bodies namely the Chartered Institute of Transport (1990,1992) 
and the Institution of Civil Engineers (1989) analysing the economic underpinning of urban 
road pricing, the technical feasibility and the pros and cons of various schemes. Urban road 
pricing has a long history stretching back in the economic literature to the mid-19th century 
with the work of Dupuit (1844), Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924). There was a revitalisation 
in the interest of urban road pricing as an intellectual idea in the 1960s, especially with the 
work of Walters (1961) and the Smeed Report (Ministry of Transport 1964). The situation is 
currently as stated by Orski (1992) that 'After years of languishing in semi-obscurity, the 
concept of congestion pricing has emerged into the sunlight. Spurred by growing concerns 
about congestion and by new federal air quality requirements, the principle of charging 
drivers for the use of congested roads is once again receiving serious attention'. Over the 
years there has been little change in the 'logic and rationale' which justifies urban road 
pricing. There has however been a change in the severity of congestion and the associated 
environmental concern (Grieco and Jones 1994). In saying this however, the history of urban 
road pricing is littered with proposals for schemes which have not been implemented 
following field trials or have advanced little beyond the drawing board. 
As stated, the emphasis has been on using the 'soft' options to contain traffic problems (Jones 
and Hervik 1994) such as using congestion itself as a restraint or relying on a number of the 
policy options illustrated in Table 1.4 
2. According to Jones and Hervik (1994) however these 
are proving to be short-term palliatives rather than long-term solutions. The alternatives to 
urban road pricing are labelled 'second best instruments' by Emmerink et al (1995) although 
it is broadly accepted that there is no one solution to these problems (May 1991). 
2 one reason for this could be the fact that decision-makers, anticipating concern from various interest 
groups, will often solicit their views. As a result public participation in the planning process often has a 
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In recent years interest in urban road pricing has risen up the political agenda (Ison 1996a). 
1.3.0 Reasons for shifting ground with respect to urban road pricing. 
Whilst there are those who argue that the time for urban road pricing 'may never come', 
(Borins 1988) there does appear to be a shifting of ground primarily as a result of 3: 
1.3.1 growing concern with the level of congestion in urban areas throughout the world 
(Grieco and Jones 1994, Small et al 1989) and international doubts raised about road 
construction as a contemporary solution to the problem; 
1.3.2 growing concern about the effect of road transport on airpollution and environmental 
degradation in towns and cities throughout the world; 
1.3.3 the development of new technology 'has greatly facilitated the adoption and 
implementation of efficient and effective demand management' (Grieco and Jones 1994). As 
stated by Orski (1992) 'the emergence of a new family of Intelligent Vehicle Highway 
Systems technologies has made peak period pricing of highway travel technically and 
economically feasible'; 
1.3.4 the increasingly stringentfinancial constraints under which authorities are operating 
and thus a realisation of the revenue-raising qualities of urban road pricing. As such, 'drivers 
have been identified as a possible source of revenue to pay for the infrastructure from which 
they themselves would benefit' (May 1992). In other words 'fiscal realities' (Small et al 
1989). 
in addition, Grieco and Jones (1994) and Orski (1992) argue that the culture of privatisation 
and the market philosophy has created pressure towards ensuring that the user and not the tax 
conservative bias (Howitt 1980). 
3 For example, see articles such as Jones and Hervik (1992), May (1992), Grieco and Jones (1994) and Ison 
(1998a). 
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payer provides the service. As such urban road pricing fits naturally into this 'economic 
logiC94 
1.4.0 Objectives of Urban Road Pricing. 
In line with the previous section, three main objectives of urban road pricing can be identified 
(Jones and Hervik 1992, May 1992). These are: 
1.4.1 The economic objective, which relates to how efficiently the congested network is 
utilised. When undertaking a journey, a motorist is not likely to take account of the 
congestion cost of that journey and may in fact only consider his or her own marginal private 
cost (MPQ. There can, however, be costs incurred on other road users which the individual 
motorist will not take into account. By introducing a road price equal to the difference 
between the MPC and the marginal social cost (MSC) of a journey it would ensure that a 
more efficient allocation of scarce resources was achieved. This would coincide with the 
point where the marginal benefit, as measured by the demand curve is equal to the MSC. As 
stated by Newbery (1990) 'As road space is a valuable and scarce resource, it is natural that 
economists should argue that it should be rationed by price - road users should pay the 
marginal social cost of using the road network if they are to make the right decisions about 
whether (and by which means) to take a particular journey, and, more generally, to ensure that 
they make the correct allocative decisions between transport and other activities'. The 
economic underpinning of urban road pricing is analysed in more detail in Appendix 1. In 
terms of the 'congestion' objective, then as stated, urban road pricing has long been 
advocated as the best way of dealing with the problem, bridging the gap between MPC and 
MSC (as illustrated in Appendix 1). The more sophisticated the scheme, as facilitated 
through smart card technology, then the closer it is likely to get to the Pareto optimum 
solution. This is one reason for the interest in congestion metering as trialled in the city of 
4 See Roth (1996), Fielding and Klein (1993), Heggie and Vickers (1998) on the financing of highways. 
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Cambridge 'charging as and when congestion occurs'. However, what is the most efficient 
and 'economically pure' as an urban road pricing scheme is also likely to be less popular 
politically. There is thus a dilemma in that the more sophisticated scheme is more likely to 
change driver behaviour, whereas the less sophisticated is likely to be more acceptable. 
1.4.2 There is a road pricing objective which in recent years has received attention, namely 
that of reducing environmental externalities. This involves the utilisation of road pricing to 
embrace non-congestion costs such as pollution, noise, visual intrusion and accidents (Jones- 
Lee 1990, Verhoef 1994). As an objective, however, this goes beyond the role envisaged for 
road pricing in its original and pure form. In saying this it could be argued that road pricing 
should embrace all forms of externalities including environmental costs as well as the costs of 
congestion (Button 1991); 
1.4.3 A ýpotential' objective of a road pricing policy is that of raising revenue for 
infrastructure investment. 
This thesis will concentrate on urban congestion as the main objective of urban road pricing, 
with respect to decision-making and ultimately the acceptance of urban road pricing in a UK 
setting urban road pricing may need to appeal to a 'broad church' and as such issues relating 
to the environment and revenue generation will also require consideration. 
1.5.0 Defining urban road pricing. 
The term 'urban road pricing' requires clarification. The literature (May 1992) is festooned 
with terms used to describe the imposition of a charge on moving traffic. Terms such as road- 
use pricing, congestion charging, congestion pricing, road-user charging and congestion 
metering have all been used. 
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Table 1.5 Five urban road pricing options. 
9 Congestion Metering 
Charge which reflects the congestion catised by each driver. The charge would vary according 
to traffic conditions, both across the charoed area and bv time. 
Time Based Ulharging 
A version of' congestion metering,, In which the charge Is directly proportional to the time 
spent travc1linL, within the atca. 
Distance Based ('harging 
Drivers are chanlcd directly Im t1h, di"lancc tla\ ClIcd \\ 1111111 the chan-'ed arca. Z7 
Point Based, or ('ordon, (Iiarging 
Drivers are charged ýý hen they pass a point \\ hich forms part of it continumis boundary for a 
s stein of' cells. Or cordolis encircling areas. or screenlines dividing in area or separating y Z7' 
two areas. Charge levels can vary hy the direction of travel. 
9 Supplementary Licences 
Supplementary licences, foi- \\ hich a t-hai, -, c is Ic\ ickt, can he reciiiii-cd to either enter an arca (an entry permit) or to be within an area, (Itiring it specific period (an area licence). While 
electronic devicesrtags-) cotild be tised, the conventional concept is a paper based licence. 
or "sticker". 
Source: The London Congestion Charging Research Programme, London HNISO 1995. 
The term 'urban road pricing' Is well established in Ilic field of transport economics S where it 11 
usually refers to setting the price equal to the social marginal cost of a trip. This is dealt with 
in more detail in Appendix 1, where, in economic terms the congestion price ensures that only 
economically justified Journeys are undertaken (see Vickery 1963 and Walters 1971). As 
such, it can be viewed as a first best instrument for tackling congestion (Eninierink et al 
1995). In practice however (lie first best solution may be difficult to achieve. According to 
Button and Verhoef ( 1998) -Fhe basic concept is deceptively easy, apply the price mechanism 
in the same way as it applies elsewhere'. This would place road users on a slinflar basis as the 
use of many private facilities such as hotels. telephones, electricity and airline, which charge 
higher prices during periods ol'peak LiCniand. 
" For example see Morrison 1986. 
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In terms of traffic engineers and transport planners according the Jones and Hervik (1992) the 
phrase road pricing has taken on a generic meaning to refer to the imposition of direct charges 
on road use, with a variety of objectives in mind. For example, Grieco and Jones (1994) 
define road pricing 'as a road-user charge introduced explicitly to make drivers pay for the 
costs of congestion and other externalities that they impose on other road users'. Table 1.5 
outlines five possible urban road pricing schemes involving various time periods, areas and 
means of charging. Thesefive bases by which pricing could be levied where examined as part 
of the London Congestion Charging Research Programme (1995). Reference will be made in 
more detail to a number of these schemes in the thesis. The conventional terrn urban road 
pricing will be used throughout, except where reference is made to a specific type of urban 
road pricing scheme such as congestion metering. 
Whilst the theoretical basis for urban road pricing has been clearly enunciated, (see Appendix 
1), sound economic rationale does not guarantee in itself political acceptability (Orski 1992). 
This is a line also taken by Emmerink et al (1995) in that 'although on theoretical grounds it 
can be easily shown that congestion pricing is a first-best solution for efficiently dealing with 
congestion, this instrument cannot yet boost much public and political support'. In fact, if 
urban road pricing is treated only as a matter of efficiency then it will jeopardise its 
implementation (Langmyhr 1997). The issue of acceptability is not confined solely to the UK. 
As stated by Rom (1994) 'Congestion pricing programs appear to be economically beneficial 
and technically feasible. Political issues must also be resolved, however, if congestion pricing 
programs are to be adopted in the United States'. 
proposals to introduce urban road pricing in any town or city are, to use Howitt's terminology 
(1980) "fragile" initiatives. The reason is that neither the citizens nor interest groups propose 
urban road pricing schemes - they tend to be only considered seriously when raised by 
government. To follow this approach, by the time planning is under way, opposition is likely 
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to develop from interests that feel threatened or from politicians who believe the proposal will 
not be acceptable to the electorate. When the proposal receives publicity then often policy- 
makers and politicians will receive complaints from citizens about the cost, unfairness and 
inconvenience of the scheme. In contrast rarely do any supporters mobilise spontaneously. 
Thus if any policy such as urban road pricing is to be accepted, officials must face attack 
without the support of the constituency. The reason according to Howitt is that first, citizens 
act defensively, responding more to threats than to opportunities. Second it is difficult to 
organise people to seek a 'collective' or 'public' good from which they would benefit 
regardless of their contribution to securing it. Thirdly, citizens tend to be more sensitive to 
immediate or short run costs and benefits than to the long run impact. Finally, individuals are 
more likely to take political action when they perceive that policy effects are the direct 
consequence of specific government action than when impacts are indirect. 
The following chapter reviews the research literature with respect to urban road pricing 
decision-making. 
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Chapter 2 Urban Road Pricing Decision-Making: A Review of the 
Research Literature. 
"Issues of public and political acceptability should be at the forefront when debating and 
designing road pricing schemes - and not left as an afterthought, once a scheme has been 
selected on other grounds " 
(Jones 1998) 
2.0.0 Introduction. 
A review of the literature relating to urban road pricing decision-making raises a number of 
key issues. The literature falls into three categories. First, the evidence obtained from urban 
road pricing schemes which are either in existence, notably Area Licensing in. Singapore 
introduced in 19751 and the Norwegian toll-ring schemes, or have been considered but have 
failed to be implemented, notably Rekening Rijden in the Netherlands and Electronic Road 
pricing Hong Kong 2. Second, that of academics, who have suggested various strategies to 
enhance the decision-making process with regards to urban road pricing. This is based on 
experience, conjecture and an expert understanding of the field. 
3 Thirdly, from the limited 
number of attitude surveys which have been undertaken in the UK dealing, amongst other 
things, with the issue of the acceptability of urban road pricing. In the following sections each 
of these three areas is elaborated. 
ne issues raised in terms of urban road pricing and the situation in which decision-making is 
undertaken can be divided into a number of discrete though interrelated areas, namely: 
the local environment; 
1 Now an Electronic Road Pricing scheme. 
2 Note that the evidence from the trial of congestion metering in Cambridge forms the basis of 
chapters 6 and 7. 
3 For example, this includes papers by Goodwin (1989), Small (1992) and Grieco and Jones (1994). 
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the standpoint of 'key stakeholders' in relation to certain issues. Issues that would make 
urban road pricing more acceptable or saleable (Ison 1998a) and as such require careful 
consideration in the decision-making process if a scheme is to have any chance of being 
implemented; 
the perception with respect to the type of technology utilised; 
9 the 'selling' of an urban road pricing scheme; and 
9 the role of a local leader, acting as a catalyst. 
As such, each will be dealt with in turn drawing on the literature in each case. 
2.1.0 The local environment. 
Successful decision-making in terms of urban road pricing is in part dependant on the local 
environment in which a scheme is being considered. This refers to the severity of congestion, 
the quality of air, whether alternative policies have been exhausted, and whether a package of 
measures have been adopted. The local conditions could be such, that an urban road pricing 
scheme is seriously considered. 
2.1.1 The severity of congestion. 
Higgins (1994) states that congestion pricing is only likely to succeed in conditions of severe 
congestion. He cites three reasons for this: 
1. Since the concept is new and controversial then both the public and the decision makers 
will look to alternatives in the first instance to remedy less severe congestion problems; 
2. The cost of implementation can only be justified where congestion is sufficiently severe 
that the benefits of reduced congestion outweigh the cost of the programme; 
3. Travellers are more likely to find greater alternatives and other demand management 
options in severally congested areas. This line is supported by Gomez-Ibanez (1992) and 
also Dittmar et al (1994) in the context of the San Francisco Bay Bridge corridor where a 
number of transit alternatives exist for peak period travellers. 
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As regards the severity of congestion then with respect to Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) in 
Hong Kong the position of the Automobile Association was that the problem had been 
exaggerated (Borins 1988) and "the fact that the increases in licence fees had led to a 
reduction in congestion from 1982 levels led many board members to feel that there was no 
immediate danger of a congestion crisis" (Borins 1988). This view is reinforced by Dawson 
(1986)-and Pretty (1988) who states that "one cannot help but think that this has been an 
attempt to impose new technology where the political situation would allow it, but where the 
need for the scheme may be disappearing". Hau (1990) also viewed the timing as being one of 
the reasons for the failure to implement ERP in Hong Kong. The opening of new 
infrastructure developments such as the Mass Transit Rail, a decline in the rate of economic 
growth with its impact on car use, and fiscal measures introduced in 1982, all meant that the 
level of congestion had improved somewhat. This could therefore be viewed as the wrong 
backdrop against which to introduce a radical new policy if the desire was to progress beyond 
the experimental stage. Alternatively, the situation in the Bay Bridge area of San Francisco 
according to Dittmar et al (1994) is uniquely suited to a congestion pricing demonstration 
since current congestion is high with peak period traffic volumes exceeding the physical 
capacity of the bridge. 
In terms of the cities of Oslo and Bergen, excessive congestion was in fact perceived as a 
major reason for toll cordons (Larsen 1995). 
Surveys which have been undertaken with respect to the severity of congestion have tended to 
be national' in nature. They do however give important insights into the public perception of 
the problem. A comparison of 12 National surveys of public attitudes to traffic related issues 
(Jones 1991b) showed that approximately 80 per cent viewed the current traffic levels as 
posing a 'very' or 'fairly serious' problem. In London, the importance of traffic congestion 
was rated even more highly than in the national surveys. 
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The Lex Report on Motoring (1996) also showed that congestion was a major problem, as 
illustrated in Table 2.1. As might be expected, there are significant differences in the problem 
of congestion in different localities. For example, when asked 'During peak times, how much 
of a problem would you say road congestion is in the area 5 miles around where you liveT 
then 35 per cent and 40 per cent of city dwellers said 'very bad' and 'fairly bad' respectively. 
For London it was 38 per cent and 34 per cent, for town dwellers 27 per cent and 31 per cent 
and for country dwellers it was 9 per cent and 24 per cent respectively, however "despite this 
most drivers would put up with congestion getting much worse before they would change 
their travel patterns" (Lex 1996). This is illustrated by the fact that 60 per cent and above 
indicated that they would continue to use their car even if congestion doubled their travel 
times. In connection with work, 82 per cent said that they would continue to use their car. 
Overall therefore radical proposals can fail "because congestion has not yet become 
unbearable" (Elliott 1986). This is the line supported by Jones (1998) in that the lack of need 
for road pricing is argued on the basis that 'Road traffic conditions are not bad enough to 
warrant the use of such an extreme measure, people would rather put up with the delays'. 
Z1.2 Air quality considerations. 
In addition to the severity of congestion the quality of air is an important factor which makes 
urban road pricing more acceptable than it has been in the past (Gomez-Ibanez 1992). It is 
certainly the case that an increase in the awareness of environmental issues has considerable 
implications for both decision-makers and the public as to the most appropriate transport 
policy to use (Grieco and Jones 1994). Jones (1993) argues that motorists perceive 
congestion as an internalised cost and as such stressing the environmental externalities of 
motoring may be more effective in developing policies. 
In terms of urban congestion and air pollution, the Lex Report on Motoring (1996) asked 
motorists what they viewed as the major problems associated with road travel and which 
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issues they were most concerned about. The results are shown in Table 2.1 (a) and (b) and 
indicate that congestion in towns and cities and air pollution were perceived as maýjor 
problems, with sornewhat less concern about traffic congestion on motorways, the safety of 
pedestrians and cyclists and the impact on global warming of car fumes and car production. 
These apply for drivers and non-drivers. In terms of the 'most concern' then air pollution 
came out on top. 
Table 2.1 Concerns about road travel. 
% agreeing issues are a major problem Drivers Non-drivers 
Traffic congestion in towns and cities 72 67 
Air pollution 71 75 
Traffic congestion on main roads and rnotorways 49 44 
The safety of pedestrians and cyclists on the road 46 54 
Global warming from car fumes and car 39 49 
production 
The destruction of the countryside 36 49 
The safety of car users oil the roads 30 49 
None of these/don't know 30 36 
) issues people are most concerned about Drivcrs, Non-drivers 
Air pollution 35 34 
Traffic congestion in towns and cities 16 1 () 
The safety of pedestrians and cyclists on the road 13 20 
Traffic congestion on main roads and rnotorways 10 5 
Global warming frorn car furnes and car 89 
production 
The destruction of the Countryside 89 
The safety of car users on the roads 85 
None of these/don't know 27 
Note: Base: Drivers (1229) and Non-drivers (717) 
Source: 1996 Lex Report on Motoring "Listening to all Road Users"/MORI 
Given the extent of the problem, ultimately urban road pricing may be viewed as being far 
less onerous to motorists than more draconian measures which might bC used to reduce 
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vehicle use and pollution (Gomez-Ibanez 1992). This has important implications in terms of 
objective setting since air pollution rather than congestion may be the context in which urban 
road pricing is considered. 
ZL3 Exhaustion of alternative policies. 
A view expressed (Dawson 1986) is that an urban road pricing strategy is more likely to be 
implemented when all alternatives have been considered such that "Pricing should not be 
seen as a panacea, but rather a final element in a balanced transport policy once road- 
building, public transport and traffic management initiatives have been exhausted". 
The reason for this is illustrated by reference to Table 2.2, which relates to the level of 
support for different measures aimed at limiting traffic congestion in various national and 
London based surveys. It shows that the strongest support was for the provision of 
alternatives to car use, most notably Park and Ride schemes, the improvement in public 
transport and the encouragement of cycling and walking. Regulations are next, with better 
enforcement of parking, and restrictions on cars entering central areas receiving majority 
support. Support for more road building was expressed by about half the population but the 
introduction of some form of urban road pricing in inner and central city areas was generally 
only supported by a minority of those interviewed. A general increase in petrol tax was even 
less popular. The view (Jones 1991b) was that road pricing is being held in reserve as a 
$policy of last resort'. Jones (1998) returns to this point by stating that the lack of a need for 
road pricing can be argued on the grounds that 'Traffic containment or reduction is needed, 
but it could be better or more appropriately achieved in other ways. Either by simply 
improving modal alternatives (for example 'better public transport') or through the use of 
other restraint measures such as bans on road traffic in major shopping streets, or restrictions 
on access to certain parts of the road network. Something less 'draconian' will suffice'. 
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Table 2.2 Levels of support for different measures to limit traffic congestion in various 
national and London surveys. 
Measures National London 
0 Provision of park and 91 59 
ride services 
0 Improving or 88 86 63 48 36 69 1 St 86 65 69 
subsidising bus and rail 
schernes 
0 Encouraging car sharing 81 37 
or pooling 
0 Encouraging walking 77 73 33 78 69 
and cycling 
0 Banning or restricting 71 69 70 26 21 65 2nd 67 39 53 
cars in central areas 
0 Enforcing parking 66 74 3rd 
controls 
0 Building new 49 64 47 23 30 51 33 4th 47 
road s/motorw ays/c ar 
parks 
0 Charging drivers to 29 38 27 14 4 32 30- 34- 
enter busy city centres 55 46 
0 Taxing petrol more 21 4474 
Source: Jones (1991b) 
The Lex survey (1996), summarised in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Table 2.3 showed that the changes 
which would benefit drivers and non-drivcrs most were improving the bus, rail and train 
networks including Park and Ride schemes and also reducing the prices of buses and trains. 
Few in either group were of the opinion that building more roads and inotorways, or urban 
road pricing would benefit them personally. In terms of the environment however there was 
somewhat greater support for urban road pricing. 
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Table 2.3 Priorities for change in transport policy amongst the general public (% 
agreeing). 
Measures 
" Improve the bus, rail and trarn 
networks 
" Introduce more 'park and r1de' 
scherries in major towns and cities 
" Reduce the prices on buses and trains 
" Pedestrianise all town centres 
Reduce the speed limits in residential 
areas 
Build more town and city bypasses, 
but no more motorways 
Provide more cycle lanes and cycle 
parking facilities 
0 Build more lanes onto existing main 
roads and motorways 
0 60 rnph motorway speed limit strictly 
enforced 
0 Build more main roads and 
motorways 
" Charge people who want to drive 
into town centres 
Motorway tolls 
None ol'these 
Don't know 
Would benefit them Would benefit the 
personally environment 
Drivers Non- 
Drivers 
Drivers Non- 
Drivers 
43 50 39 33 
37 24 37 29 
35 58 24 25 
27 34 37 30 
25 40 20 21 
25 12 12 1 () 
18 22 30 28 
14 5 2 2 
13 12 20 13 
11 4 2 2 
10 9 16 14 
3 2 7 4 
7 5 2 2 
3 7 7 14 
Note: Base: Drivers (1229) and Non-drivers (717) 
Source: 1996 Lex Report on Motoring "Listening to all Road Users"/MORI 
In terms of support for policies then Table 2.4 shows that the strongest net support was for 
improving the public transport system and reducing prices on public transport. There was net 
opposition to urban road pricing but not as much as for the building of more main roads and 
motorways and widening existing roads. 
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Table 2.4 Net support for transport policies amongst the general public (% would 
support minus % would oppose) 
Measures Drivers Non-drivers 
0 Improve the bus. rail and trarn networks 46 49 
0 Reduce the prices on buses and trains 39 53 
0 Introduce more 'park and ride' schemes in major towns and 37 28 
cities 
0 Pedestrianise all town centres 28 30 
0 Provide more cycle lanes and cycle parking facilities 28 30 
0 Reduce the speed limits in residential areas 23 32 
a Build more town and city bypasses, but no more inotorways 12 -1 
0 60 rnph motorway speed limit strictly enforced -8 10 
0 Build more lanes onto existing main roads and motorways -9 -19 
0 Charge people who want to drive into town centres -10 -5 
0 Build more main roads and motorways -25 -37 
0 Motorway tolls -37 -19 
Note: Base: Drivers (1229) and Non-drivers (717) 
Source: 1996 Lex Report on Motoring "Listening to all Road Users"/MORI. 
An important point made by Jones (1991b) is that although opinion surveys are useful as ýj 
means of identifying measures which are popular with the public it does not mean they will 
be very effective. In fact, this popularity may be based on their ineffectiveness and lack of' 
imposition on the car-based traveller. In fact some motorists may support for example, better 
public transport in the belief that other drivers will use it and so leave more road space for 
them 
Research undertaken as part of the MIRO (Mobility Impacts Responses and Opinions) project 
(see Bartley 1995) provides evidence on public acceptance and efficiency of various policy 
options in terms of the city of Cambridge (Thorpe and Jaensirisak 1998). The study focused 
on 
a the levels of public acceptance and perceived effectiveness of packages of' travel-dernand 
measures aimed at reducing traffic -con gesti on in the city of Cambridge; 
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respondents' preferred allocation of the net revenues generated from the charging system; 
impacts on the public acceptance of road-user charging and increased city-centre parking 
charges following the guaranteeing of individuals' preferred allocation of net revenues; 
and 
the perceived fairness of alternative road-user charging regimes. 
In terms of acceptance four approaches were explored namely: 
" road user charging: charging vehicle-users for travelling into Cambridge and within the 
city centre; 
" improving public transport: for example, improving the quality and frequency of services 
for buses and trains, and reduced fares; 
" extra parking controls: reducing the number of spaces available and increasing the cost of 
parking in the centre of Cambridge; and 
" zone-access control: banning all private cars (except residents') from the centre of 
Cambridge. 
80 per cent of respondents felt that improving public transport was totally acceptable. 
Banning cars from the city centre was viewed as acceptable by only 20 per cent of 
respondents whereas for road user charging the figure was only in the region of 10 per cent. 
This is not too surprising given the restraint based nature of three of the approaches. 
In terms of how effective private car users in the sample considered packages of measures in 
reducing the frequency of private car use for trips into the city centre, then as might be 
expected, "banning private cars from the city centre combined with improved public transport 
would influence the travel decisions of more respondents than for any of the other three 
packages". 
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ZMA package of measures 
A related issue to the exhaustion of alternative policies is the view that success and 
acceptability depends on collateral actions that offset any negative impacts of a pricing 
scheme (Higgins 1994). Gillen (1994) suggests that failure to attend to collateral actions has 
been a key reason for the lack of support "Pricing is not a 'stand alone' strategy and should be 
introduced in conjunction with other policy tools as a package". As such, alternative transport 
services may have to be expanded in order to give the travellers affected by the pricing a 
choice of modes (Higgins 1994). 
Increased demand for public transport does not necessarily mean that its capacity must be 
expanded however as a condition for the introduction of congestion pricing (Higgins 1994). 
Better utilisation of under-utilised services is possible and also bus speeds and reliability may 
increase under pricing schemes (Kain 1994). 
Collateral action is important given the equity issues outlined below in section 2.2.2 and 
Higgins (1994) argues that they 'should be aimed as much as possible to remedy perceived 
inequities'. For example, Giuliano (1994) suggests that women are likely to suffer 
disproportionately since they frequently have less ability to vary their travel time because of 
inflexible work schedules and household responsibilities in addition to the likelihood of 
driving alone. The need for collateral action is proposed by Jones (1991 a) who views traffic 
restraint as an integral part of a package of measures to deal with future traffic growth. The 
NEDO survey (199 1) showed that the acceptability of urban road pricing increased as a policy 
option if its use was presented alongside policies such as improved public transport and road 
infrastructure paid for by the revenue raised from urban road pricin . 
Larsen (1995) suggests that one important reason why it was possible to introduce toll 
cordons in Norway was the need to improve the road network, with a simultaneous lack of 
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funds for this purpose. This is also the case in Singapore where the introduction of the Area 
Licensing Scheme (ALS) was part of an overall package of measures including an 
improvement in the public transport network involving Park and Ride provision (Holland 
and Watson 1978). 
2.1.5 the husiness community 
In addition to the acceptance by the general public, the business community must also accept, 
or at least not reject, urban road pricing. The business community's concerns include the 
possible increase in delivery costs, the possible need to increase wages or employee parking 
subsidies to compensate for the higher commuting costs, or the need to shift employee work 
schedules, and possible competitive disadvantage with similar firrns located outside the 
priced zone (Higgins 1994). According to Small et al (1989) the fear of an adverse effect on 
business is in part because they fail to recognise the offsetting positive effects which can be 
generated from urban road pricing revenue. In addition, if regional centres compete with each 
other, as (say) shopping centres. (Higgins 1994) then concern is expressed over the division 
of business activity from one centre to another. In such a situation, urban road pricing across 
several centres may be necessary. 
Finally, in terms of the local level, an interesting aside argued by Grieco and Jones (1994) is 
that the investigation 'municipality by municipality' allows for a more incremental approach 
to urban road pricing and as such "reduces the prospect of a comprehensive national political 
backlash capable of placing a moratorium on road pricing schemes". 
2.2.0 Standpoint of key players in terms of certain issues 
number of issues are raised in the literature. 
4 See the section 2.2.3 entitled 'Use of the Revenue' for a full explanation. 
30 
ZZI Being chargedfor congestion. 
According to Jones (1998) 'many drivers react strongly against the idea that they should be 
charged on the basis of the amount of congestion they encounter ... this seems to them to be 
irrational and inappropriate'. The reasons put forward are: 
* People expect to be charged for things they wish to acquire, not the things they wish to 
avoid; 
* Most drivers see themselves as victims of congestion, not contributors to it; 
* There is concern that any attempt to charge drivers directly in proportion to the congestion 
they are experiencing would encourage bad driving and would increase stress and traffic 
accidents. 
2.2.2 Equity 
Market based solutions inevitably stimulate equity based opposition and therefore issues of 
acceptability (Langmyhr 1997). The idea can be summed up in the phrase 'It isn't fair' (Jones 
1998). - It is important to recognise that changes in transport policy impact upon different 
elements within society, there are winners and losers (Banister 1994). There is therefore a 
need to ensure equity in the distribution of the benefits and the allocation of the harms that 
result from a policy initiative (Hosmer 1996). He concludes "it is no longer possible to 
consider only the aggregate benefit to society in determining the policies that should govern 
that movement and the designs that should facilitate it" (Hosmer 1996). Richardson (1994) 
recommends that "Issues of equity, of who wins and who loses, are important considerations 
in the implementation of transportation policy and technology". 
It is important to note (Rom 1994) that it is almost impossible to design a congestion pricing 
program that is both completely equitable and administratively feasible5. Equally, in the 
This point is stressed by May (1992) in that "It has to be accepted that any form of road pricing will 
introduce some inequities. The key is to keep these to a minimum, and to find ways of compensating 
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discussion of urban road pricing an implicit assumption is made that the status quo is 
equitable and that the assessment of equity outcomes are made on the basis of changes from 
this status quo and not from any absolute standard (Rom 1994). As such individuals are 
typically more sensitive to the equity of changes in conditions than they are about the equity 
of cuffent conditions. It is certainly the case that individuals are more likely to perceive new 
costs rather than new benefits. In addition they are likely to view costs as certain and benefits 
as uncertain and are more likely to engage in political opposition to new costs rather than to 
support new benefits (Rom 1994). As such, even when the costs and benefits of a proposed 
programme are equal, elected politicians may view the political costs as higher than the 
political benefits. It may be however that a 'entrepreneurial leader' might persuasively argue 
that some policy is essential even though the benefits are diffuse and its costs concentrated 
(Rom 1994). 
Equity was perceived as a problem in the Hong Kong experiment (Pretty 1988) since a small 
proportion of the traffic was being asked to pay a large sum. This raises the issue of 
exemptions which would appear to be an important concern when considering the 
implementation of an urban road pricing scheme (see section 2.3.4) 
it is likely to be the case that any form of urban road pricing will lead to some inequities (May 
1992). It is however interesting to note that Giuliano (1992) argues that equity and 
distributional considerations are not particularly important with regards to public acceptance. 
She states that "distributional equity may present an apparently legitimate basis for opposition 
that is actually motivated by other reasons". An issue which needs to be addressed in terms of 
the perception of urban road pricing is the benefit to society as a whole and to the individual 
who is affected by it (Banister 1994). 
those that remain". 
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223 Use of the revenue. 
The use to which the revenue generated from urban road pricing is put plays a crucial role 
(May 1992). Higgins (1994) argues that apparently a condition for public acceptance is the 
degree to which the urban road price relates to use and how revenues relate to perceived 
beneficial public purposes. According to Higgins such purposes could vary from clean air to 
highway improvements to reduced congestion, depending on the area. 
A major objection to urban road pricing is the perception that it is simply a way for the 
government to raise taxation (Downs 1992). It is certainly the case that the government 
should dispel any notion that urban road pricing is a revenue raising device (Hau 1992b). If 
this is the case then Higgins (1994) argues that an appropriate response 'may be to return 
congestion pricing revenues to taxpayers via a highly visible tax rebate or reductions in 
vehicle ownership and use taxes'. 
If all the revenue raised is not returned to motorists then it makes the politics of urban road 
pricing more problematic'. As such, Gomez-Ibanez (1992) argues that "the distribution of 
such enormous surpluses is likely to be politically controversial". This is based on the fact 
that the motorists who pay the charge are likely to scrutinise how the proceeds are utilised. 
According to Gomez-Ibanez (1992) "It would be undesirable to return most of the proceeds 
to motorists by investing them in highway or transit improvements since the surpluses often 
may be more of an accounting artefact than a sensible signal that added capacity is needed". 
Thus, in addition to returning part of the revenue to the motorist, primarily in the form of 
highway improvements, general tax relief might be acceptable. Hau (1992b) put forward the 
case for the revenue to be earmarked for transport in the form of a transport fund. As such, 
the motorist would be indirectly 'compensated' for the times when they are tolled off the 
6 Appendix I details the economic theoretical underpinning of urban road pricing and how the main 
beneficiary from urban road pricing is the authority. Section A. 4.0 reveals two groups affected by urban 
road pricing namely the tolled and the tolled off and as such the 
importance , theoretically, as to how the 
authority uses the revenue raised. 
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(Hau 1992b). The fact that the use to which the revenue is utilised is not a trouble free area is 
also noted by Higgins (1994) in the debate among certain interest groups over the revenue 
allocation from the proposed increases in San Francisco Bay Bridge tolls between 1990 and 
1992. "Legislators were divided on whether revenues for transit should go primarily to 
extensions of the regional rail system, the Bay Area Rapid Transit, in suburban areas or to 
increased transbay service and service rehabilitation". He suggests that if the same lesson 
applies to congestion pricing, agreement on revenue allocation is a necessary - but not easily 
obtained - condition for congestion pricing to work (Higgins 1994). Dittmar (1994) states that 
"Squabbles over revenues can block any proposal, especially if there is no clear link between 
the use of the proposal and those paying". 
An important issue is that the winners, which could be the taxpayers, are more difficult to 
mobilise than the losers (Gomez-Ibanez 1992). The reason suggested is that they are a large 
group but each member of the group is only likely to receive a small benefit and so have little 
stake in actively promoting urban road pricing. In contrast the losers will perceive a 
significant stake in opposing urban road pricing and placating them is a difficult task even 
though economists demonstrate that the gains may be greater than the losses (Gomez-Ibanez 
1992). 
Goodwin (1989) illustrates a possible way in which the revenue could be distributed in order 
to elicit the widest possible support through what he terms the 'rule of three'. The notion is 
that the revenue raised from urban road pricing could be divided such that: 
"A third could be used for development and maintenance of new road infrastructure, where 
the investment would be both acceptable and cost effective; 
"A third could be allocated to improving the effectiveness of public transport; 
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A third could be used to reduce the general tax burden or to increase social spending in 
line with the priorities of the authority. 
A 'third' is an arbitrary proportion. 
Small (1992) also investigates in some detail a package of revenue uses that could attract 
widespread support. This would involve two thirds of the revenue being given back to the 
motorist, via commuter allowances, reduced road user taxes, and via a reduction in general 
taxes. The other third would be used to pay for new road infrastructure, improvements in 
public transit and in public services to business. 
In 1992, Touche Ross surveyed 11 local authorities responsible for traffic management in a 
number of historic cities in the UK (Nevin and Abbie 1993). The overriding view of 
respondents was that urban road pricing revenues should be 'ring fenced'. All believed that 
revenue should be explicitly allocated to public transport subsidies and all but one felt they 
should also be used to fund other traffic management measures. 
A survey was undertaken by NEDO (1991) with the aim of obtaining Londoner's views of 
road user charges. 75 per cent of the 500 interviewed were car owners and were asked about 
the potential solutions and acceptability of a road user charge. Taken in isolation, less than 
half (43 per cent) of those interviewed regarded road user charging as acceptable to some 
degree and over half (53 per cent) regarded charging as unacceptable (see Table 2.5). It is 
interesting however that if the revenue raised by a road user charge was spent on policies to 
reduce congestion and so on, as indicated in Table 2.6, then road user charging becomes more 
acceptable. In this situation 62 per cent regard it as acceptable whilst 33 per cent still consider 
it has unacceptable as seen in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5 Acceptability of road user charging: Before and after the allocation of 
revenue. 
Totally acceptable 
Fairly acceptable 
Neither 
Not very acceptable 
Before revenue allocation 
14 
29 
4 
26 
27 
After revenue allocation 
16 
46 
4 
19 
Source: NEDO (1991) 
In terms of the MIRO project undertaken in the city of Cambridge (Thorpe and Jaensirisak 
1998) the level of acceptance without and with guaranteed revenue allocation increased from 
34 per cent to 54 per cent totally or fairly acceptable, although 34 per cent still considered it 
as totally or fairly unacceptable. 
In terms of how the revenue generated from road user charging should be spent, Table 2.6 
shows the responses from London respondents, each of whom was given 100 points which 
represented total revenue generated. As indicated, Londoner's required 38 per cent of' the 
revenue raised to be spent on improving public transport, either locally or nationally. The 
NEDO Report states that Londoner's appeared to be undecided as to whether the revenue 
should be allocated "nationally" or "locally" to the options they selected. 
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Table 2.6 The overall allocation of revenue raised by road user charging. 
Measures Allocation of revenue 
Improving public transport in the London area 26 
Improving roads in the London area (e. g. new roads/road 15 
widening) 
Improving public transport nationally 12 
Improving roads nationally 10 
Reducing Poll Tax/local rates in the London area 8 
Reducing Road Fund Licence nationally 7 
Spending on non-transport crovernment services (e. g. NHS, Social 7 
Services) in London 
" Spending on non-transport government services (e. g. NHS, Social 7 
Services) nationally 
" Better enforcement of traffic regulations (e. g. more clamping) in 6 
London 
" Reducing Poll Tax/local rates nationally 4 
Source: NEDO (1991) 
Thorpe and Jaenslrisak ( 1998) utilised a similar form of questioning. Each respondent was 
asked to allocate ten units of net revenue generated from a system of road user charging in 
Cambridge between eight types of project as given in Table 2.7. 
The survey showed that 32 per cent of the available net revenue should be allocated to 
improving public transport facilities, with the remainder ofthe net revenue distributed equally 
between the other options although with only 5 per cent allocated for building new roads and 
only 6 per cent for a general reduction in the tax burden. 
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Table 2.7 Allocation of total revenue between individual purposes. 
Policy Optiolls of total revenue allocated 
0 improvements to the environment 14 
0 improvements to public transport 32 
0 building new roads 5 
maintaining and improving existing roads 11 
a general reduction in the burden of taxation 6 
road safety improvements 9 
improving and/or expanding pedestrianised areas I () 
improving and/or expanding facilities for cyclists 13 
Source: Adapted from Thorpe and Jaensirisak (1998) 
The question still remains, that even if revenue is spent in the way recommended and thus 
concerns over equity are accommodated, would it really be sufficient to persuade the public to 
accept the principle of road pricing? 
2.2.4 Privacy 
The invasion of road user's privacy has been advanced as a major sturnbling block to the 
successful introduction of an urban road pricing scheme (Chartered Institute of Transport 
1990,1992, Jones and Hervik 1992). This is an issue that relates to the type of technology 
applied. In terms of the Hong Kong experiment each vehicle was identified in order to enable 
charges to be applied for the use being made of the road, with a bill being sent to the owner of' 
the vehicle at the end of each month. One of the possible defects with the Hong Kong scheme 
was the problem of the invasion of privacy (Borins 1988, Pretty 1988 and Hau 1990) sincc an 
important prerequisite for any system to be acceptable by the general public II is anonymity. In 
fact, it could be regarded as the sin qua non of any scheme which requires political 
acceptability (Hau 1992b). As such, the way in which the issue can be mollified depends on 
the type of technology used for collection of the charge (Jones and Hervik 1992). Thcy argue 
that under an AVI system, road pricing payment is no different in princIple to an Iterniscd 
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telephone bill, that hostility would be reduced if the opportunity for manual payment 
remained and anyway it may be possible to set up systems for anonymous accounts. To an 
extent the issue of invasion of road user's privacy raised in Hong Kong has been overcome by 
removing the need for AVI and the development of the smart card technology (May 1992). 
The issue of privacy of those who fail to pay the charge however will still remain (May 1992). 
2.2.5 The Objective of urban roadpricing 
Higgins (1994) argues that an important condition to the acceptance and effectiveness of an 
urban road pricing programme is a rational and understandable link between the design of the 
programme and the type of problem addressed. For example, he suggests that the ideal 
conditions for the introduction of urban road pricing are "a congested network of streets 
within the area considered for pricing and a much less congested highway network leading 
into the area7'. The reason for this is so that motorists can associate the charge with a benefit 
in total travel time. If however motorists spend a large proportion of their journey time in 
congestion ouýside the charged area then savings in travel time within the charged zone may 
not be much compared to their total trip time. 
Is the objective one of reducing the level of congestion or air pollution? From the perspective 
of air pollution then it would be important to consider an area wide urban road pricing 
scheme. As such, it would be less important to reduce congestion within limited areas than to 
reduce vehicle use over a region (Higgins 1994). 
in terms of the type of urban road pricing scheme, the Adam Smith Institute and Smith Group 
(1999) state that "Each local authority has its own objectives and priorities for traffic 
management and the development of its urban environment. The design of a scheme should 
follow from the specific objectives it needs to serve. The main objectives that a road user 
charging scheme could meet (or at least contribute to) include: reducing congestion and 
pollution to pre-defined levels, financing investment in new infrastructure, 'rationing' 
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available road space among competing users, and 'internalising' the marginal social cost of 
road use to increase economic efficiency. There is clearly an overlap in some of these 
objectives. Depending upon the balance of objectives that a local authority chooses to pursue, 
there could be differences in the scheme design, technology used, tariff structure and 
'optimal' charge levels, different objectives may point to conflicting solutions that can only 
be resolved locally. This emphasises the importance of any scheme being objectives-driven. 
The local political and economic situation in a given urban area will dictate the overall 
objectives of a scheme. This is therefore the first point that needs to be addressed when 
designing such a scheme". 
2.3.0 The technology 
Failure to implement an urban road pricing scheme may rest with the difficulty experienced in 
the work of implementation itself (Howitt 1980). This is particularly the case with ambitious 
schemes. The difficulty of implementation rests on the amount of co-operation which is 
required between the various implementing groups and also by the amount of resources 
required in terms of money, personnel, equipment and administrative capacity. The 
probability of implementation declines as the need for resources increases (Howitt 1980). As 
such, this should be a major consideration when making decisions with respect to urban road 
pricing. Issues such as cost, reliability and accuracy , the level of sophistication and who 
should be exempt are all important in terms of the decision making process with respect to 
urban road pricing. 
2.3.1 The Cost 
The issue of cost is of central importance. In tenns of the Hong Kong experiment the decision 
to postpone the construction of six foot bridges was seized upon by the opponents of 
electronic road pricing as evidence that public safety would be jeopardised in order to pursue 
a road pricing scheme (Borins 1988). The cost was also cited by Dawson (1986), Pretty 
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(1988) and Hau (1990) as a problem expressed in the Hong Kong experiment. In terms of 
ALS in Singapore when introduced in 1975 it had the advantage of having a low cost of 
implementation both in terms of land requirements and initial capital outlay (Hau 1992b). 
2.3.2 Reliability and accuracy 
Equally important is reliability and accuracy of the equipment. Jones (1998) states that "In the 
UK in particular ... an electronic 
form of urban road pricing raises two kinds of concern: 
That the technology may misfunction, either by not correctly recording the passage of a 
particular vehicle or by making an incorrect charge for the use of the road network. In a 
large city such as London the sheer scale of the exercise also results in some scepticism 
about the practicality of the exercise. 
Even were the technology to be very reliable some people argue that 'it would not work' 
because large numbers of drivers would refuse to pay. 
These problems are compounded by confusion in the public mind by the wide range of 
technologies on offer ... and the lack of first-hand experience of their successful operation". 
Even though the Hong Kong scheme was found to perform with over 99 per cent 
effectiveness and reliability (Catling and Harbord 1985) the district boards expressed concern 
that the technology would not work (Borins 1988). Programmes of whatever form are more 
politically attractive when there is substantial evidence that they will work as advertised 
(Rom 1994). Agreement amongst the analysts is important in this respect since failure to 
produce quick and unambiguous benefits when first tested will undoubtedly mean that they 
will not be tested again (Rom 1994). 
2.3.3 Level of sophistication 
A factor closely linked to the two previous issues is that of the level of sophistication. As 
stated by Rom (1994) "Citizens are understandably skeptical of complicated governmental 
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programs. Congestion pricing programs that do not rely on complex strategies of 
implementation will be more politically attractive than those that do". 
Emmerink et al ( 1995) undertook a desk top exercise, with the results exploratory in nature 
not based on scientific research and tentative, suggesting that the cordon system with the 
charge depending on the time of day to account for congestion seemed to be the most 
appealing policy option available 7. 
Borins (1988) argued that the experience from the Hong Kong experiment showed that a 
sophisticated urban road pricing scheme "may be difficult, perhaps even impossible, to 
introduce in a democratic urban polity"8. In support of this the NEDO survey showed a 
preference for low- as opposed to high-technology charging and enforcement schemes. This is 
confirmed in Table 2.8 with less than 25 per cent of those interviewed perceiving direct 
charging as an acceptahle way of charging for the use of roads. A metering system based on 
Costs Impact on User " Side ' Implement- Overall 
(One off) Congestion friendliness effects ation 
Cordon (F) ++++ 
Cordon (T) ++++ ++ 
Distance-bascd (F) + 
Dis(ance-based (T) ++++ 
Time-hased (F) ++ 
Time-hascd (T) ++ 
Congestion Metering ++ 
S''[11, c: I., 111111clink ('1111 1995. 
Notes: 
a. The above tahle illustrates i'actors that have an impact on the attractiveness ot'dillerent types of' 
urhan road pricing scherne. It gives a qualitative expression ol'the level ol'impacts and thus it is 
rather suh " 
jective. 
h. F fixed charges T time of'day dependent charges. 
C, The impacts are measured on an ordinal scale ranging 1'rom most un[avourahle (--) to niost 
f'avourahle (++) with - and + as intcrinco-hate outcomes. 
d. Reflecting the predictahility ol'tho: congestion price. 
C. Reflecting shifis in land use patterns. All these systcnis will induce certain shills in land use 
patterns, though these might he most undesirahle under a cordon systern. 
1. Reflecting the dilTicultics associaled will, putting the theory into practice. For example. the 
prohlern of'rat running l'alls into this category. 
g. Overall assessment taking into account all relevant factors. 
In saying this however it would appear that tile technology was accepic(i (I)jjwson 1986). The 
reason given was that Hong Kong enjoys some ofthic most advanced electronic intrasIrLICIM-C ill the 
world. 
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prepayment was supported by only 8 per cent although as stated by Jones (1992) "... it is 
unclear whether this was a reaction against the technology, or against the more precise 
targeting of the charge that the technology would make possible". In the Executive Summary 
of the NEDO Report it is stated that "Simple methods like area licences to travel in congested 
areas or higher parking charges are more acceptable than other methods, particularly 
Electronic Meters in cars". Overall therefore there is a trade-off between methods of urban 
road pricing which are less effective but more acceptable, and those which are more effective 
but less acceptable. "A road user charge system which makes a progression from 
Supplementary Licensing to full point of use pricing may therefore be one option" (NEDO 
199 1). This is a view supported by Nevin and Abbie (1993). They suggest that, "at least in the 
early stages as motorists become used to the idea of road pricing, there may be benefits in 
sacrificing theoretical optimality for practical feasibility and acceptability". As such, they 
state this would point: "perhaps to relatively low-tech solutions such as toll gates, rather than 
high-tech options such as smart cards, at least in the first instance". 
This produces a dilemma for decision-makers "since low-technology schemes and 
developments are likely to be less effective in producing the desired outcome, with the 
consequence that such schemes may be declared ineffective and consequently discontinued 
and dismantled. On the other hand, the proposed implementation of widespread high-tech 
systems may generate a significant backlash" (Grieco and Jones 1994). As such a gradualist 
approach to decision-making may be required, with a series of modifications 'step by step. A 
piecemeal approach has certain advantages, not least in that it is easier to promote. 
incremental adoption is also less visible and so, less likely to evoke opposition, with the 
successful adoption and implementation of the first step helping to allay public concern about 
the potential impact of subsequent steps (Howitt 1980). Starting with a simplistic scheme as 
with toll rings in Bergen (Larsen 1988), of Area Licensing in Singapore (Behbehani, 
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Pendakur, Armstrong-Wright 1984) this has the advantage of getting the puhlic accustorned 
to the notion of urban road pricing and also allowing the technology to be proved. Survey 
evidence (Seale 1993) would seem to suggest that politicians also prefer a cordon toll ring. 
Policies that extend existing restrictions seem less threatening and therefore tend to generate 
less opposition (Howitt 1980). 
Table 2.8 Londoners' most and least acceptable methods of urban road pricing. 
Most 
acceptable 
Least 
acceptable Difference 
By adding the charge for road use onto petrol 30 32 -2 
prices in the London area 
By adding the charge for road use onto parking 
charges in the London area (car parks and parking 19 10 +9 
meters) 
Daily, weekly, monthly or annual area licences 
which allow you unlimited travel in the London 24 9 +15 
area after buying the licence 
Meter in your car which monitors your journeys 
in the London area. An itcrnised bill is then sent 15 26 -11 
to you (like a telephone bill) 
" Meter in your car which accepts tokens or plastic 8 20 -12 
cards like a phone card which you buy in advance 
" Other 2 +2 
" Don't know 3 2 +1 
Note: * Less than I per cent 
Source: NEDO (1991) 
An interesting counter view to this is that new technology will promote the political 
acceptability of' urban road pricing (Small et al 1989). The reason put forward is that when 
individuals are confronted with the concept of road pricing it conjures up the image of' toll 
booths and long qUeues. New technology negates both these mcntal images. 
The push for a more tech nological ly advanced system is advanced by dic Adam Smith 
Institute/Stilith Group (ASI) ( 1999). They State that "From the traffic managcnicnt point of' 
view, the crucial advantage of' electronic systerns over paper-based systems is that charges 
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11" 
can be varied according to the actual situation in terms of the time of day, current levels of 
congestion or local air quality, for example. For the user, particularly the regular user, the key 
advantage is convenience. The in-vehicle equipment is 'fit-once-and forget'. Charges are 
levied as and when you drive, with no further action required from the user". They do 
however state that simplicity is the main benefit of paper-based schemes, from the user's 
point of view. There being no technology to come to terms with , no in-vehicle equipment 
other than a sticker, and nothing (from the user's perspective) can go wrong. In terms of 
convenience the ASI argue that with a paper based scheme it depends on how frequently 
stickers have to be purchased and how many retail outlets for stickers are available to 
customers. The less frequently a user has to buy a sticker, say once a year, then the more 
convenient, but weaker the link between using the road space within an area and paying for 
access to it. As for enforcement, the paper based approach would probably have to accept 
large payment evasion rates. Overall, the stance taken by the ASI (1999) is that paper based 
schemes represent a poor compromise between traffic management effectiveness and 
convenience for the consumer and as such rule it out of serious consideration for all but the 
simplest of schemes such as for National Parks. 
2.3.4 Exemptions 
Linked to the notion of clear objectives and successful decision-making then specific issues 
such as which groups of motorists, if any, should be exempt from the urban road pricing 
require careful consideration. In the case of Hong Kong, Borins (1988) surmised that well 
organised interest groups such as taxi drivers and commercial vehicle owners would exert 
political pressure to be exempt from paying the road price. This would increase the burden on 
other road users and would be viewed as inequitable, with private car drivers feeling singled 
out and discriminated against (Hau 1990). As such, Hau (1992b) argued that all vehicles must 
be charged on the basis of efficiency and fairness. The issue of equity can be dealt with to 
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some extent by providing exemptions (May 1992). There are though arguments against this 
in terms of enforcement and administrative problems. 
The whole area of exemptions and the use of revenue, dealt with in section 2.2.3 raises an 
interesting issue. Rom (1994) is of the opinion that urban road pricing programs are 
6politically easiest' if designed such that the benefits are concentrated, clear and quick, 
whereas the costs are defuse, opaque and delayed. If the costs are concentrated and the 
benefits distributed widely then politicians will antagonise a minority without necessarily 
animating a majority, who will fail to see that their lot has improved (Rom 1994). 
2.4.0 Selling of the policy. 
The selling of any policy requires careful consideration of a series of issues. Not least, the 
timing of such a policy, how such a policy is presented and the openness and trust among all 
the stakeholder groups. 
Z4.1 Timing 
Rom (1994) argues for an incremental adoption of congestion pricing. His view is that in 
order to gain political acceptability then congestion pricing programmes should be designed 
so that interests and institutions can gradually adjust to the changes. The gradualist or 
incremental approach is a- theme taken up by Grieco and Jones (1994). They note the 
dilemma that achieving public acceptance of new technology may require, at least in the first 
instance, a level of motorist charge which does not change travel behaviour, and as such does 
not substantially reduce the level of congestion. An incremental approach has been 
undertaken in Oslo, starting out with a reserved lane for vehicles with seasonal passes, 
manned toll booths and coin operated machines (Larsen 1995). This was subsequently (in 
November 1990) switched to an electronic seasonal pass; in December 1991 the electronic 
system was extended to include pre-paid trips. Emmerink et al (1995) argue that to proceed 
with a technologically advanced system might be dangerous. They suggest that in the first 
phase user awareness of 
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the costs associated with mobility during congested periods should be realised. "Then in the 
second phase, there is a fair chance that more advanced systems can be implemented 
successfully with the backing of the politicians and the public". 
Timing is important. Proposals are more politically appealing when the benefits come early 
and the costs late (Rom 1994) "As congestion pricing advocates have learned, imposing costs 
first and providing benefits later is the road to political defeat" (Rom 1994). The problem as 
perceived by Dittmar (1994) is the almost total absence of individuals or firms that might 
receive immediate benefit. 
Finally, the introduction of any new pricing scheme will involve many complex operational 
issues (Higgins 1994) and as such an early testing and demonstration phase is desirable. 
2.4 2 Presentation. 
The introduction of any new policy creates uncertainty and it is important that the authority 
allays the fears of the various stakeholder groups. Bearing in mind the efficiency gains 
outlined in Appendix I then "To gain public support for this policy innovation, proponents 
must demonstrate that social inefficiencies caused by road congestion and social efficiencies 
created by congestion pricing are real and substantial. If they are, advocates must also be bold 
in advertising these facts" (Rom 1994). Rom also argues that aiming to sell congestion 
pricing programmes on the basis of such concepts as efficiency and equity, although 
appealing to the analyst, are not persuasive to politicians and voters. Speed and reliability, 
particularly from the US perspective synonymous with efficiency are highly valued 
characteristics. They may be a useful 'ideological selling point'. He states "For congestion 
pricing to become politically attractive to the public, proponents might want to consider 
embracing the value of speed". Reliability is also an important benefit of urban road pricing 
and one that can be used as a selling tool. As such, the attitude of decision-makers is crucial. 
"If they present road pricing as a positive means of improving the quality of the city centre, 
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they are likely to encourage economic activity; if they present it as a means of restricting 
mobility and freedom of choice, they may well have the contrary effect. The way in which 
road pricing is presented as part of an overall transport strategy is thus of crucial importance" 
(May 1992). 
The views expressed above are not entirely supported by Howitt (1980). The most commonly 
cited benefits of policies such as urban road pricing according to him are more efficient use of 
road space to reduce congestion, shorter travel time, increased revenue, improvements in air 
quality, and energy conservation. He argued that such benefits are extremely weak 
inducements for political activity. They are 'collective' goods which produce relatively small 
benefits for any individual, with the effects being felt over a relatively long period. In addition 
the beneficiary might not recognise that the benefits are the result of the consequences of 
urban road pricing. Hence there would rarely be an organisation of broad political coalition. 
On the other hand the 'cost' of urban road pricing measures are distributed in a fashion which 
is likely to provoke political activity. Response can be relatively easy since in any instances 
the organisations already exist to promote their interests, such as the Chamber of Commerce 
or neighbourhood groups, with financial backing and access to the press. 
According to Borins (1988) and Hau (1990) there was a failure to sell the ERP scheme to the 
public in Hong Kong. An aggressive advertising campaign was absent and the literature 
which was available, such as the Consultation Document, failed to make a sufficiently strong 
case. "A stronger case could have been made by showing the net benefits to various examples 
of transport system users... " (Borins 1988, Hau 1992b). At a basic but important level, the 
Norwegian National Roads Administration responsible for projects financed by tolls put up 
road signs at construction sites stating that the projects were financed by toll revenue. As such 
it acted as a reminder that tolls have visible results and are not just another tax. 
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An interesting point made by Grieco and Jones (1994) is that in order to achieve an initial 
acceptance of urban road pricing it may be necessary to "limit the extent to which price 
signals designed to achieve alterations in road-use behaviour are emphasised or impressed 
upon the consciousness of the driver in the first period of implementation. Put simply, there 
may be a set of political pressures which favour a strategy which aims at the implementation 
of the technology for urban road pricing rather than at the implementation of an effective 
urban road pricing system itself as a first-stage implementation goal". They also argued that a 
bluffing of the distinction between tolling and road pricing may be useful. 
2.4.3 Public Relations 
There is a need for municipalities to clearly explain to the public and other interest groups the 
reasons behind the decision-making and the benefits (direct and indirect) they are likely to 
derive (Grieco and Jones 1994). Given the fact that many objections will surface it is 
important that an ongoing public relations system be designed not to sell a fixed concept but 
to help decision-makers respond to concerns and objections (Higgins 1994). Higgins argued 
that "The staff and leadership of the organisation should exhibit a flexible and open attitude 
toward public and community reaction, and be prepared to alter proposals and eventual 
operations accordingly". In addition, he stated that public relations personnel should be 
experienced in the use of paid advertising, press conferences, community meetings, press 
releases, workshops, direct mail, public speaking and video productions. This type of 
personnel was not readily recognised in the Hong Kong situation since "The Government did 
not seem to have very much credibility; the reports, presentations at board meetings and 
promises to reduce licence fees commensurate with tolls and to keep the road usage data 
confidential did not seem to convince many of the district board members" (Borins 1988). 
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Z4.4 Openness and Trust 
The actions taken by the authorities should be based in a large part on local perceptions of 
adverse outcomes. The perception needs to be assessed in a systematic way (Higgins 1994). 
Public surveys, focus groups and interviews with stakeholders are ways of determining the 
nature and level of likely objections (Higgins 1994). 
Trust is an essential element in the introduction of any new policy. As such apparent 
scepticism was expressed with the Hong Kong experiment by the Automobile Association in 
that Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) would be used as a means of taxing the motorist 
excessively (Borins 1988). In addition, reports in the Hong Kong media fostered the belief 
that ERP was to form a further tax (Dawson 1986). A similar point is made by Small et al 
(1989) in that "People who mistrust governments may regard congestion pricing as a sinister 
form of tax increase". Evans (1992) suggests that "In the theory of congestion pricing, it is 
assumed that governments (as monopoly suppliers of roads) will not exploit their monopoly 
power". Unfortunately there is no clear rationale underlying this assumption and it might be 
seriously questioned in practical application (Emmerink et al 1995). It is important to 
remember that the promised results may not materialise, which will obviously affect attitudes 
and erode the possibilities for future political action (Langmyhr 1997). In terms of trust then 
the 
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whole process should be above reproach. For example, public objection to ERP in Hong 
Kong was based on the fact that the use of patented technology was viewed as a means of 
exporting employment to the UK (Hau 1992b). 
There was a limited amount of information which the authorities chose to make public with 
respect to ERP in Hong Kong (Hau 1990). The Consultation Document summarised the 
consultants' findings but did not make the work itself available for discussion and criticism 
(Borins 1988). As stated by Hau (1990) "the Government could have made information more 
publicly accessible on the ERP system, together with the associated transport studies carried 
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out, for discussion and comments". At the very least, certain academic economists and 
engineers, who have had a tradition of being favourably disposed to road pricing, would have 
been able to lend their support. He goes on to suggest that the public release of the ERP Pilot 
Scheme: Main Report, in May 1985: "could have clarified many of the preconceived notions 
and misconceptions. In particular, the distributional results of the simulated schemes could 
have been publicised to support the government's assertion that ERP is fairer than alleged". 
It is certainly the case that the successful campaign of any urban road pricing scheme requires 
good data, careful analysis and a sophisticated political approach (Dittmar et al 1994). 
The ASI (1999) detail key areas of concern which local communities need to address in terms 
of winning over both public and business opinion. They include: 
e defining the 'serious problem' that requires traffic demand management; 
e demonstrating that road user charging is the best mechanism to alleviate the problem; 
9 providing assurances that the technology will work and billing will be accurate; and 
e ensuring that the individual's needs are met in tenns of service, administration, privacy 
and security. 
2.5.0 The role of a catalyst 
A central figure would appear to be important in the successful acceptance of many new 
policy initiatives. As stated by Fauth et al (1978) agencies or individuals who act as 'policy 
entrepreneurs' are important in advancing concepts and seeking support. In Hong Kong the 
government's campaign with respect to ERP was led by the Transport Secretary, Alan Scott 
who had a reputation for being blunt and paternalistic and was seen as one who told the 
colonials what was in their best interest. He saw ERP as his personal priority and the air of 
controversy that surrounded the issue was according to Borins (1988) "partially due to the 
controversy which surrounded the man". He had an image of being a promoter of unpopular 
policies. 
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A politician could act as a catalyst although as stated by Elliott (1986) from a US perspective 
'Toliticians are constantly busy attending to their constituents' mail, co-ordinating or fighting 
with one another, taking symbolic stands on one public issue or another ... or running for 
reelection. But they have little time or inclination to do anything truly new or creative, 
however attractive these may be to scholars and advisory bodies. Players in the political 
arena learn to keep their agenda short, if they want anything done". There is footdragging 
which "though it defies economic logic, does follow a coherent political logic of reluctance 
to alienate the mass of drivers who have never heard of William Vickery, don't understand 
the subtleties of peak-load pricing, ... and would bridle at the thought of having to pay for 
something they think they now get free". 
It is clearly the case that "Patience and persistence are also required to advance new policies 
and get them before the public" (Dittmar et al 1994). If an urban road pricing policy is not 
adopted, however, it can be said "that policy debated and not adopted can be characterised as 
skilful failure" if it helps to advance the understanding of an issue. This theme is also voiced 
by Grieco and Jones (1994) in that "although the political failure of a technology to gain 
acceptance in the particular European polity within which it was first developed may (in the 
short term) represent something of a failure in national terms, if it gains acceptance elsewhere 
within Europe, it should not be construed as a failure in European terms". 
Finally, May (1992) outlines five models on how best to introduce urban road pricing: 
1. A policy based approach. Here road pricing forms part of a broad strategy and approval is 
sought for that policy. This policy has worked well in Singapore. 
2. A technology led approach. This is the approach carried out in Hong Kong and it lacked 
public support, not least because of the perceived invasion of privacy. 
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3. A revenue generating approach. Here Norwegian cities have been more successful, not 
least because the objective has been clear from the start. This approach has revealed that it 
is better to use a manual system to start with. 
4. A demonstration approach, as advocated by the Chartered Institute of Transport (1990). 
This approach is currently being advanced in the US where cities are given a financial 
incentive to partake. This allows for uncertainties to be resolved through experimentation. 
5. A analysis led approach. Here careful and objective assessment is made of the issues and 
an analytical programme is designed to answer them. The London Congestion Charging 
Research project (1995) is one such approach. 
It is the opinion of Emmerink et al (1995) that the limited evidence from the literature 
suggests that the third model is the most suitable for achieving public support. If so then the 
authorities should state clearly how the revenue is going to be used9. In terms of model four 
then the question arises as to which sites to choose. 
2.6.0 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to review the literature with respect to decision-making and 
urban road pricing. This review, based on the evidence from schemes either in existence or 
which have been considered, academic experience, conjecture or understanding, and attitude 
surveys, has raised a series of important issues. The local environment in which urban road 
pricing is being considered appears to be all important. More pointedly, is congestion severe 
enough for a policy option such as urban road pricing to be seriously contemplated? In 
addition, how severe is local air quality, since this may be a more effective environment in 
which to develop such a policy? Have all the alternative policies to urban road pricing been 
considered and in fact exhausted, viewing urban road pricing as a policy of last resort, with 
This would require a strict rather than a potential Pareto improvement. 
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less draconian options sufficing at the present time? Urban road pricing could be viewed as 
part of a package of measures and this could improve its acceptance. 
Central in terms of issues requiring careful consideration are those of equity, the related issue 
of the utilisation of the revenue raised from an urban road pricing scheme, the invasion of 
road user's privacy and the need for rational and understandable objectives. 
In terms of the type of technology utilised, issues such as the cost of installation, reliability 
and accuracy of the equipment, the level of sophistication of the scheme under consideration, 
in addition to the issue of which road users (if any) should be exempt requires careful 
consideration as part of the decision-making process. 
With respect to selling the policy of urban road pricing, then timing would appear to be all 
important; with the scheme designed so that stakeholders can gradually adjust to the changes 
with an early testing/demonstration desirable. Selling also involves careful presentation, as 
part of an overall transport strategy and boldness in advertising the benefits. Public relations 
requires careful consideration, designed not to sell as fixed concept but to respond to 
concerns. In all the above, openness and trust are vital, with the whole process being above 
reproach. 
Finally, the role of a policy entrepreneur should not be underestimated as a means of 
advancing concepts and seeking support. 
Against this context, the aim of chapter 3 is to analyse the theory of decision-making. This is 
necessary if the thesis is to meet its aims of dealing with how the decision-making process 
should be undertaken in order to achieve political acceptance and as such, overcome barriers 
to implementation. 
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Chapter 3A Review of the Models of Decision-Making 
"The incremental approach posits the decision maker as starting not with some ideal goal 
but with the policies currentlY in force. Decision making entails considering only incremental 
change, or changes tit the margins. Only a rather restricted number of policy alternatives is 
reviewed and only a limited number of consequences is envisaged and evaluated for any 
given alternative" 
(Smith and May 1980) 
3.0.0 Introduction 
Despite the growing unease with the dominant framework of policy analysis, the policy cycle 
or stagist approach continues to be the basis for analysing the policy process. (Parsons 1995). 
This involves disaggregating the process into a series of discrete stages or sub-stages. 
According to Howlett and Ramesh (1995) the principle behind the notion of the policy cycle 
is the logic of applied problem solving. They depict the stages in applied problem solving and 
its corresponding stages in the policy process as in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Five Stages of the Policy Cycle and their Relationship to Applied Problem- 
Solving. 
I Phnvw-, of ADDlied Problern-Solving Stages in the Policv Cvcle 
I 
1. Problem Recognition 1. Agenda-Setting 
2. Proposal of Solution 2. Policy Formulation 
3. Choice of Solution 3. Decision-Making 
4. Putting Solution into Effect 4. Policy Implementation 
5. Monitoring Results 5. Policy Evaluation 
Source: Howlett and Ramesh (1995) 
As such, AKenda-Setting refers to the process whereby problems come to the attention of' the 
authorities; Policy Formulation refers to the process by which policy options are formulated 
within authorities; Decision -Making refers to the process by which authorities adopt it 
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particular course of action or non-action; Policy Implementation refers to the process by 
which authorities put policies into effect; and Policy Evaluation refers to the processes by 
which the results of policies are monitored. 
The policy cycle approach has been criticised (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, Hill 1997a, 
Parsons 1995) in that it creates an artificial view of policy making, creating a "false picture of 
a process which is not a conveyor belt in which agenda-setting takes place at one end of the 
line and implementation and evaluation occurs at the other. " Hill (1997a) suggests "that there 
has been a dangerous tendency to separate implementation issues from decision-making 
issues, when what is important is to understand their inter-relationships. " In fact, policy will 
often continue to evolve within the implementation phase rather than the decision-making 
phase of the policy process (Hill 1997b). A similar point is made by Anderson (1975) in that 
'Policy is being made as it is being administered and administered as it is being made'. 
Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993) argue that 'breaking up the decision-making process into 
hypothetical units is artificial .... The step-by-step approach also risks assuming that policy 
making proceeds through a coherent and rational process - like writing a term paper with a 
beginning, middle, and an end, with each part tied logically to each succeeding part. In fact, 
decision making rarely proceeds in this manner; it has been described more accurately as 
resembling a "primeval soup, " with action occurring fitfully as problems become matched 
with policy ideas considered to be in the political interests of a working majority of the 
partisans with influence over a policy domain ...... Policy sometimes is formed from a 
compromise among political participants, moreover, none of whom had in mind quite the 
problem to which the agreed policy responds. Action often springs from new opportunities, 
not from "problems" at all . ...... 
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Throughout the literature review undertaken in the previous chapter reference has been made 
to issues of implementation with respect to urban road pricing. What is clear however is that 
successful implementation relies on clear, precise and unambiguous decision-making. 
Bad execution, bad policy or bad luck can be advanced as reasons for the failure to 
implement policy (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). As such, the policy could be ineffectively 
implemented, and thus viewed by the policy initiators as bad execution. In turn both the 
initiators and implementors may agree that external circumstances were such that it was no 
one's fault, simply 'bad luck' that the policy failed. According to Hogwood and Gunn (1984) 
however, a reason less commonly offered (at least less openly) as an explanation of policy 
failure is that the policy was 'bad' itself. 'Bad' in the sense of being based on 'inadequate 
information, defective reasoning, or hopelessly unrealistic assumptions'. What this indicates 
is that there is no sharp divide between the decision-making and the implementation stages of 
the policy process. So what occurs at the so-called 'implementation stage' will influence the 
policy outcome. Equally, the probability of a successful outcome (that desired by the initiators 
of the policy) will be enhanced if thought is given at the policy design stage to potential 
problems of implementation. 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984) in a chapter' of their book Policy Analysis for the Real World set 
out the preconditions which would need satisfying if 'perfect implementation' were to be 
achieved. These are: 
The title of the chapter is 'Why 'perfect implementation' is unattainable'. This has been subseqcntly 
published in 'The Policy Process' A Reader, Hill (Ed) 1997, based on a seminal article 
by Gunn (1978). 
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3.0.1 The circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling 
constraints. 
For example, the policy may be unacceptable to various interests, which have the power to 
veto them. It is important that such possibilities are borne in mind during the decision- 
making stage. 
3.0.2 That adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the programme. 
This could also be viewed as an external constraint. As such, politicians may will the policy 
'end' but not the 'means'. 
3.0.3 That the required combination of resources is actually available. 
This follows on from the previous point in that at each stage in the implementation process 
the appropriate combination of resources are actually available. This means money, 
manpower, land, equipment and so on. 
3.0.4 That the policy to be implemented is based upon a valid theory of cause and effect. 
This means that policies are sometimes ineffective not because they are badly implemented 
but because they are bad policies. The policy may not understand the problem to be solved, its 
causes and cures. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) view a policy as a 'hypothesis containing 
initial conditions and predicted consequences. That is, the typical reasoning of the decision- 
maker is along the lines of 'if X is done at time t(l) then Y will result at time t(2)'. Pressman 
and Wildavsky undertook a detailed case-study of the failure of a programme in the late 
1960's to create employment for minority groups in Oakland, California. One conclusion 
reached was that the programmes failure in terms of implementation was, at least in part, a 
failure of decision-making. 
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3.0.5 That the relationship between cause and effect is direct and that there arejew, if any, 
intervening links. 
In other words, the more links in the chain, the greater the risk that some of them will prove 
to be poorly conceived or badly executed. 
3.0.6 That there is a single implementing agency which need not depend upon other 
agencies for success or, if other agencies must be involved, that the dependency 
relationships are minimal in number and importance. 
As such, where implementation requires not only a complex series of events and linkages but 
also agreement at each event among a large number of participants, then the probability of a 
successful or even a predictable outcome must be further reduced. 
3.0.7 That there is complete understanding of, and agreement upon, the objectives to be 
achieved; and that these conditions persist throughout the implementation process. 
In real life, the objectives of programmes are often difficult to identify or are couched in 
vague or evasive terms. Gunn (1978) goes on to state that 'even official objectives, where 
they exist, may not be compatible with one another, and the possibility of conflict or 
confusion is increased when professional or other groups proliferate their own unofficial 
goals within a programme'. Official goals can often be poorly understood and even if they are 
understood and agreed on, in the first instance this may not persist throughout the lifetime of 
the programme, since goals may be succeeded, multiplied, expanded upon or in fact 
displaced. Hence implementation failure may stem from the decision-making stage of the 
policy process. 
3.0.8 That tasks arefully specified in correct sequence. 
As such, when moving towards agreed objectives it is possible to specify in complete detail 
and perfect sequence, the tasks to be performed by each participant. 
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3.0.9 That there is perfect communication and co-ordination. 
This is necessary between the various elements or agencies involved in the programme. 
Overall, communication has an important contribution to make to co-ordination and 
implementation. 
3.0.10 That those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance. 
In other words, those in authority should also be those in power, with the ability to secure 
total and immediate compliance from others whose consent and co-operation is required for 
the programme's success. 
In essence therefore perfect implementation depends to a great extent on the decision-making 
process, making sure all obstacles are bome in mind, devoting sufficient time and resources, 
having clearly stated objectives and a policy which is good as oppossed to a bad policy. 
3.1.0 Approaches to Decision-Making. 
Decision-making can be defined as 'a process in which choices are made or a preferred option 
is selected' (Parsons 1995). It can take place in different arenas and at different levels. At one 
level there is a decision by high policy actors making national decisions, and at the other 
there are the decisions of actors at the local level. This thesis deals with decisions made at the 
local level. The decision-making process is multi-faceted and equally the framework used to 
explain this process is multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary. The process can be viewed 
through a variety of lenses. The lack of unity to the study of public policy reflects the nature 
of the research topic. Public policy is hard to research as it is a composite of different 
. processes that crosscut most branches of government and involve many decision-makers. The 
task of investigating decision-making in policy sectors is also highly complex (John 1998). 
There are a number of schools of thought encompassing a range of academic disciplines and 
frameworks. Fo r something as complex as decision-making by individuals and groups no one 
discipline or framework can possibly explain everything. By highlighting one aspect another 
TIT 
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is ignored or underestimated. There is no one explanation of decision-making hence the aim 
is to clarify what approach offers the most plausible account of or for a particular decision. 
Parsons (1995) and John (1998) outline a number of qpproaches to decision-making which 
invariably overlap and interact, there often being common ground between them. Briefly, and 
by no means exclusively these include, the power approach to decision-making, the public 
choice approach and the rational approach. The power approach perceives decision-making 
as something which is shaped and determined by the structure of power, based on areas such 
as class, pressure groups and technical knowledge or professionals. For example, an elitist 
model holds that power is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or groups with 
decision-making to the advantage of those elites. Organisational elites may generate their 
own interests and goals distinct from those of the mass members. Professional elites may 
exert power in decision-making, being more interested in their own gain and advantage than 
in the public they serve. Power may also be based on technical knowledge. 
The public choice approach would argue that bureaucratic power has increased by serving 
itself rather than the public interest. Downs (1967) argues that the motivations of individual 
officials are diverse and give rise to different kinds of bureaucrat such as zealots who are 
highly motivated officials committed to push for a policy or programme. 
In terms of the rational approach, Parsons states that 'the idea of rationality has been central 
to the theory and practice of decision-making in the post-war era'. The work of Simon is 
central to the analysis of rationality in decision-making and in response to this approach 
Lindblom advanced decision-making as muddling through, the incremental approach. 
The rational decision-making model can be viewed as prescriptive, whereas the alternative 
'incremental approach' is more pragmatic, suggesting that incrementalism is the best way to 
reach accommodations between the various interest groups (Hill 1997b). The rational 
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approach is associated with the work of Simon (1957,1976) and incrementalism with that of 
Lindblom (1959). 
Both Simon and Lindblom set up largely similar models of rational decision-making2 . Once 
undertaken both proceed to develop reality in terms of deviations from 'perfect rationality'. In 
this respect Simon believes that decision-makers seek to be rational with the 'administrative 
man' (unlike the 'economic man') settling for 'satisficing behaviour3' - bounded rationality. 
As such, he takes account of organisational and political realities. Lindblom on the other hand 
developed successive limited comparisons. With this approach Lindblom stressed that 
pressures upon decision-makers are such that this kind of 'rationality' is unattainable and 
many decisions are 'incremental' involving small adjustments to what has been done before. 
In fact, the two explanations stand side by side as a means of illuminating the policy process 
with respect to urban road pricing. Care must be taken when analysing the two approaches 
since the 'rationalist-incremental' debate is a somewhat narrow and artificial framework and 
it is important to stress that both models are at a high level of generality. 
In addition, 'Policy analysis is not an exact science. It involves trying to understand and 
explain events in situations in which we never have complete information about what 
happened and why it happened, and our interpretations are influenced by our frames of 
reference and our ideologies. ' (Hill 1997c) 
3.2.0 The rational model of decision making. 
Simon (1957,1976) made an early contribution to the area of decision-making in a book 
entitled Administrative Behaviour. In order to clarify the meaning of rationality in decision- 
making he defined two types namely the rationality of economic man making choices in the 
manner assumed by economic theory and the administrative man with limited rationality 
- "1 1- ". -11-1 
2 Lindblom with what he calls the Rational-Comprehensive method. 
3 'Satisficing' was coined to accomodate in one word both 'satisfying' and 'sufficing' behaviour. 
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recognised from everyday life. In the Preface to Administrative Behaviour Simon stated that 
'Whereas economic man maximises - selects the best alternative from among all those 
available to him, his cousin administrative man, satisficies - looks for a course of action that 
is satisfactory or "good enough. " Examples of satisficing criteria, familiar enough to 
businessmen if unfamiliar to most economists, are "share of the market, " "adequate profit, " 
"fair price. " Also 'Economic man deals with the "real world" in all its complexity. 
Administrative man recognises that the world he perceives is a drastically simplified model of 
the buzzing, blooming confusion that constitutes the real world. He is content with this gross 
simplification because he believes that the real world is mostly empty - that most of the facts 
of the real world have no great relevance to any particular situation he is facing and that most 
significant chains of causes and consequences are short and simple. Hence, he is content to 
leave out of account those aspects of reality - and that means most aspects - that appear 
irrelevant at a given time. He makes his choices using a simple picture of the situation that 
takes into account just a few of the factors that he regards as most relevant and crucial. " 
(Simon 1976) 
Thus in terms of economic man decision-making involves making choices from the 
acquisition of all the information necessary, comparing the information on different options, 
and then selecting the option which will enable him to achieve his goals and interests. Hence, 
rational choice involves choosing alternatives 'which are conducive to the achievement of 
goals or objectives within organisations'. As such the policy chosen is the one which will 
maximise the decision-makers value, the selection being made after a thorough analysis of the 
alternatives and their consequences. In other words 'the rational administrator is concerned 
with the selection of these effective means' (Simon 1976). Further, Simon stated that it is 
important in the construction of an administrative theory to examine the notion of rationality 
and to clearly define 'the selection of effective means' (Simon 1976). In the process of 
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decision-making, alternatives are chosen which are deemed appropriate means for achieving 
desired ends. (Simon 1976). Caution is though required since there may be failure to consider 
the alternative ends that could be reached by selection of another behaviour. This rational 
decision-making always requires the comparison of alternative means in terms of respective 
ends to which they will lead (Simon 1976). It is the case that particular means used to attain a 
particular end may have consequences other than the specific end being sought and these 
unsought ends need to be given their proper weight in considering the desirability of the 
means (Simon 1976) 
3.3.0 Activities involved in rational decision-making 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984) state that the main activities involved in rational policy-making 
are: 
3.3.1 Intelligence gathering 
Namely gathering of information before taking action. In a completely rational world, 
decision-makers would be continually and systematically identifying all present and potential 
problems; 
3.3.2 Identifying all options 
In that a completely rational decision-maker would identify all policy options and consider 
them in detail; 
3.3.3 Assessing the consequences of options 
In that it would be necessary to know what would happen if it were adopted; 
3.3.4 Relating consequences to values 
Since the gathering of data with respect to problems, options and consequences would be 
useless if they cannot be related to a set of criteria. As such 'rationality is concerned with the 
selection of preferred behaviour alternatives in terms of some system of values whereby the 
consequences of behaviour can be evaluated' (Simon 1957). 
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3.3.5 Choosing the preferred option 
Given the above information in order to arrive at a fully rational policy. 
3.4.0 Difficulties with the Rational Approach 
There are difficulties with the rational approach, acknowledged by Simon (1976) and Hill 
(1997b). 
3.4.1 In terms of the decision making process, whose values and objectives should be 
applied. 
In terms of urban road pricing for example, should it be those of councillors, officials, 
academics or pressure groups? 4 It is certainly the case that the values and objectives of the 
organisation may differ from those of the individuals within an organisation. Simon is aware 
of this and states that "a decision is organisationally rational if it is oriented to the 
organisationts goals; it is personally rational if it is oriented to the individual's goals" (Simon 
1976). There may however be conflict between the individual, personal self-interest and the 
larger organisational interese. Arrow (1954) through his 'impossibility theorem' 
demonstrated that under quite plausible assumptions with respect to conditions a social 
welfare function should satisfy, such that different individuals are to be allowed to weight 
their values in different ways, then no such aggregate function exists. In other words, there is 
no purely 'rational' way of resolving a conflict of interest. 
4 'Because the model assumes that at some stage an authoritative person or organisation will inject an explicit 
set of values there is, however, a tendency for prescriptive models derived from the ideal-type rationality 
model to have centralist, technocratic connotations' (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). 
As stated by Hogwood and Gunn (1984) 'A truly rational model would be based upon the largest relevant 
scale of values and interest. It would avoid the type of sub-optimal decision-making which results from 
confusing a sub-system (such as one department in a local authority) with a larger system (the local 
authority itself). This still begs the question, however, of how values at this largest relevant scale would be 
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3.4.2 There are difficulties when referring to the goals of an organisation in that 
statements of intention within organisations are implemented by individuals or groups who 
ma interpret them differently. In fact policy maybe made as it is being implemented (Hill y 
1997b). 
3.4.3 The nature of decision making is not necessarily logical or rational. 
A major reason for this is that it is most likely that not all the alternatives will have been 
considered at the policy stage 6, knowledge of the consequences of the various alternatives is 
incomplete and the process of evaluating the consequences involves considerable 
uncertainties. 
3.4.4 The rational-model is an idealised view of decision making. 
In practice there may be what Simon calls 'bounded rationality'. This involves the decision 
maker in choosing an alternative which does not maximise their values but is satisfactory, 
hence, 'satisficing'. The idea was to show that although human behaviour was not rational in 
the 'economist's sense' it is 'in good part intentionally SO, 7 . Hence Simon develops a concept 
to explain a rationality which is limited but not irrational therefore the 'bounded rationality' 
of 'administrative man'. The decision-making characterised by administrative man operates 
in a world of bounded rationality, motivated by satisficing rather than maximising. A 
decision-making process is concerned with a satisfactory outcome, as opposed to an outcome 
which is the maximum or optimal result. Outcomes are unknown things, thus actors set out to 
pursue choices which are susceptible of a broad measure of attainment. In other words they 
are concerned with a compromise of values and goals, hence satisficing (Parsons 1995). In 
Administrative Behaviour (1976) Simon states that "It is impossible for the behaviour of a 
set and articulated. ' 
6 -nis is one of the dilemmas faced by policy makers in deciding whether or not it is worth commissioning 
research (Smith and May 1980) 
7 Simon (1976) in the Preface of his book Administrative Behavior states that 'Administrative theory is 
peculiarly the theory of intended and bounded rationality - of the behavior of human beings who satisfice 
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single, isolated individual to reach any high degree of rationality. The number of alternatives 
he must explore is so great and the information he would need to evaluate them so vast that 
even an approximation to objective rationality is hard to conceive. Individual choice takes 
place in an environment of givens - premises that are accepted by the subject as bases for his 
choice; and behaviour is adaptive only within the limits set by these givens". It is important to 
bear in mind that policy decision-making is an interactive process. It involves individuals 
who often have conflicting goals and intereStS8 . As such, it is not sensible to talk about the 
decision maker in the singular since policy decision making is a complex collective process. 
As stated by Hogwood and Gunn (1984) "Few policies are made by individuals or even single 
agencies, but are instead made by the interaction of many policy influentials operating in a 
power network ('polycentricity')". 
It is possible to set out the limits to human rationality (Simon 1976). 
3.5.0 The limits to human rationality 
Human rationality is limited since: 
3.5.1 Diere is incompleteness andfragmentation of knowledge. 
'Rationality implies a complete, and unattainable, knowledge of the exact consequences of 
each choice. In actuality, the human being never has more than a fragmentary knowledge of 
the conditions surrounding his action' (Simon 1976). In fact complete rationality is limited by 
a lack of knowledge. 
3.5.2 There are limits of attention. 
Thus problems must be dealt with on a serial, one-at-a-time basis, since decision-makers 
cannot think about too many issues at the same time; attention shifts from one value to 
another. 
because they have not the wits to maximise. 
'Ibis is certainly the case with urban road pricing. 
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3.5.3 All consequences cannot be known. 
Thus the decision-maker relies on a capacity to make valuations. 
3.5.4 There are cost limitations. 
This is the resource limitation to rationality. As such, it costs to be rational, in terms of time, 
energy and money. 
Given these points the question is 'How can decision-making be rationalT Simon argues that 
rationality is procedura19, essentially selecting goals and courses of action which will best 
achieve the purpose. As such, an individual may be said to be behaving rationally if his or her 
behaviour is directed at realising the goals of expressed values. An organisation may be 
viewed as rational if concerned with attaining its values in a given situation (Simon 1976). 
There is the added problem in that 'There is by no means consensus on the fact that 
rationality represents some universal good nor even upon the definition of rationality' (Smith 
and May 1980) 
In 1960, Simon published a book 'The New Science of Management Decision' in which he 
considered how decision-making might be improved in the light of new techniques and 
technology. The suggestion was that decision-making could be improved by increasing the 
scope of programmed as opposed to 'non-programmed' decisions. He argued that although 
organisations do not work as rationally as they might, the use of technology, management 
technique, operations research and the like could improve the situation. Decisions are 
programmed 'to the extent that they are repetitive and routine [and] to the extent that a 
definite procedure has been worked out for handling them'. Decisions are non-programmed 
'to the extent that they are novel [and] unstructured': the problem may not have arisen before, 
or its precise nature may be elusive and complex, or it may be so important 'that it deserves 
9 This consists of assuming the decision-maker can 'isolate from the rest of the world a closed system 
containing only a limited number of variables and a limited range of consequences' (Simon 1976) 
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custom-tailored treatment'. 'In non-programmed decision-making the decision has no 
specific procedures or capacity for dealing with the situation but must instead 'fall back on 
whatever general capacity it has for intelligent, adaptive, problem-oriented action'. (Hogwood 
and Gunn 1984) As such, rationality should, could and can be a goal in decision making. As 
stated by Simon (1983) "If we do find solutions (as I think we shall) for the difficult problems 
of environment and energy - solutions, that is, that handle both sets of problems 
simultaneously - it will be because we are able to model the main interactions among the 
facets of these problems, and hence to think clearly about trade-offs". (Simon 1983). 
3.6.0 Summary 
Thus for the rationalists decision-making could be viewed as conforming to "some neat set of 
steps in which improvements are possible by virtue of the growth in knowledge and 
technology". Etzioni (1967) observes that rationalistic models are widely held conceptions 
about how decisions are and ought to be made. An actor becomes aware of a problem, posits 
a goal, carefully weighs alternative means, and chooses among them according to his estimate 
of their respective merit, with reference to the state of affairs he prefers. The rationalistic 
approach is seen as utopian (Smith and May 1980). The model represents the planner's dream 
but in the real world ends are not that clear, decisions are not that neat and evaluation is not 
systematic. 
3.7.0 The Science of Muddling Through: the incrementalist approach. 
The rational or more mechanical approach to decision-making "choosing the means that best 
satisfied goals that were previously clarified and ranked" was questioned by Lindblom (1959) 
in his paper entitled 'The Science of "Muddling Through"10. In it he argued that for complex 
problems" it is not possible to utilise the rational approach. According to Lindblom (1959) 
10 'Muddling through' can be viewed as a method or 'science'. 
11 Of which urban traffic congestion is one. 
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assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men simply do not possess, 
and it is even more absurd as an approach to policy when the time and money that can be 
allocated to a policy problem is limited, as is always the case" (Lindblom 1959). He also 
argues that in any case authorities because of political and legal constraints restrict their 
attention to relatively few values and relatively few alternative policies among countless 
alternatives. As such, the root method, the best way as a blueprint or model is not workable 
for complex policy issues 12 and there is method in the apparent irrationalism of muddling 
through. "This model posits the decision-maker as starting not with some ideal goal but with 
the policies currently in force. Decision making entails considering only incremental change, 
or changes at the margins. Only a rather restricted number of policy alternatives is reviewed 
and only a limited number of consequences is envisaged and evaluated for any given 
altemative" (Smith and May 1980). 
Lindblom described the approach as successive limited comparisons. He compared this 
approach to the rational approach which he termed the rational-comprehensive method. He 
called these the branch and root method respectively 
13 
. His view is that successive limited 
comparison is more relevant and realistic in conditions of 'bounded rationality' (Parsons 
1995). The two approaches can be characterised in simple terms as in Table 3.2, in which 
Lindblom set up the Rational-Comprehensive straw man to be pulled down. 
12 77hus the basic premise is that in human information, capabilities are limited in conditions of complex 
decisions in which actors cannot possibly have all the information, or know consequences or evaluate every 
alternative. 
13 Ile branch since there is continual building out from the current situation , step-by-step in small degrees, 
and root since there is a start from fundamentals, anew each time. Always prepared to start completely 
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Table 3.2 A comparison of the root and branch approaches to decision making. 
I Rational -Comr)rehens 1 ve (Root) Successive Limited Comt)arisons (Branc-h-T-1 
I lb 
arification of values or objectives distinct Selection of value goals and empirical 
)m and usually prerequisite to empirical analysis of the needed action are not distinct 
alysis of alternative policies from one another but are closely intertwined. 
2a 2b 
icy formulation is thus approached Since means and ends are not distinct, rneans- 
)ugh means-ends analysis: First the ends end analysis is often inappropriate or limited. 
isolated then the means to achieve them 
sought. 
3a 3b 
ie test of a "good" policy is that it can be The test of a "good" policy is typically that 
own to be the most appropriate means to various analysts find themselves directly 
sired ends. agreeing that it is the most appropriate means 
to an aRreed obiective. 
4a 4b 
ialysis is comprehensive; every important Analysis is drastically limited: 
evant factor is taken into account. Important possible outcomes are 
neglected. 
Important alternative potential policies are 
neglected. 
Important affected values are neglected. 
5a 5b 
Theory is often heavily relied upon. A succession of comparisons greatly reduces 
or eliminates reliance on theorv. 
Source: Lindblom (1959) 
3.7.1 Intertwining Evaluation and Empirical Analysis (lb) 
With regards to objectives, la and lb in Table 3.2, Lindblom (1959) states that the root 
method often breaks down in terms of its handling of objectives. He argued that the idea that 
objectives should be clarified, and in advance of a review of the alternative policy options is 
to be commended. But, he suggested that when this is attempted in terms of' complex social 
issues 14 then the following difficulties arise: 
from the ground up. 
14 Of which urban traffic congestion is one. 
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e On critical objectives, then citizens, politicians and administrators disagree. Even when a 
specific objective is put forward there is room for disagreement over sub-objectives. These 
conflicts cannot be resolved by ascertaining the majority preference, since they have not 
been registered on most issues. In fact there are often no preferences in the absence of 
public discussion sufficient to bring an issue to the attention of the electorate; 
* Should the intensity of feeling be considered as well as the number of individuals 
preferring each alternative? Since it is impossible to do otherwise then administrators are 
reduced to deciding policy without clarifying objectives first; 
9 Social objectives do not always have the same relative values. One objective may be 
highly prized in one circumstance, another in another circumstance. 
Overall, Lindblom is arguing that first, objectives and policies to achieve those objectives are 
chosen simultaneously. Second, the administrator focuses on marginal or incremental values, 
15 
finding general formulations of objectives unhelpful . 
Thus, in terms of Ia and b Lindblom is arguing that to clarify objectives in advance of policy 
selection in terms of complex problems is impossible and the administrator does not have to 
try to analyse any values except the values by which alternative policies differ and need not 
be concerned with them except as they differ marginally. As such the need for information on 
values and objectives is dramatically reduced. [i. e. a particular congestion level or effects on 
the environment]. Spelling out objectives could also precipitate conflict rather than agreement 
(Hogwood and Gunn 1984: 52) and in addition it would provide standards by which to judge 
perfonnance. 
15 As such, if confronted with two polices, which could be two Policy options for dealing with urban traffic 
congestion or two urban road Pricing schemes, both could offer the same degree of attainment of objectives 
a, b, c, and d. But the first may offer more of e (which could be greater public acceptance) whilst the second 
offers more off (which could be equity or fairness). In choosing between them the administrator is offered 
the alternative of a marginal or incremental amount of e at the expense of a marginal or incremental amount 
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3.7.2 Relations between Means and Ends (2b) 
In terms of means and ends, 2a and b in Table 3.2, then with the root method of decision 
making means and ends are chosen independently. In the branch method however they are 
simultaneously chosen; which leads to 3a and b relating to the "test of a good policy". 
3.7.3 The Test of a "Good" Policy (3b) 
In the root method a decision is correct or rational if it can be shown to attain some specified 
objective, with the branch approach however it is not possible to show that a policy is 
mistaken by arguing that important objectives are not being achieved. Instead it must be 
argued that another policy is more preferred. 
If agreement cannot be reached on values or objectives, either abstractly, as with the root 
approach, or marginally, as with the branch approach, then what is the test of a good policy. 
For the root approach there is no test. With the successive limited comparisons or branch 
approach then the test is agreement on policy itself, which is possible even when there is no 
agreement on values 16 . Agreement on policy may be the only practical test of the correctness 
of a policy. As stated by Lindblom (1959) "If agreement directly on policy as a test for best 
policy seems a poor substitute for testing the policy against its objectives, it ought to be 
remembered that objectives themselves have no ultimate validity other than they are agreed 
upon". 
3.7.4 Non-Comprehensive Analysis (4b) 
In the rational-comprehensive approach, then ideally every relevant factor is taken into 
account, as stated in 4a of Table 3.2. The lack of perfect information however makes it 
impossible to achieve a comprehensive approach and as such each administrator when 
dealing with complex problems must find ways to simplify. As stated by Lindblom (1959) "In 
of f. The only values that are relevant to his choice are these increments by which the two policies differ. 
16 So for example politicians of different ideologies may not agree on particular objectives but may agree on 
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the method of successive limited comparisons, simplification is systematically achieved in 
two principal ways. First, it is achieved through limitation of policy comparisons to those 
policies that differ in relatively small degree from policies presently in effect. Such a 
limitation immediately reduces the number of alternatives to be investigated and also 
drastically simplifies the character of the investigation of each. "Since the policies ignored by 
the administrator are politically impossible and so irrelevant, the simplification of analysis 
achieved by concentrating on policies that differ only incrementally is not a capricious kind of 
simplification. In addition, it can be argued that, given the limits on knowledge within which 
policy-makers are confined, simplifying by limiting the focus to small variations from present 
policy makes the most of available knowledge. " (Lindblom 1959). The second method of 
simplification of analysis is the practice of ignoring important possible consequences of 
possible policies, as well as the values attached to the neglected consequences". 
It is the case that in Western democracies such as the UK, decision-makers generally limit 
their analyses to incremental 17 differences in policies, chosen to differ only incrementally 
(Lindblom 1959, Richardson and Jordan 1979). This is mainly because policy does not move 
in 'leaps and bounds'. Public attitude has an important role to play in this, since there is a 
need for fundamental agreement on potentially disruptive issues. They make relatively small 
adjustments to policies rather than sweeping changes. As such they are moving cautiously and 
experimentally. There are small-scale extensions of past efforts with the expectations that 
there will be a constant return to the problem to make further extensions and a need to 
reconsider the problem in the light of new data (Richardson and Jordan 1979). 
specific proposals. 
17 Or marginal 
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Interest groups have an important role to play since in democratic societies they can often 
assure a more comprehensive regard for the values of the whole of society than any attempt at 
comprehensiveness (Lindblom 1959). 
3.7.5 Succession of Compayisons (5b) 
As stated in 5a and b of Table 3.2, then policy is not made once and for all but is made and 
remade continuously. Instead, decision-making is 'serial'. As stated by Lindblom (1959) it is 
&&a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in which what is desired 
itself continues to change under reconsideration". By proceeding through a series of 
incremental changes the decision maker avoids serious mistakes, namely: 
* past sequences of policy steps have provided knowledge as to the possible consequences of 
similar further steps; 
" big jumps in pursuit of goals that require predictions beyond the decision-makers 
18 
knowledge are not needed, since the policy is not the final resolution of a problem, it is 
only one step in a series of steps; 
" The policy maker is able to test previous predictions as each further step is moved onto; 
"A past error can be remedied fairly quickly. Certainly more quickly than if policy 
proceeded through more distinct steps over a period of time. 
According to Lindblom (1959) the Rational-Comprehensive approach often relies heavily on 
19 
theory, attempting to find general propositions which can be applied to specific situations 
With successive limited comparisons, no such reliance is required, since it is just that, a 
succession of comparisons. This can help to explain why decision-makers are often of the 
opinion that academics are not helpful on occasions, offering theoretical constructs when 
decision makers often feel more confident "flying by the seat of their pants". As stated by 
Is Or anyone else's knowledge. 
19 The view of Lindblom (1959) is that the assumption of root analysts is that theory is the most systematic 
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Lindblom (1959) "Theorists often ask the administrator to go the long way round to the 
solution of his problems, in effect ask him to follow the best canons of the scientific method, 
when the administrator knows that the best available theory will work less well than more 
modest incremental comparisons. Theorists do not realise that the administrator is often in 
, 20 fact practising a systematic method . 
Theory may be of limited use in decision-making for two reasons. First, it requires a great 
deal of facts, being constructed only through a great deal of observations, and second, it is 
generally insufficiently precise for application to a decision-making process that is based on 
small changes. In addition, in public policy making the general level of theoretical 
understanding is low. 
In contrast, the branch approach requires far less facts and concentrates only on the facts that 
are relevant to those choices faced by the decision maker. 
3.8.0 Summary 
Decision-making in terms of 'muddling through' exhibits the characteristics illustrated in 
Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 The characteristics of 'Muddling Through'. 
I. It proceeds through incremental change; 
2. It involves mutual adjustment and negotiation; 
3. It excludes by accident, rather than by systematic or deliberate exclusion; 
4. Policy is not made once and for all; 
5. It proceeds through a succession of incremental changes; 
6. It is not theoretically driven; 
7. It is superior to a 'futile attempt at superhuman cornprehensiveness'-, 
9. The test of a good decision is agreement and process rather than goal- 
attainment or meeting objectives; 
9. It involves trial and error. 
Source: Parsons (1995) 
means of bringing relevant knowledge to bear on a specific problein. 
20 'Mis is an argument supported by Joseph ( 1999) who suggests that experts and their models should be put 
on top and not on tap, with a need lojust try it and have far less desk top studies and models. 
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It is important to stress that one of the ideas underpinning successive limited comparisons is 
that decision-making involves achieving agreement between groups (Richardson and Jordan 
1979) This is one reason for avoiding a preliminary insistence on the clarification of values or 
objectives. There is more chance of agreement on a specific proposal than there is on 
agreement of objectives. According to Richardson and Jordan (1979) the best policy is one 
that gains agreement and "This emphasis on accommodation between groups explains why 
decision-making takes the form of comparison between pragmatic available alternatives ... If 
agreement is sought it is unrealistic to consider too radical proposals as they are unlikely to 
have wide enough attractions for the various interests. This encourages only relatively minor 
changes to be put on the agenda'. 
3.9.0 Criticism of the incremental approach 
As with the rationalistic model the incremental approach has been subject to criticism: 
e It has been viewed as being conservative since it only deals with short term changes and 
reinforces inertia (Dror 1964 ) 
Dror also suggests that it is a valid approach only if the policies currently utilised are 
generally satisfactory, if the problem is relatively stable and if means of dealing with the 
problem are available continuously. Dror however regards "its [incrementalism's] main 
impact as an ideological reinforcement of the pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces 
prevalent in all human organisations, administrative and policy making,, 
21 
. He also states 
that 'The "rational-comprehensive" model has at least the advantage of stimulating 
administrators to get a little outside their regular routine, while Lindblom's model justifies 
a policy of "no effort. " Taken together, the limited validity of the "muddling through" 
21 As stated by Dror (1964) 'Even more dangerous is acceptance of the "incremental change" attitude by social 
scientists, as it reduces their functions as an innovating social factor. By limiting their suggestions to 
incremental change, the social scientist also significantly reduces his utility to policy makers, the latter 
being well aware of incremental alternatives and looking to the social scientist for new ideas'. 
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thesis and its inertia-reinforcing implications constitute a very serious weakness. (Dror 
1964). Lindblom (1964) disagrees that incrementalism. is anti-innovation. He states 
"Logically speaking, one can make changes in social structure as rapidly through a 
sequence of incremental steps as through dramatic - hence less frequent - alterations. 
Psychologically and sociologically speaking, decision makers can sometimes bring 
themselves to make changes easily and quickly only because the changes are incremental 
and are not fraught with great risk of error or of political conflict. " The difficulty with this 
as suggested by Cates (1979) is that "My problem is trying to identify a big or little 
decision. Appearances are deceiving. And if I could, I'm not sure it would do me any 
good". There is also a tone of elitism here somewhere; who is a "big decision maker? " The 
search for the big decision is a wild goose chase. Whether a decision is big or little, 
whether big decisions come less frequently than little decisions, whether one 
big decision 
is equal to several little decisions - these questions all miss the point. The point is: How 
can decision making be improved? And, that is the fatal flaw of incrementalism. - how do 
you "muddle" better? As such, there is a need to specify how large a programme change 
is 
allowed to be if it is to be designated an 'increment' (Lane 1993). It does however appear 
difficult to specify how large the 'increment' is allowed to be (Demester and Wildavsky 
1979). 
Smith and May (1980) argue that the incremental approach can be accused as being unjust 
in that 'good' decisions are assessed not by their ranking on some objective evaluation 
criterion but simply by their acceptability in a particular situation. As such, incrementalism 
is seen to favour the interests of the most powerful and systematically under-represent the 
interests of the underprivileged and politically unorganised. 
The incremental approach can also be viewed as extremely costly (Smith and May 1980). 
Although the costs of the rational decision making are high the costs of failing to explore 
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radical alternatives to existing policies may be even higher. As such, the incremental 
approach is accused of offering no way of informing participants that a sub-optimal 
solution which has emerged is so costly comparatively as to represent an outcome that 
decision makers would find unacceptable if the costs were apparent. Heyderbrand (1964) 
concludes that 'the question remains whether incremental change is only a form of 
adaptation which leaves basically intact what ought to be changed'. 
3.10.0 Conclusion 
"In the rational approach decision-making is essentially something which is about defining 
goals, selecting alternatives and comparing options. A good decision was one which meets 
the objectives. Simons' arguments had provided a manifesto for this belief in the essential 
improvability of decision-making. Lindblom's aim was to challenge the rational blueprint for 
a brave new politics by pointing out that there was method in the apparent 'irrationalism' of 
'muddling through'. Furthermore, he wanted to show how the idea of a more rational 
decision-making process (through the use of new tools and techniques) was simply not 
workable for complex policy questions" (Parsons 1995) 
in analysing the decision-making process, contrasting theoretical approaches, such as the 
rational or incremental approach can be used. As such, a) either one or the other can be 
utilised to shed light on the policy process or b) the various theoretical approaches can be 
compared and contrasted in terms of their explanation of how the policy process takes place. 
As stated in the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, the incremental approach starts with 
policies currently in force and considers only change at the margin. In addition, there are only 
a limited number of consequences envisaged and evaluated for any alternative. While 
appreciating that there are a variety of lenses through which decision-making can be studied, 
there being various models of the decision-making process, the incremental approach has 
been selected as the central tenet of this thesis. The reason is that this approach is implied 
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throughout the array of research literature reviewed as part of chapter 2. What is revealed is 
that in terms of the decision-making process with respect to urban road pricing a gradualist, 
step-by-step approach appears to be the most appropriate. This is based, in part, on the fact 
that the attitude to urban road pricing is such that there is a need to move cautiously, taking 
account of the views of the key stakeholder groups. Thus having reviewed the literature with 
respect to urban road pricing decision-making the incremental approach would appear to offer 
the best explanation of how the policy process takes place and should proceed. It is with this 
in mind that chapter 4 details the methodology and research objectives of the thesis stressing 
the incremental approach to urban road pricing decision-making. 
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Chapter 4 Research Approach and Objectives 
'Policy process studies are likely to be case studies, using qualitative methods .... One slight 
exception to the generalisation that quantitative methods cannot be used in the examination 
ofprocesses is information on levels of supportfor particular political positions'. 
(Hill 1997b) 
4.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter details the methodological approach taken in the thesis and the research 
objectives which emerge from a review of the literature on urban road pricing (see chapter 2), 
namely that of an incremental approach to decision-making with respect to urban road 
pricing. 
4.1.0 Methodological approach 
With respect to the methodology adopted, a pragmatic approach has been chosen, attempting 
to integrate both a quantitative and qualitative approach in a single study. The two approaches 
can be seen as complementary, rather than rival designs (Firestone 1987). Salomon (1991) 
suggests that no single paradigm is necessarily superior to the other - 'It is important to select 
what is most clearly a function of the particular aspect or unit of the world one wishes to 
study. Complementing research paradigms and methods mean more than coexistence; it 
underlines how one approach can inform and guide the other'. 
As stated, Hill (1997b) argues that 'policy process studies are likely to be case studies, using 
qualitative methods ... One slight exception to the generalisation that quantitative methods 
cannot be used in the examination of processes is comparative studies which have sought to 
explain similar activities in different countries (or different local authorities) by reference to 
contextual variables - demographic data, economic data, information on levels of support for 
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particular political positions, etc. '. It is on this basis that the thesis utilises the two 
approaches, via a national survey in order to obtain the attitudes of the key decision-makers in 
terms of urban road pricing and in-depth interviews as part of a case study approach to 
congestion metering considered in the city of Cambridge between 1990 and 1993. At the 
national level, views of Councillors and Officials (County, Metropolitan and London 
Borough) are ascertained as well as those of Academics (Economists, Civil Engineers and 
Planners). In-depth interviews with the key decision-makers at the national level would have 
been beneficial, that is, interviews with the Councillors who were members of the Transport 
Committee within a Local Authority or indeed a range of Transport Officials. Equally 
structured interviews with transport academics would have potentially provided interesting 
findings. Given the limitations surrounding research as part of a Ph. D. this was not practically 
possible (see chapter 9) and as such there was a reliance on the national survey. 
4.2.0 A case study approach 
A case study can be defined as 'an extensive examination of a single instance of a 
phenomenon of interest' (Hussey and Hussey 1997) or a situation 'in which the researcher 
explores a single entity or phenomenon ("the case") bounded by time and activity (a program, 
event, process, institution, or social group) and collects detailed information' (Yin 1989). Yin 
further, states that in general 'case studies are the preferred strategy when "how" or "why" 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the 
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context'. Such explanatory 
case studies can also be complemented by two other types, namely exploratory and 
descriptive case studies. The research undertaken with respect to congestion metering fits this 
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scenario with a case study which is both experimental and explanatory and to a lesser extent 
descriptive. Scapens (1990) defines these case studies as being': 
9 Experimental case studies where the research examines the difficulties in implementing 
new procedures and techniques; 
9 Explanatory case studies where existing theory is used to understand and explain what is 
happening; 
9 Descriptive case studies where the objective is restricted to describing the current 
situation; 
Otley and Berry (1994) add another type of case study namely, one which arises by chance, 
with circumstances such that the researcher is given access and the opportunity to examine a 
particular phenomenon. This was certainlY the case in terms of congestion metering in the city 
of Cambridge. 
in addition to the above, Yin (1989) argues that there is a distinctive need for a case study 
approach which arises out of a desire to understand complex social phenomena, of which 
urban traffic congestion and the urban road pricing option is indeed one. 
Yin (1984) states that in all of case study research, one of the most challenging tasks is to 
define an exemplary case study and to this effect, presents five general characteristics of an 
exemplary case study: 
4.2.1 The case study must be significant 
As such, the study is likely to be one in which the case is of general public interest and where 
the underlying issues are nationally important, either in theoretical terms or in policy or 
practical terms. Both are true in terms of the decision-making process with respect to urban 
road pricing and in particular congestion metering in the context of the city of Cambridge. A 
It is important to note that the different types of case study are not well delineated and one type may be 
combined with or merged with another (Hussey and Hussey 1997) 
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single-case study can be chosen because it was a revelatory case - that is, one reflecting some 
real-life situation that social scientists had not been able to study in the past. In addition, a 
critical case may have been chosen because of the desire to compare two rival propositions; if 
the propositions are at the core of a well-known theory - or reflect major strands of thought in 
a discipline - the case study is likely to be significant. Congestion metering in the city of 
Cambridge was chosen since it was the first ever trial of an urban road pricing scheme in the 
UK, and as such it created a great deal of international interest. In addition, it was a 
sophisticated road pricing scheme ideally placed to shed light on the rival propositions in 
terms of the rational and incremental approaches to decision-making. 
4. Z2 The case study must be 'complete' 
A sense of completeness is an important component of a case study. As such, Yin states that 
the case study should demonstrate convincingly that the investigator has expended exhaustive 
effort in collecting the relevant evidence. The overall goal, is to convince the reader that very 
little relevant evidence remained untouched by the investigator, given the boundaries of the 
case study. This does not mean literally collection of all the available evidence, but that the 
critical pieces have been given 'complete' attention. Such critical pieces, would be those 
representing rival propositions. Every attempt was made to interview all the Councillors and 
Officials who had first hand experience of congestion metering. It remains to be seen whether 
the reader is convinced that the investigator has expended exhaustive effort. 
4.2.3 The case study must consider alternative perspectives 
For explanatory case studies, a valuable approach is the consideration of rival propositions. 
To represent different perspectives adequately, an investigator must seek those alternatives 
that most seriously challenge the design of the case study. These perspectives can be found in 
alternative cultural views, different theories, or variations among decision-makers who are 
part of the case study. As such, they should present the point of view of all the major actors in 
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the case. In terms of congestion metering, the major decision-making actors were subject to 
in-depth interview and as such were central to the case study. 
4.2.4 The case study must display sufficient evidence 
The exemplary case study is one that effectively presents the most compelling evidence, so 
that the reader can reach an independent judgement regarding the merits of the analysis and 
conclude, independently, whether a particular interpretation is valid. 
4.2.5 The case study must be composed in an engaging manner 
The study should be written in a clear writing style - the reader will no doubt judge. 
43.0 Triangulation 
As stated, the thesis combines a quantitative and qualitative, mixed method approach. The 
term triangulation has been used (Denzin 1978) to argue for the combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon. The research has involved "between 
methods" drawing on qualitative and quantitative methods (Jick 1979), as such, in-depth 
interviews and a national survey. The concept of triangulation is based on the assumption that 
any bias inherent in particular data sources, investigator and method would be neutralised 
when used in conjunction with other data sources, investigators and methods (Jick 1979). 
Although the distinction between the two paradigms may be clear at the philosophical level, 
as Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue, when it comes to the use of quantitative or qualitative 
methods and to the issues of research design the distinction breaks down (Punch 1986). 
Increasingly, researchers argue that one should attempt to mix methods to some extent, since 
it provides more perspectives on the phenomena being investigated (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe 
and Lowe 1991). Fielding and Fielding (1986) advocate the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. 
Greene et al (1989) put forward five purposes for combining the two approaches namely: 
1. triangulation in order to seek convergence of results; 
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2. complementarity, in that overlapping and different facets of a phenomenon may emerge; 
3. developmentally, wherein the first method is used sequentially to help inform the second 
method; 
4. initiation, wherein contradictions and fresh perspectives emerge; 
5. expansion, wherein the mixed methods add scope and breadth to the study. 
In terms of convergence, where it occurs confidence in the results grows considerably. 
Schools of thought exist in terms of paradigms and methods used (Creswell 1994). The line 
taken in this thesis is that of the pragmatists integrating the methods in a single study (see 
Rossman and Wilson 1985). They argue that a false dichotomy exists between qualitative and 
quantitative approaches and that researchers should make the most efficient use of both 
paradigms in understanding social phenomena. They should be viewed as complementary 
rather than as rival camps, researchers improving the accuracy of their judgements by 
collecting different kinds of data bearing on the same phenomenon (Jick 1979). In fact, they 
are better viewed as two ends of a continuum rather than as two distinct kinds of methods. 
Furthermore Jick (1979) states that 'it is probable that the triangulation approach is embedded 
in many doctoral theses that, when packed into articles, tend to highlight only the quantitative 
methods'. 
It is important to note at this stage that 'It is a delicate exercise to decide whether or not 
results have converged. In theory, a multiple confirmation of findings may appear routine. If 
there is convergence, it presumably is apparent. In practice, though, there are few guidelines 
for systematically ordering eclectic data in order to determine congruence or validity. For 
example, should all components of a multi-method approach be weighted equally, that is, is 
all the evidence equally useful? If not, then it is not clear on what basis the data should be 
weighted, aside from personal preference. Given the differing nature of multi-method results, 
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the determination is likely to be subjective'. As such, the stance is taken that the two 
approaches used in this thesis are of equal weight. 
Finally, in such an approach the triangulating investigator is left to search for a logical pattern 
in mixed-method results. The claim to validity rests on a judgement or a capacity to orgamse 
materials within a plausible framework (Jick 1979). 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991) provide a useful, if somewhat simplistic summary 
from a pragmatic view, as to what are seen as some of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
two approaches as seen in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 The relative strengths and weaknesses of the quantitative and qualitative 
research method. 
Quantitative method: 
Strengths: Weaknesses: 
it can provide wide coverage, 0 Rather inflexible; 
Fast and economical, 0 Not very effective in understanding 
Considerable relevance to policy processes or the significance that people 
decisions. attach to actions; 
41 Since they focus on what is, or what has 
been recently, they make it hard for the 
policy-maker to infer what changes and 
actions should take place in the future. 
Qualitative method: 
Strengths: Weaknesses: 
" ability to look at change processes over 0 data collection can take up it great (teal of' 
time; tirne and resources; 
" ability to understand people's meanings; 0 analysis and interpretation ot'data may be 
0 ability to adjust to new issues and ideas as very difficult; 
they emerge; * qualitative studies often I'eel untidy since it 
" ability to contribute to the evolution of is harder to control their pace, progress 
new theories; and end-points; 
" provide a way of gathering data which is 0 many people, especially policy-niakers, 
seen as natural rather than artificial. may give low credibility to studies based 
on a phenomenological approach. 
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In terms of the empirical work undertaken as part of this thesis an aim has been to incorporate 
the relative strengths of both the quantitative and qualitative approaches. In terms of the 
quantitative method, the survey has provided national coverage of each local authority in 
England. It would have been too time consuming to have undertaken face-to-face interviews 
with representatives from each local authority although as stated in section 10.1.1 in-depth 
interviews would have provided useful insights. In addition, the survey approach has provided 
data which is of relevance to policy decisions. This is demonstrated by the willingness of 
Transport Policy, the Journal of the World Conference on Transport Research Society to 
publish the national survey findings (Ison 2000 forthcoming). In terms of the qualitative 
method, the case study approach has allowed analysis of a process over a three year period, 
i. e. congestion metering in Cambridge between 1990 and 1993. In-depth interviews have 
given an ability to understand Councillors and Officials meanings in terms of congestion 
metering and provide information seen as natural rather than artificial. 
4.4.0 The Empirical approach 
Much of the research which has been undertaken with respect to urban road pricing decision- 
making has been non-UK based. This is not too surprising since the only schemes currently in 
existence are in Singapore and Norway, with trials taking place in Hong Kong in the 1980s. 
One aim of the thesis is to redress the imbalance and as such the research undertaken is UK 
specific, that is decision-making in the UK with respect to urban road pricing. 
The research undertaken in the UK has tended to focus on public attitude surveys relating to 
the perceptions and attitudes to urban road pricing. These surveys are importanO since 
ultimately public acceptability will be required if any scheme is to be introduced. There are 
however a number of other key stakeholder groups central to the decision-making process 
2 As stated by Jones (1991b) in this respect "... it is critically important to have an understanding of public 
perceptions and attitudes when considering any new policy initiatives". 
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whose opinions are equally important and as such require investigation. The groups, 
illustrated in Table 4.2, have an understanding of urban traffic issues, especially at the local 
level and specific groups have a direct involvement in decision-making. Through their direct 
involvement and/or professional interest in urban road pricing, they have an important role to 
play, not least in fashioning public opinion, agenda setting and decision-making and as such 
the research will focus on these 'key stakeholder groups'3 . 
4.4.1 Local authority councillors 4 and officials with responsibility for transport policy have 
a critical role to play. The research will focus on these 'key players', at the County, 
Metropolitan and London Borough level. Emphasis will be on local rather than central 
government since the impetus for any urban road pricing scheme is likely to be at the local 
level; 
4.4.2 the academic community, and in particular economists, civil engineers and planners 
who have a particular interest in urban road traffic issues. They can have a significant 
influence on opinion and agenda setting not least through articles in academic journals, 
conference papers and consultancy; 
4.4.3 Road user and environmental interest groups such as the AA and Friends of the Earth 
have an important role as pressure groups in influencing the 'environment' in which a policy 
such as urban road pricing is considered; 
4.4.4 Professional Bodies and Associations represent the transport professional and are 
important not least in formulating positional documents. 
It would appear from a review of the literature that the 'opinions' of these four broad groups 
have been neglected and thus the thesis will concentrate in this area. As such, a National 
3 it is important to state that they reflect their own group not the whole population. 
4 Chairs of the Committees with responsibility for transport policy. 
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Traffic Survey of the 'key stakeholder groups' has been undertaken, details of which are 
given in section 4.5.0. 
Whilst it is important to ascertain the opinions of the various stakeholder groups nationally it 
is equally important to draw on specific UK experience, where it exists. As such the research 
will also analyse decision-making with respect to congestion metering in the context of the 
city of Cambridge. What lessons can be learrit in terms of decision-making from a rather 
sophisticated type of urban road pricing scheme considered between October 1990 - October 
1993 (see section 4.6-0). 
In summary the aims of the thesis are to: 
11 undertake UK specific research through the use of a national road traffic survey; 
concentrate on local decision-makers5 and 'players' who have a major influence on 
decision-making rather than on 'the public'; 
e draw on the experience of congestion metering in the context in the city of Cambridge, 
1990-1993. 
Rather than what Parsons (1995) refers to as 'high policy actors' forn-iing national policy. It is at local level 
were enactment will be an issue. 
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4.5.0 The national urban road traffic survey. 
The aim of the National Urban Road Traffic Survey is to provide an insight into an 
important area of urban transport policy while also contributing to a better 
understanding of the relationship between 'players' in the transport debate. As such 
the views were ascertained of key UK individuals in the transport debate, namely from 
local authorities (both Officials and Councillors), leading transport academics, 
transport interest groups and Professional Bodies. 
4.5.1 Method 
Over the period April - May 1996 a pilot questionnaire was sent to a selected group of 
eleven individuals. This included four from local authorities, four academics, one 
from a professional body and two transport consultants. This proved useful in 
identifying issues of clarity and content and as such all criticisms and suggested 
improvements were incorporated into the final questionnaire where considered 
appropriate. 
The final questionnaire survey was conducted over the period August - October 1996. 
Each potential respondent was mailed a self-completion questionnaire and a pre-paid 
addressed envelope together with a covering letter carefully explaining the purpose Of 
the survey. Any respondent who had failed to return a completed questionnaire after 
approximately three weeks was mailed a further questionnaire, reminder letter and a 
pre-paid envelope. Table 4.3 gives a summary of the individuals who received the 
questionnaire and the response rate. A copy of covering letter and the survey is to be 
found in Appendix 2. 
In terms of Local Authorities, the Municipal Year Book (1996) was used as a source 
for determining who should receive the questionnaire. Six distinct groups were 
identified as having a direct interest in urban road traffic issues (see Table 4.3). Two 
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difficulties were encountered when using the Municipal Year Book. First, there was 
no consistency with regards to the names of Departments and titles given to the 
individual responsible for transport planning and policy issues within a particular 
Authority6. It is no clearer in tenns of Councillors, and in particular the Chair of the 
respective Transport Committees. 
Second, Local Authorities have been subject to a high degree of reorganisation in 
recent years, leading to frequent changes in Departmental names and staff 
responsibilities. 
For both these reasons it was deemed necessary to telephone the Department of each 
Local Authority most likely to be responsible for transport planning and policy issues. 
As such it was possible to obtain the name and official title of the individual with a 
knowledge of traffic issues and in particular urban congestion and the policies for 
dealing with it. At this stage the name/s of particular Councillor/s responsible for 
traffic were also ascertained 7. This exercise proved most useful in determining contact 
names, titles and addresses (if different from the Municipal Year Book), to which the 
Urban Traffic Survey should be sent. 
The high response rate from Local Authority Officials and Councillors, shown in 
Table 4.3, can be attributed in part to determining contact names and also, perhaps 
more importantly, to the considerable interest and concern regarding the traffic issues 
involved. 
For example, a selection of the titles used included Head of Transportation and Traffic, Director of 
Planning and Engineering Services, Director of Highways and Technical Services, Director of 
Engineering 
Services, City Engineer, Technical Services Officer, Director of Development Services, Director of 
Environment, Borough Engineer, Director of Environmental Services, County Surveyor. 
7 This meant the Councillor who was Chair of the Transport Committee, or the equivalent. 
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Table 4.3 Summary of Questionnaire Response Rate. 
Number of 
Questionnaires 
_Mailed 
Out 
Number of 
Respondents 
Response Rate 
Local Authorities: 
County Officials 47 41 87 
County Councillors 55 39 71 
Metropolitan Officials 36 28 78 
Metropolitan Councillors 36 23 64 
London Officials 32 23 72 
London Councillors 31 16 52 
Academics: 
Economists 40 25 63 
Planners 25 18 72 
Civil Engineers 38 27 71 
Transport Interest Groups: 
Road User Interest Groups 15 7 47 
Environmental Groups 4 1 25 
Professional Bodies 10 
- -6 
60 
TOTAL: 369 254 69_ 
In terms of the academic community three particular groups were identified, namely 
Economists, Planners and Civil Engineers. Since an interest in transport was of' 
paramount importance then simply distributing the questionnaire to the Heads of' the 
particular Departments8 within UK Universities would/could have resulted in a 
disappointing response. It was thus decided to use two Sources, namely transport 
related Journals and the University Transport Studies Group. As such the Journal of 
Transport Economics and Policv, Traffic Engineering and Control, Tranq)ort Policv, 
Tramport Reviews and 1he Town Planning Review were consulted over the period 
1990-96. The airn was to obtain the names of UK academics who had contributcd to 
those Journals over the period in question. In addition the contact narnes for the 
University Transport Studies Group in UK Universities was also UtIllSed. In a number 
of instances there was an overlap between the two listings, as might be expected. 
8 With the names and addresses obtained from the Commonwealth Universities Yearbook 1995-96 
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A third group was also identified namely the 'transport interest group', which could 
be sub divided into the Road User Interest Group, the Environmental Group and 
Professional Bodies. In this area two sources were consulted, namely, the Associations 
and Professional Bodies of the United Kingdom and the Directory of British 
Associations. Thus a small group was identified as illustrated in Table 4.3. The 
response rate was disappointing given the excellent response from the other groups 
and the fact that each body identified had been contacted by telephone in order to 
ascertain the most appropriate contact name. 
Since the road user interest group, environmental groups and professional bodies and 
associations comprise such a small sample, and in fact in the case of environmental 
groups just one response, then no attempt has been made to analyse their findings 
individually. As such, whereas the findings are included as part of the overall 
response, where data for these groups have been presented (mainly in Appendix 3) 
they are simply for completeness. 
4.6.0 The case study of congestion metering in the city of Cambridge. 
In order that the research should be both valid and relevant opinions were elicited 
from Councillors and Officials who had direct contact with and knowledge of 
congestion metering in Cambridge, over the period October 1990 to October 1993, the 
time over which congestion metering was being considered in Cambridge. 
Local Authorities operate at a number of levels, namely County, City and District 
Councils with councillors elected to each. The concept of congestion metering was 
investigated by the County Council as a means of dealing with traffic congestion, but 
it also had implications at both the City and District level. Thus it was viewed 
important to obtain the opinions of all three groups of councillors. In terms of the 
County Council, membership of the Transport Services Committee (TSC) over the 
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period in question was deemed the relevant population. Thirteen County Councillors 
were thus interviewed, as shown in Table 4.4. This represents approximately 60 per 
cent of those who attended the TSC meetings, the majority as members9. Over the 
same period the Cambridge Traffic Planning and Liaison Select Panel was established I 
in order to act as a consultative body and a forum for debating and offering advice to 
the County Council in the course of implementing the Cambridge Transport 
Strategy'(). The Panel included City and South Cambridge District Councillors in 
addition to county councillors'' and of the six City and District Council panel 
members, four were interviewed, as illustrated in Table 4.4. In addition four officials 
were interviewed in order to obtain the transport professionals perspective. 
Table 4.4 A summary of Councillors and Officials interviewed. 
Cambridgeshire Cambridge City South Cambridge 
County Council Council District Council 
Conservatives 8 
Labour 22 
Liberal Democrat 31 
_Officials 
31 
Of the twenty one interviewed twenty were face to face with each interview lasting 
one to one and a half hours over the period May to June 1996. The interviewees were 
asked a series of open-ended questions as seen in Table 4.5 and also to complete a 
questionnaire enquiring how concerned they wcre about a range of' ISSLICS relating to 
congestion metering, ranked on a scale of I to 5. This was the same as (ILiestion 7 used 
in the national survey (see Appendix 2), although it related specifically to congestion 
metering. 
9 The political split rellects the make up ofthe council over the period in question. 
'0 See chapter 6. 
" The county councillors werc also mernhers ofthe TSC. 
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Table 4.5 The questions asked of selected Councillors and Officials with respect 
to congestion metering in the city of Cambridge. 
1. How serious do you consider the current levels of traffic congestion to be in the city of Cambridge? 
2. Why was the concept of congestion metering considered in the context of Cambridge? 
3. What do you understand by the term congestion metering? 
4. What was your initial reaction to the proposal of congestion metering when it was first announced? 
5. Did those reactions change in the period following the first announcement? 
6. What do you view to be the potential advantages of congestion metering? 
7. What do you view to be the potential disadvantages of congestion metering? 
8. Did you approve of the way in which the revenue raised from congestion metering was intended to be 
used? 
9. In your opinion why was congestion metering not continued with beyond the Field trial 
10. How could the concept of congestion metering have been made more politically and publicly acceptable? 
11. Would the proposal of a less technologically advanced system (at least in the first instance) have proved 
more politically acceptable? 
12. What is the likelihood of a similar scheme being introduced in the city of Cambridge in the next five years? 
13. What is the likelihood of a similar scheme being introduced elsewhere in the UK in the next five years? 
Both the national survey and the case study of congestion metering are used to analyse 
the decision-making process. How should the decision-making process be undertaken 
with respect to urban road pricing in order to improve acceptability and the chances of 
implementation. As stated, the literature review on urban road pricing decision- 
making in chapter 2, would suggest an incremental approach to decision-making. As 
such, this is the focus of the research. 
4.7.0 Research Objectives 
In terms of a case study Yin (1984) details what are termed study propositions with 
each proposition directing attention to something that should be examined within the 
scope of the study. In fact Yin states that 'the more a study contains specific 
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propositions, the more it will stay within feasible limits', with the proposition helping 
to organize the entire case study'. Whilst this thesis has adopted a mixed method 
approach through the use of a national survey and case study, a series of propositions 
have been utilised as the methodological device for the thesis. In terms of the research 
objectives the following proposition can be stated, namely that: 
"An 'incremental approach' is the most appropriate in terms of urban road 
pricing decision-making in the UK". 
This, in part, is based on the fact that declsion-making involves achieving agreement 
between interest groups. 
This general proposition can be analysed through a series of six specific propositions 
which emanate in part from the literature review undertaken in chapter 2: 
Proposition 1: 
'Urban road pricing is likely to become more acceptable as a policy option the 
more serious the level of congestion and pollution are perceived to be in the 
towns and cities of the UK'. 
As such, until urban congestion and pollution are seen as being severe enough, 
decision-makers are likely to persevere with other less draconian policy options when 
dealing with the problern. Thus 'an incremental approach' to decislon-making with 
respect to urhan congestion and traffic related pollution would appear most likely, 
making changes at the margins. Only when these options have been exhausted is 
urban road pricing likely to become more acceptable. Policy tends not to move in 
'leaps and bounds' and public attitude has an important role to play in this since there 
is a need for fundamental agreement on potentially disruptive issues. 
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Proposition 2: 
'In terms of the money raised by urban road pricing one third should be 
considered as general tax revenue, either to reduce existing taxes or to increase 
social spending in accordance with the priorities of each country or locality, one 
third used for new road infrastructure and its associated maintenance, in 
locations again chosen in accordance with the varying national or local priorities 
and one third to improve the effectiveness of public transport, by a suitable 
combination of fare and service level improvements'. (Goodwin 1989) 
A step-by-step approach, particularly in terms of allocating the revenue raised would 
appear to be an important aspect of decision making with respect to urban road 
pricing, not least since an idea underpinning the incremental approach is that decision- 
making involves achieving agreement between the various interest groups. Hence the 
test of a good policy is agreement on the policy itself. As such, an approach similar to 
the 'rule of three' should be built into the design of an urban road pricing scherne 
from the beginning, since it is important in developing an acceptable policy of urban 
road pricing. This is likely to be influenced by local considerations. 
Proposition 3: 
'The support for urban road pricing increases if it is taken as part of a 
comprehensive package of measures'. 
'I'llis suggcsts aii increiiiental approach to decision-iiiakiiig, SIIICC UlItIl I 
comprehensive range of measures have been exhausted urban road pricing will not 
prove acceptable as a policy option. 
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Proposition 4: 
'The major concern with respect to urban road pricing relate to privacy, equity, 
the utilisation of the revenue raised and the clarity of objectives. 
There are issues raised as part of the literature review. Thus, the benefit of an 
I incremental approach', is that attention is given to these issues as the decision- 
making process with respect to urban road pricing develops. 
In terms of the technology considered then the following proposition can be put 
forward: 
Proposition 5: 
'The simpler the scheme being proposed the more acceptable it is likely to be'. 
A less sophisticated scherne, at least in the first instance, is more likely to be accepted 
as a policy option. This proposition is based specifically on the desire to reduce 
uncertainty, uncertainty in terms of the reliability and accuracy of the urban road 
pricing equipment used and the likely cost involved in terms of installation. Overall, a 
'gradualist approach' to decision making. In addition, proceeding through a series of' 
incremental changes the decision-making can avoid serious mistakes (see section 
3.7.5). As such: 
Proposition 6: 
'An extensive trial of an urban road pricing scheme is required in the UK'. 
'Hils reinforces the 'Incremental approach' to decision-making with respect to urhan 
road pricing, not least in reducing the areas of uncertainty. 
The propositions are 'incrementalist' in form not least because of the contentious 
nature of urban road pricing. 
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It is important to reiterate that policy is not made once and for all and that decision- 
making involves achieving agreement between groups, with decision-making taking 
the form of comparisons between pragmatic available alternatives. 
4.8.0 Conclusion 
Based on the position taken by Hill quoted at the outset of this chapter, both a 
quantitative and qualitative approach have been adopted as part of this thesis. The two 
approaches, namely a national survey and a case study can be seen as complimentary, 
informing and guiding each other. The survey allows the perceptions of decision 
makers and opinion formers to be ascertained across the whole country, as such 
providing a wide coverage with considerable relevance to policy decisions. The case 
study allows for an extensive examination of a single instance of a contemporary 
phenomenon of interest, namely the first ever trial of an urban road pricing scheme in 
the UK. The case study approach is highly relevant to the desire to understand a 
complex social issue, such as urban road pricing decision-making. A case study is the 
preferred method when why, how and what questions are being posed. My was 
congestion metering considered and how was it envisaged it would be introduced, and 
in fact what were the advantages and disadvantages? The two approaches complement 
each other providing a wider perspective on the phenomena. Research in the UK has 
tended to focus on public attitudes and whilst important the attitudes of decision- 
makers require attention. This is a central feature of the thesis. 
The research objective of this thesis stems from the literature review of urban road 
pricing undertaken as part of chapter 2, which although not explicit, implies an 
incremental approach to urban road pricing decision making. This notion is analysed 
via six propositions dealing with: 
the seriousness of congestion and pollution in urban areas; 
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* how the revenue raised from urban road pricing is allocated; 
* the package approach to urban traffic congestion; 
* the major issues of stakeholder concern relating to urban road pricing; 
e the sophistication of the urban road pricing scheme being considered; and 
* the need for an extensive trial of urban road pricing. 
These six propositions form the basis of the following chapters detailing the national 
survey and the case study of congestion metering in the context of the city of 
Cambridge. 
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Chapter 5 An Incremental Approach to Urban Road Pricing: A 
National Perspective'. 
'A range of polices tire required. Frequent, cheap, reliable, clean public transport 
with Park and Ride services coupled with restricted access fiv cars and deliverv 
vehicles - but not urban road pricing' 
(Metropolitan Borough Councillor 1997) 
'Urban road pricing will only have a chance of acceptance by car users, provided the 
receipts are used to improve the roadjýcilities, particularlY in that area' 
(County Councillor 1997) 
5.0.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to detail the results of the national survey undertaken of key 
stakeholders in the urban road pricing decision-making process at the local level. As 
such, the attitudes of local authority councillors and officials, as well as transport 
academics and various road user interest groups, are ascertained. Above are two 
comments made by Councillors when responding to the National Survey reflecting 
aspects of decision-making with respect to urban road pricing. In the previous chapter 
the following proposition was stated, namely that: 
"An 'incremental approach' is the most appropriate in terms of' urban road 
pricing decision-making in the UK". 
As stated, this can be aiialysed thi-ough a senes of specific pi-opositiolls. 'I'llese will be 
analysed in this chapter using as a basis the framework set out in Chapter 2, 
An abridged version ofthis cImpter was presented at the TRB Annual Meeting January 2000 cmided 
'Local Authority and Academic Attitudes to Urban Road Pricing: A UK Perspective'. 
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5.1.0 The local situation 
5. LI The seriousness of urban traffic congestion and traffic related pollution 
Proposition 1: 
'Urban road pricing is likely to become more acceptable as a policy option the 
more serious the level of congestion and pollution are perceived to be in the 
and cities of the UK'. 
Traffic congestion and traffic related pollution are perceived to he serious or very 
serious in urban areas of the UK. In response to the questions 2 'How serious do you 
consider the current levels of traffic congestion to be in towns and cities of the UKT 
and 'How serious do you consider the current levels of traffic related pollution to be in 
towns and cities of the UKT, answers were given as shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 The seriousness of traffic congestion and traffic related pollution in 
towns and cities of the UK (All respondents %). 
Very Serious Fairly Not Very Not at al I 
Serious Serious Serious Serious 
Traffic Congestion 30.8 52.8 15.2 1.2 
Traffic related Pollution 34.1 39.0 24.5 2.4 
As indicated, 83.6 per cent of respondents viewed congestion as being serious or very 
3 
serious in the towns and cities of the UK . In terms of pollution the figures were 
somewhat less at 73.1 per cent, although still cause for concern. 
As stated in Chapter 4, the respondents were split into 'key stakeholder groups', 
namely Councillors and Officials at County, Metropolitan Borough and London 
2 See Appendix 2. 
One respondent (academic) annotated the survey suggesting that traffic congestion was 'Not Very 
Serious' in towns but was 'Serious' in cities ofthe UK. In terms oftraffic related pollution it was 
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Borough level and academics, Economists, Planners and Civil Engineers, Road User 
Interest Groups, Environmental Groups and Professional Bodies and Associations.. It 
is important to ascertain the strength of feeling of these key interest groups In terms of 
congestion and traffic related pollution. As such, Table 5.2 is a summary with respect 
to the percentage viewing congestion and pollution as being serious or very serious in 
towns and cities of the UK. The Table is disaggregated further in Appendix 3 Tables I 
and 2. 
Table 5.2 Strength of feeling with respect to the seriousness of congestion and 
traffic related pollution in towns and cities in the UK. 
Respondents: Traffic Congestion 
(Serious or Very serious) 
Traffic related Pollution 
(Serious or Very Serious) 
County Council: 
Officials 67.5 57.5 
Councillors 92.1 86.8 
Metropolitan Borough: 
Officials 78.6 64.3 
Councillors 91.3 78.3 
London Borough: 
Officials 91.3 86.4 
Councillors 93.8 100.0 
Economists 83.3 62.5 
Planners 100.0 88.9 
Civil Engineers 73.1 53.8 
Road User Interest Groups 100.0 71.4 
Environmental Groups 100.0 100.0 
Professional Bodies and 50.0 66.6 
Associations 
All 83.6 73.1 
perceived as being 'Not at all Serious' in towns and 'Fairly Serious' in cities offlic LJK. 
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Table 5.2 reveals: 
that with the exception of London Borough Councillors, all Local Authority groups 
view congestion as more serious than traffic related pollution in towns and cities of 
the UK; 
* Councillors in all three areas perceive congestion and traffic related pollution as 
more serious than Officials. In fact, over 90 per cent of Councillors view 
congestion as serious or very serious; 
* in terms of academic opinion, Economists, Planners and Civil Engineers all view 
traffic congestion as more serious than traffic related pollution (serious or very 
serious); 
4, although this is the case, if one simply takes 'very serious' as a benchmark, then the 
situation is somewhat different. All three groups of Councillors view traffic related 
pollution as more serious on this basis when compared with congestion. In fact, in 
terms of London Borough Councillors, 75 per cent view pollution as being 'very 
serious'. In fact if 'very serious' is used then all but Metropolitan Borough 
Councillors, Economists and Civil Engineers view pollution as more serious. This 
can be seen in Tables I and 2 of Appendix 3; 
* the strength of feeling hardens the more urbanised the area, particularly for 
Officials. For example, 67.5 per cent of County Officials and 92.1 per cent of 
County Councillors view congestion as being serious or very serious, whereas in 
the London Boroughs the figures are 91.3 and 93.8 per cent respectively. If one 
considers traffic related pollution, then for the same groups the figures increase 
from 57.5 and 86.8 per cent to 86.4 and 100 per cent respectively. 
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5.1.2 7he effectiveness of vayious policy options 
Given the perception that current levels of traffic congestion and traffic related 
pollution are serious or very serious in towns and cities of the UK then the question 
arises as to what are viewed as effective and acceptable methods of dealing with the 
problem? The response is outlined in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 and tables 3 and 4 of 
Appendix 3. 
As outlined in chapter 4 the responses to the National Urban Road Traffic Survey 
were asked for on a5 point scale. In terms of 'effectiveness' shown in Table 5.3,1 is 
taken to 'totally ineffective' and 5 as 'totally effective'. As such, it is possible to 
obtain a 'mean value' in order to create a ranking in terms of effectiveness. On this 
basis, selective expansion of road construction is perceived as the least effective and 
the banning or restricting of vehicles in central areas perceived as the most effective. 
The Table indicates that the implementation of urban road pricing as one of the most 
effective options for dealing with urban traffic congestion. In fact, 81.6 per cent of 
respondents viewed urban road pricing as being 'totally' or 'fairly effective, with only 
the Banning or restricting of vehicles in central areas seen as being more effective. 
This is also the case if the only category considered is 'totally effective'. In this case 
the response in terms of the implementation of urban road pricing and the banning of 
vehicles is 22.1 and 33.7 per cent respectively. Appendix 3, Tables 3.1 to 3.9 reveal 
detail with respect to the various 'key stakeholder groups'. 
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Table 5.3 Effective policy options for reducing traffic congestion in towns and 
cities of the UK (All respondents). 
Totally/Fairly Totally/Fairl Mean 
Policy Option: Ineffective y Effective 
I%% 
ive expansion of road construction in 
areas 
55.1 35.2 2.66 1 
The encouragement ofhorne working 
The encouragernent of car sharing 
The creation of a comprehensive network of 
safe cycle and walking routes which do not 
involve the use of heavy trafficked roads 
An increase in the price o[petrol to f-'5 per 
gallon 
Introduction or expansion of Park & Ride 
sites 
Cheaper public transport fares 
A doubling of parking charges in urban areas 
An improvement in the frequency & 
reliability of public transport 
The development of ý1 kind use & transport 
planning strategy 
The implementation ofurban road pricing 
Bann i ng/restricti 119 vehicles in central areas 
38.8 28.6 2.84 
39.4 28.9 2.85 
19.9 56.1 3.39 1 
18.9 62.1 3.47 1 
3.5 67.8 3.59 1 
15.0 65.4 3.62 
13.4 73.2 3.64 
9.7 77.4 3.81 
7.8 80.8 3.88 1 
11.5 81.6 3.88 
4.9 87.4 4.15 
The following can be noted: 
e there is consistent agreement that the 'least effective' methods of dealing will, 
urban traffic congestion are 'selective expansion of road construction ill urban 
areas' and the 'encourage nient of home working and car sharing'; 
1- -11-1---- 
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op - as regards the 'most effective' then the banning of vehicles in central areas is 
perceived as one of the most effective; 
e in terms of urban road pricing, whereas Table 5.3 indicates strong overall support, 
there is a lack of commonality with respect to the various stakeholder groups. For 
example, Table 3.7 of Appendix 3 shows strong support by Economists for the 
market based approach including urban road pricing when dealing with issues of 
traffic congestion. 4 This is borne out by the fact that in terms of the effectiveness of 
policy options, an increase in the price of petrol to E5 per gallon, a doubling of 
parking charges in urban areas and the implementation of urban road pricing are 
viewed as three of the four most effective methods of dealing with the problem. In 
fact, in terms of the implementation of urban road pricing approximately 92 per 
cent of Economists surveyed viewed it as being 'totally or fairly effective'. If 
however the views of Councillors are referred to, there appears to be somewhat less 
support. All three groups of Councillors (County Councils, Metropolitan Borough 
Councillors and London Borough Councils) view the implementation of urban road 
pricing as less effective than other methods. In fact, Metropolitan Borough 
Councillors perceive the implementation of urban road pricing as the least effective 
of all the policy options suggested, with 47.6 per cent viewing it as being 'totally' 
or 'fairly effective' whereas 42.9 per cent view it as being 'totally' or 'fairly 
ineffective' (see Tables 3.2,3.4 and 3.6 of Appendix 3). 
4 This supports the view put forward by Frey etal (1985), Common (1989) and Beckerman (1990). 
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Table 5.4 Publicly acceptable policy options for reducing traffic congestion in the 
towns and cities of the UK (All respondents). 
Totally 
Policy Options: 
Unacceptable Totally/Fairly Mean 
/Not Very Acceptable 
increase in the price of petrol to: E5 per 
]on 
89.1 5.6 1.74 
The implementation of urban road pricing 
A doubling ol'parking charges in urban areas 
Selective expansion of road construction in 
urban areas 
Bann i ng/restricti ng veliicles in central areas 
rhe encouragement of car sharing 
rhe encourage nient ot'llorne working 
rhe developnient of a land use & transport 
)Ianning strategy 
ntroduction or expansion of Park & Ride 
The creation of a comprehensive network of 
safe cycle and walking routes which do not L, 
involve thC LISC Of IICIVY trafhcked roads 
Cheaper public transport I'arc,, 
An improvement in the frequency & 
reliability of public transport 
79.7 11.4 2.11 
77.6 13.5 2.27 
60.4 26.7 2.59 
46.9 38.0 2.91 
15.8 50.0 3.55 
10.9 60.7 3.72 
1.6 80.7 4.13 
3.8 84.9 4.13 
2.5 89.5 4.33 
3.8 91.6 4.51 
1.6 94.2 4.57 
Councillors view policy options such its Park and Ride, public transport improvements 
and cheaper public transport fares along with banning or restricting vehicles in central 
areas and the development ol'a land use and transport planning stratcgy, as being more 
effective. 
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5.1.3 The acceptability of various policy options 
In terms of acceptability (totally or fairly acceptable) then the opinion is somewhat 
different to the one for effectiveness. As regards the implementation of urban road 
pricing only 11.4 per cent view it as being 'totally' or 'fairly acceptable', as indicated 
in Table 5.4, and if only 'totally acceptable' is considered then the figure is only 2.4 
per cent with only the 'selective expansion of road construction in urban areas' being 
lower at 2.1 per cent. 
The most acceptable relate to improving alternative modes of transport to the private 
car. Measures such as improved public transport, cheaper public transport fares, the 
creation of a comprehensive network of safe cycle and walking routes which do not 
involve the use of heavy trafficked roads and the introduction or expansion of Park 
and Ride services are to the fore. Even if only 'totally acceptable' is considered then 
figures for the above are 64.9,63.0,47.3 and 3 1.4 per cent respectively. 
Detail with respect to the 'key interest groups' perception of publicly acceptability of 
the various policy options is outlined in Appendix 3, Tables 4.1 to 4.9. It can be noted 
that: 
the price mechanism, namely an increase in the price of petrol to E5 per gallon, a 
doubling of parking charges in urban areas and the implementation of urban road 
pricing along with a banning of vehicles from central areas and the selective 
expansion of road construction in urban areas are consistently the least acceptable 
measures of reducing traffic congestion in the towns and cities of the UK; 
* in terms of the most acceptable, the main thrust is public transport related. For 
seven of the nine groups the major thrust is the 'carrot approach' to the problem of 
congestion through cheaper public transport fares, an improved public transport 
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service, Park and Ride and a comprehensive network of safe cycle and walking 
routes. 
If Tables 3.1 to 3.9 and 4.1 to 4.9 of Appendix 3 are compared in terms of the most 
effective and publicly acceptable policy options, then there appears to be little 
commonality. This is illustrated in Table 5.5 which for each shareholder group lists 
the four most effective and most publicly acceptable policy options in terms of their 
mean values. The Table shows that: 
* the banning of vehicles in central areas is perceived as one of, or the most, effective 
policy options for dealing with urban traffic congestion in the UK; 
* there is a preponderance of the 'stick approach' in terms of the perceived 
effectiveness of various policy options, particularly chosen by Officials and 
Academics. 
* with respect to acceptability the 'carrot approach' prevails, most notably through 
public transport improvements, cheaper public transport fares, Park and Ride 
improvements and a comprehensive network of safe cycle and walking routes. 
40 with respect to Councillors, the traditional decision-makers, there is a degree of 
overlap between effectiveness and acceptability - in the area of public transport- 
improvement, cheaper fares and Park and Ride, as well as a land use and transport 
planning strategy (see Table 5.5). 
112 
Table 5.5 A comparison ofthe most effective and most acceptable policy options 
with respect to reducing traffic congestion listed in terms of mean values. (All 
respondents) 
Effectiveness kcceptability Effectiveness Acceptability 
County Officials: County Councillors: 
3.88 Parking chai ýc.,, I and Lise stralegý 4,03 PT improvement 4 13 Cycle/walk routes 
3.95 Land use sirmqp ('\, clc/\\, iilk routes 4.0.5 Land use strategy 4.34 PT improvement 
3.99 Urban road pricing i (, o I' T onprm ement 4.11 Banning vehicles 4.41 Park & Ride 
4.20 Banning vchicIcs Chk"TCI I'l, 1,11CS 4.14 Park &, Ride 4 ýo Clicalm- PT fares 
Metropolitan Borough Metropolitan 
Officials: Borough Councillors: 
3.69 Petrol price Pai k& kidc 4 to Cheaper PT fares 4 io I-and use strategy 
3.75 Land use stralcov it CycleAvalk routes 4.14 P 'r improvement 4.21 Cycle/walk routes 
3.96 Urban road pricing I ý, I Cheaper PT fares 4 24 Land use strategy 4.44 Cheaper PT fares 
4.04 Banning WhILIC.. " i I' T improvement -i ;, ) 
Banning vehicles 4.53 PT improvement 
London Borough London Borough 
Officials: Councillors: 
3.87 Cheaper PT tares iI -and use strateg. \ 
3.93 I-ind use strategy 4 60 Land use strategy 
3.91 Land use strategy i is ()cleAvalk routes 4.07 Banning vehicles 4.67 Cheaper PT fares 
4.17 Urban road pricing - I' T improvement 4 29 Cheaper PT fares 4 so PT improvement 
4.30 Banning \ chicles 4 77 Cheaper PT fares 4 36 PT improvement 4 87 Cycle/walk routes 
Economists: Planners: 
3.59 Pelrol price 12 Park & Ride 3ý83 PT improvement 4.22 Park & Ride 
3.87 Parking charges I 12 Cý cleAvalk routes 4. oo Land use strategy 4.22 Home working 
4.09 Ranniny \chicles 1 17 Cheaper PT fares 4.12 Urban road price 4,44 PT improvement 
4.33 Urban road pricing 1 ý, 2 I'T improvement 4.56 Banning vehicles 4.56 Cycle/walk routes 
Civil Engineers: 
3.70 Petrol price i Is Park & Ride 
3.81 Land use stratei, i, ) CycleAvalk routes, 
3.93 Banning vehicles is Cheaper PT fares 
L4.07 Urban road pricing (,, PT improvement 
What would appear clear from Table 5.5 is that there is a need for a 'package 
approach' to the problem of urban traffic congestion and all traffic management 
initiatives may havc to he exhausted before a policy such as urban road pricing is 
considered acccptable. This is further reinforced by the comments made in the open- 
ended section as part Of (ILICStion 3 of the national survey. Eighteen of the sixty who 
completed this section stressed a of measures' or an integrated approach. 
Comments made included 'Sticks road pricing) need to be combined with carrots 
- better public transport' (County Councillor). These policy options cannot be 
considered in ivolatitm' (Metropolitan Borough Official), 'None qf these options can 
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be effective in isolation' (County Official), 'It is a package of measures rather than 
individual measures i. e. integrated transport policy' (London Borough Official), and 
'A range of policies: Frequent, cheap, reliable, clean public transport with Park and 
Ride services coupled with restricted accessfor cars and delivery vehicles - but not by 
roadpricing' (Metropolitan Borough Councillor). 
As regards policy options, one which was not presented as an option but was in fact 
stated by sixteen of the respondents was Private Non Residential Parking provision 
and the need to either reduce the number of spaces and/or tax the provision. 
Comments were made such as 'Ability to control use of private non-residential 
parking' (County Councillor), 'Private Non-Residential Parking; controLlreduce 
existing, limit new' (London Borough Councillor), 'Control of Private Non- 
Residential Parking' (London Borough Official), 'Tax on employer parking spaces' 
(Academic -Planner), 'Tax private non residential parking spaces' (London Borough 
Official), and 'Legislation for conversion or pricing of PNR parking in city centres' 
(Academic -Civil Engineer). 
In addition, public transport provision was fleshed out by eleven of the respondents 
relating to specific policy options such as 'Segregated and enforced bus lanes' 
(Academic -Economist), 'Bus lanes with traffic lights operated by bus carried 
activators' (County Councillor), 'Real time information about public transport' 
(Academic -Planner), 'Development of urban rapid transit systems' (Academic -Civil 
Engineer), 'Improve quality of public transport, other than through frequency and 
reliability and image of public transport, perhaps through use of new technology or 
new modes' (Academic -Planner) and 'The Park and Ride not a proliferation of sites, 
but sensitive placing with due care to its geographical location with an emphasis on a 
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dedicated cross service to areas of high employment, not as now with most Park and 
Ride operating to the centres of towns'(County Councillor). 
In conclusion to this section, it is not clear whether urban road pricing is likely to 
become more acceptable as a policy option the more serious the level of congestion 
and pollution are perceived to be in the towns and cities of the UK. There are in fact 
grounds for pessimism since groups that view traffic congestion in urban areas to be 
serious or very serious, in particular Councillors, view the implementation of urban 
road pricing as less effective than do other groups. In fact, in terms of effectiveness 
then Councillors - County, Metropolitan and London Borough - view the 
implementation of urban road pricing as being 71.4,47.6 and 71.4 per cent totally or 
fairly effective, whereas Academics - Economists, Planners and Civil Engineers - 
view it as 91.7,94.1 and 88.9 per cent 'totally or fairly effective' respectively. More 
specifically, if one takes London Borough Councillors, they view congestion and 
traffic related pollution to be serious or very serious, 93.8 and 100 per cent 
respectively but only view the implementation of urban road pricing as being 40 per 
cent totally or fairly acceptable, with the highest mean value (2.73) of all the key 
interest groups. 
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5.2.0The idea of* tirban road pricing 
5.2.1 The use of urban road pricing reventie 
Proposition 2: 
'in terms of the iuonvý raked by, urban road pricing one third should be 
considered as general tax revenue, either to reduce existing taxes or to increase 
social spending in accordance %iith the priorities of each country or locality. one 
third used for ne%i road infrastructure and its associated maintenance, in 
locations again chosen in accordance NOth the varying national or local priorities 
and one third to improve the effectiveness of public transport, by a suitable 
combination of fare and ser% ice lei el improvements'. (Goodwin 1989) 
In re I at i on toiii 1)ý ,iii, i, t, 1 1,1 ic i ; oo, iii( 198 Q) arpies th at the cI oser a sche rne 
comes to aCtUal inipleinClItatiOn then the more necessary it is to define details. In 
addition, he states that contending pressures by different interest groups rather than the 
particular state of' public opinion at a moment in time need to be accounted for. As 
such, he sug-ests that the legntiniacy of the competing arguments should be built into 
the scheme design froin the beginning - lience the 'rule of three' and an incremental 
approach to urban road pricing decision-making. 
The proposition stated above refers to the way in which Goodwin perceived that 
revenue should he partitioned (scc Chapter 2. section 2.2.2. How the revenue raised 
certainly a rnaýjor concern of any scheme as from urban road pricing is allocýjtc(j P, 
outlined in section 5.4.0 below. 
In order to ascertain how the revenue should be utilised the national survey (see 
Appendix 2) asked each respondent to allocate 100 units of money to various policies. 
The 100 units represented the total amount of money raised from urban road pricing 
and Table 5.6 outlines tile 1-espon. sc f()r tile sample as a whole, to the question 
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'Imagine you have I(H) units ot'nioney to spend, which represents the total amount of 
money raiscd M urhan road pricing. How (to you think the units should be allocated to 
the variOLIS POIICICS. "ý 
Table 5.6 Allocation of* (lie revenue raised from urban road pricing to various 
policy options (,. %If respondents). 
Allocation of 
Policy Options revenue to each 
I 
policy (%) 
I Improving public transport in (tic area in which urban road pricing is introduced. 44.45 
Improving public transport in urban areas nationally 11.59 
Improving the road network in the area %%, here urban road pricing is introduced 12.51 
Improving (lie urban road netwotk nationally 
Reducing Vehicle Excise Duty nationally 
3.30 
2.13 
nding on non-transport government services, such as Health and Education, in 3.12 
urban area where urban road pricing is introduced 
Spending on non-t [. I 11spolt mcitimcni . cr\ I ces, such its Health and Education 2.86 
nationally 
I Reducing the Council Tax in the area Micie urban road pricing is introduced 4.18 
Reducing the Council Tax nationally 0.64 
Better enforcement ot HtOIIL- such as strengthening of parking 11.65 
controls 
1.80 
Note: * the total does not sum to 100 per cent since there were a very small number 
of nil returns from the respondents. 
First, Table 5.6 shows that the respondents allocated the largest proportion of the 
revenue generated from urhan road pricing to the improvement of public transport. In 
fact, the view was that . 
56 per cent of the revenue raised should be allocated to that 
5 There are certain limitations with (his form of'question and they will be addressed in chapter 9. 
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particular policy, of which approximately 80 per cent should be spent in the area in 
which urban road pricing is introduced. 
Improving the road network was the second-ranking area of expenditure, 
approximately 16 per cent in terms of both improvement in the area in which urban 
road pricing is introduced and nationally. As with public transport however, the 
preference was for the revenue raised from urban road pricing to be spent locally on 
road network improvements (80 per cent). 
The third ranking area of expenditure was for the better enforcement of traffic 
regulations, such as the strengthening of parking controls. Other Options such as 
spending on non-transport services and reducing the Council Tax were given a much 
lower priority with little overall support. It is interesting to note that an allocation of 
revenue to non-transport areas 6 was only in the region of 10 per cent of the overall 
spending available. 
Second, a preference was expressed for local as opposed to national expenditure. 
Discounting 'Better enforcement of traffic regulations, such as strengthening of 
parking controls' for which no local/national allocation was stipulated, then the 
suggestion was that 76 per cent of spending should be utilised in the area in which 
urban road pricing is introduced. 
Third, the information presented in Table 5.6 can be disaggregated in order to provide 
details of the opinions of the various interest groups. This is presented in Table 5.7 7 
and shows consistently strong support for using the revenue raised from urban road 
6 Namely Spending on government services, such as Health and Education, in the area where urban 
road pricing is introduced or nationafly in addition to a reduction in the Council Tax either locally 
or nationally. 
7 Figures for road user interest groups, environmental groups and professional bodies and 
associations are to be found in Table 5 Appendix 3. 
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pricing to improve public transport. In fact, support of 50 per cent plus in all but one 
case, and 70 per cent in terms of London Borough Officials can be noted. 
Overall these statistics are perhaps not too surprising since one would expect decision 
makers and those who have to implement policy to favour expenditure on improving 
services in their area of activity. Thus Chairs of Transport Committees and Transport 
Officials favour an improvement in public transport in the area in which urban road 
pricing is introduced. 
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Fourth, in terms of the proposition stated at the beginning of this section, Tables 5.6 
and 5.7 would appear to offer support for the 'rule of three' but not on the basis of 
three equal partS8 . Translating the various policy options presented in Table 5.7 into 
Goodwins' 'rule of three' as follows: 
Improve the effectiveness of pubfic transport: 
9 Improving public transport in the area in which urban road pricing is introduced; 
Rnproving public transport in urban areas nationally. 
New road infrastructure and its associated maintenance: 
* Improving the road network in the area where urban road pricing is introduced; 
* Improving the road network nationally. 
Considered as general taxation, either to reduce existing taxes or to increase 
social spending: 
* Reducing Vehicle Excise Duty nationally; 
o Spending on non-transport government services, such as Health and Education, 
in the urban area where urban road pricing is introduced; 
* Spending on non-transport government services, such as Health and Education 
nationally; 
* Reducing the Council Tax in the area where urban road pricing is introduced; 
Reducing the Council Tax nationally; 
e Better enforcement of traffic regulations, such as strengthening of parking 
controls. 
allows the construction of Figure 5.1. The Figure supports the basic proposition of 
Goodwin in terms of all nine groups represented and offers a basis for eliciting 
widespread public support. 
8 Goodwin (1989) did stress however that 'a third' is arbitrary. 
121 
As stated earlier, it shows a consistent preference for utilising the revenue raised from 
urban road pricing for improving public transport, followed by reducing existing taxes 
including increased social spending and improvements to the road network. 
In terms of the national survey, respondents were given the opportunity to state other 
options on which the revenue raised from urban road pricing should be spent. Fifty- 
three responded to this question, twenty-two of which stated revenue should be 
allocated to improved cycle and walking routes. Comments included 'Improvements 
of pedestrian and cycle infrastructure and other environmental improvements' 
(Academic -Economist), and 'Incorporation of traffic calming, pedestrian and cycle 
facilities' (Metropolitan Borough Official). 
In addition, mention was made of. 
e improved safety, with comments such as 'Local safety schemes1traffic calming etc. ' 
(Metropolitan Borough Councillor), and 'Traffic calming on 'non through routes' 
is essential to improve safety and movement' (County Official). 
e public transport in rural areas 'It would be logicalfor some of the funds generated 
to go to improving RURAL public transport, thus reducing car-borne in-comers' 
(County Councillor). 
awareness campaigns 'National public awareness campaigns to improve 
acceptability of policy options' (London Borough Official) and 'Publicity to 
explain benefits and facilities available from improved public transport' 
(Metropolitan Borough Councillor), 'removal of car parking' (Academic -Planner). 
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5.3.0 A package approach 
'The support for urban road pricing increases if it is taken as part of a comprehensive 
package of measures'. 
The respondents were asked 'if an urban road pricing scheme was introduced and the money 
spent in the way you suggested, how publicly acceptable would you now think urban road 
pricing would beT The results for all the respondents are shown in Table 5.8 which compares 
support for urban road pricing before and after the question relating to the specific allocation 
of urban road pricing revenue hits been asked. It indicates that taken in isolation only 11.3 per 
cent of those who completed the survey viewed urban road pricing as acceptable (either 
totally or fairly) and approximately 80 per cent regarded it as being unacceptable (either not 
very acceptable or totally unacceptable). If the revenue raised by an urban road pricing 
scheme was spent on specific policy options, as indicated in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, then urban 
road pricing was perceived as more acceptable. In fact, if the revenue is allocated to specific 
policies such as improved public transport, then over 50 per cent would regard urban road 
pricing as acceptable. There is still though approximately 30 per cent who would still 
consider it as unacceptable. 
Table 5.8 The acceptability of urban road pricing: Before and after the revenue has 
been allocated to various policy options (All respondents). 
Before revenue allocation After revenue allocation 
% 
Totally acceptable 2.4 2.0 
Fairly acceptable 8.9 52.6 
Neither 8.9 15.7 
Not very acceptable 56.1 25.3 
Tntally unacceptable 23.6 4.4 
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The information presented in Table 5.8 can be disaggregated in order to provide details of the 
opinions of the various stakeholder groups. This is presented in Appendix 3, Tables 6.1 to 6.9 
and shows consistently strong support for urban road pricing if the revenue is allocated to 
specific policy areas. The level of acceptability (both totally and fairly) is in excess of 50 per 
cent for all groups apart from Metropolitan Borough Officers and Councillors. 
5.4.0 Issues of concern 
Proposition 4: 
'The major concern with respect to urban road pricing relate to privacy, equity, the 
utilisation of the revenue raised and the clarity of objectives. 
The national survey asked '11' in urban road pricing scheme was introduced how concerned 
would you be about each of the following issuesT The results for all the respondents is 
shown in Table 5-9. 
The Table summanses a number of important issues relating to urban road pricing and it is 
possible to separate them into issues of principle and practice. Issues of' principle relate to 
aspects such as whether road users should in fact be charged for the use ofroad space and the 
invasion of privacy aspect of urban road pricing. Practical issues relate to the 'practicalities' 
of introducing an urban road pricing scheme - the uncertainty and lack of(letailcd knowledge 
of issues such as who should be exempt, how an urban road pricing scheme would integrate 
with other congestion management measures, how the scheme would be enforced, the 
adequacy of public transport provision and how the revenue raised frorn an urban road pricing 
scheme would be utilised. What is clear frorn Table 5.9 is that two main issues of principle, 
namely 'the fact that the introduction of urban road pricing Would inean that in congested 
periods the road user would have to pay for the use of the road' and 'the invasion of road 
users' privacy' are of least concern to respondents, whereas practical issues particularly in 
terms of 'the need for clearly stated objectives with respect to urban road pricing', 
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transport provision' and 'how the revenue raised is being utilised' are (teemed of greatest 
concern. It is perhaps somewhat surprising that the principle of charging for the use of' road 
space was of least concern - with 77.5 per cent of' respondents heing either 'very' or 'fairly 
unconcerned' with respect to that issue. On the other hand the lack of'real concern in ternis of' 
'the invasion of users' privacy' may be a result of' the development of' smartcard technology, 
as stated in chapter 2 section 2.2.3. 
Table 5.9. Concern with respect to urban road pricing 
ISSUES: 
Very/fairly 
Uncoriccrned 
C/( 
Very/fairly 
concerned Mcan 
Fact that the introduction of urban road pricing 
would mean that in congested periods the road user 77.5 14.0 1.99 
would have to pay for the use ofthe road 
Invasion of road users' privacy 54.6 26.3 2.52 
The impact on delivery vehicles and commercial 13.7 61.8 3.63 
traffic 
Exemption for certain groups 15.4 69.6 3.72 
How urban road pricing would be integrated with 15.2 75.6 3.82 
other congestion management measures 
The cost of implementing an urhan road pricini, 12.4 77.2 2.93 
scheme 
Equity/fairnes,, ofan in-han road pricint! sclicine 14.5 77.1 3.94 
The reliability and accuracy Of Urban road pricing 12.8 75.2 . 
1.98 
equipment 
The econornic Impact Oil thC MIMI) 11-ea III WIIICh 0.4 83.2 4.1.1 
Urban road pricing is introduced 
E-nforcement ofan urban road pricing scheme 7.6 82.8 4.14 
, rhe need for clearly stated objectives, such as, the 
regulation oftraffic demand, the achievcinent of' 4.4 91.6 4.46 
environmental henel'its and the raising ofrevenue 
for investment In transport systems 
The public transport provision once urban road 4.8 92.8 4.47 
pricing is introduced 
flow the revenue raised from urban road pricing 1.6 93.6 4.59 
Would he used 
ReVCIILIC LISC 1, J)CFCCI%Cd il', 111C Major conceill and mle which IC(lillics 
possibly in linc with the c% idencc prcscnIcd in the previous scctjon. In fact. approximaicly 94 
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per cent of respondents were either 'very' or 'fairly concerned'. The issue of' public transport 
provision once an urban road pricing scherne is introduced is also a ma' -n and in Z7, jor concci 
relation to the utilisation of revenue would appear to create a difficult situation since an 
improved public transport system is necessary to Improve the acceptability Of Urban road 
pricing but the revenue generated by an urban road pricing scheme is necessary (or at the very 
least desirable) in order to provide the improved publiC transport system. 
There appears to be consistency In terms of the main areas of concern and as such 'rable 5.9 
can be disaggregated so as to reveal opinions of the various stakeholder groups, as shown in 
Appendix 4, Tables 7.1 to 7.9. It can be seen that all groups are agreed that charging for tile 
use of road space and the invasion of road users' privacy are areas of' least concerti whilst the 
need for clearly stated objectives, public transport provision and revenue use form the greatest 
areas of concern. Whilst the areas of least concern are the sanie for all grOLIP. S, COMIC11101-S 
(County, Metropolitan and London Borough) display greater concern with respect to the 
charging for road space and the invasion of'privacy than do the other groups. In terms ol'tllc. sc 
two areas the concern (either very or fairly) ranges from 18-27 per cent and 30-50 pcr mit 
respectively. This is likely to he the result of' political awareness and the loss of' votes whIch 
would emanate from Councillors considering ail urban road pricing policy ophon. 
In terms of' the issue of' clarity of' objectives, puhlic (ransport provislon and flow tile revenue 
would be utilised then in all cascs at least 75 per cent" are cillict- I',,,, -ly ()I- 
5.5.0 The type of lechnology ittilised. 
,, rhe simpler the scheme being proposed the more acceptable it is likely to be'. 
I abic 5.10 , how-, ýIflltudc,, h) id 111hall wad pliclill". Thc 
cvidencc is somewhat inconclusive. F. 'ach , cheine millined is pcrccl%, cd as being more 
unacceptable than acceptable. This is a somewhat curious response since section 5.3.0 
indicates that over 54 per cent of respondents view urhan road pricing as being acceptable it' 
the revenue is allocated to specific policy options. Of the scheiries shown in Tablc 5.10 it can 
be seen that an Area Licence, along the lines of' that introduced in Singapore in 1975 appears Z71 
to be the most acceptable of the schemes outlined. In fact 40.7 per cent perceived the Area 
Licence as fairly or totally acceptableM, although a similar percentage (42 per cent) Viewed It 
as being unacceptable (totally or not very acceptable). In tcrins of' the various stakeholder 
groups (see Appendix 3 Tables 8.1-8.12) then on balance a daily, weekly or monthly Area 
Licence would appear to be the most acceptable. Of' Academic Planncrs, 70.6 pcr ccnt 
perceive it as being totally or fairly acceptable. There was much ICSS SLIPPOI-t and a greater 
strength of negative feeling towards the other methods of' urhan road pricing. For cxample, 
only 3 1.3 per cent viewed the smartcard method, along the lines envisaged for Camhridgc city 
1990-93 as being acceptable compared with 53 per cent unacceptable. in ()I' ý, co,. (I(),, 
charge the strength of f'Celing IS II)LICh harder. Only 29 per cent view it as being totally or 
fairly acceptable with 58-1) per ccnt viewing it as totally unacceptahle or not very acceptahle. 
As such. this would appear to he the Icast acceptahle ofthe four inctliods pul 
5.6.0 Selling the concept. 
Proposition 6: 
'An extensive trial ofan urban road pricing scherne is required in the tW. 
What Is shown III Tah1c ý. II I" thill 111CIC 1'ý I LACil C, 111 IM 111 CXICIIý, IVL' Illid 01 ill) MIMI) 
road pricing scheme in (lie I IK. The Tahlc indicates thal 73.5 per cent of respondelits ýIgj-ccd 
or strongly agrccd that an cxtcnsIvc trial ShOUld OCCUr. Thcrc was not it uniform strength of' 
And 100 per ceril in ccriain cases. 
The reason for the relative sirength of'support could be based on the fact that respondcn1% have beell 
i1ccustomed to this type oI urban road pricing scheme re the experience in Singapore and the idallve 
Simplicity of dic lechnology 
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fccling howcvcr. Strong support was to bc found among Officials and Acadcmics, 83.7 and 
82.6 per cent respectively (agree or strongly agree) with somewhat less enthusiasm from 
Councillors, 48.7 per cent (agree or strongly agree) with in fact 35.9 per cent either 
disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. A more detailed breakdown is given in Appendix 3 Table 
9 which indicates somewhat less enthusiasm from all three groups of Councillors (County, 
Metropolitan Borough and London Borough) with 53.8,34.8 and 56,3 per cent support 
respectively. It is pure conjecture as to the reasons for the differences. It is certainly the case 
that academics are keen to learn from the experience a trial creates. " As regards Councillors 
there is consistently less support. This is somewhat surprising given the evidence presented 
to the House of Commons Transport Committee on Urban Road Pricing (1995) 12 
For example, in the minutes of evidence given to the House of Commons Transport Committee on Urban 
Road Pricing (1995) Professor AD May stated 'A trial scheme is needed to confirm that the benefits 
predicted from congestion charging can be rcalised. Such a trial needs to be carefully monitored, and 
operated flexibly so that problems can be resolved if an when they arise. Ile trial should be in a free 
standing but congested provincial city, and should be a package of measures, rather than of congestion 
charging alone... '. When questioned he suggested that 'People may well be overestimating the imposition 
... (of urban road pricing). 
That is one of the issues one can only demonstrate by a pilot scheme in due 
course. 
In evidence submitted to the House of Commons Transport Committee Inquiry the London Boroughs 
Association (which has 20 member authorities and the Corporation of London) stated that it 'wanted road 
pricing thoroughly examined .... and supported the urgent need for a pilot road pricing scheme ... we do believe that there will be benefits in implementing a pilot study in order that we can actually see what the 
real effects are rather than being based purely on information that has been fcd into a computer that may or 
may not be accurate and may not be bome out in fact'. 
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Table 5.11 Agreement as to the extensive trial ol'an urban road pricing scheme. 
Group: Neither 
Strolludý Agree A, -, rec Nor Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree DISIVrCC 
All Respondents 37.9 35.6 9.1 8.7 8.7 
Of which: 
Officials 31.5 52.2 10.9 3.3 
Councillors 21.8 26.9 15.4 14.1 2 1.8 
Academics 59.4 2 3.2 1.4 11.6 4.3 
Possible reasons t`0r the lo\\ei- Ic\ cl of' Support 1,01- all urball road pricing trial by Councillor. " 
could include the fact that: 
" they are for urban road pricing, but think that a delay will ensue il'trials take place, 
" they may think there have been enough trials, From which to learn. 
Or they are against urban road pricing, in which casc: 
4, they may be against a trial. 
in addition they may query the uscl'uhicss ofa trial since: 
" they may perceive them as a waste ofnioncy/ a misallocation 0l'rcS0UrcCS, 
" Councillors perhaps being more praCtICally I`6CUSCd may view a trial its hclmý rather 
stcrilc, of'use only to academics. 
This represents ill area for Further research. 
it would appear to be the case that since urban road prici I I 'fig "cl)'-Cscllts it radical departure i 
ternis of how traffic congestion is addl-cs. sed then all 111cf-ciliclitll approach \%ollld appeal. 
appropriate, starting with small Scale demonstration 1)1'0. jcct". This VICW 1.1.1* s(IppOf-tcd by dic 
government's White Paper oil the FLItIll-C 01' TI-MISI)OI-11, Ill WhIC11 It StjItCS tllýlj 'I'I'llMll'y 
legislation will be needed. Subject to that being ill place, \\c will then work with local 
authorities and other interested ort IIII 4,111ISM101IS Oil ý1 IILIIIII)Cl- ()J'I)'Iot sClIC111CS *fI(l'\, '(jjIýIll,,, 
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approved by the Secretary of State (in Scotland, by the Scottish Executive). The effects of 
these schemes will be monitored and used to inform the design of future schemes'. 
It is certainly the case that the lack of urban road pricing schemes operating throughout the 
world makes it difficult for rational decisions to be made with respect to which scheme. Table 
5.9 flags a series of concerns a number of which could be addressed through the extensive 
trial of an urban road pricing scheme in the UK. 
5.7.0 Conclusion 
What is clear from the survey is that key stakeholders perceive the problem of traffic 
congestion and traffic related pollution to be serious or very serious in towns and cities of the 
UK. In terms of Local Councillors, the traditional decision-makers, the problem is viewed as 
more serious than in the eyes of Officials and in fact is viewed as more serious among 
London Borough Councillors and Officials than in other areas of the country. This being so, 
then one would perhaps expect a policy option such as urban road pricing, to be viewed as 
effective as a means of reducing congestion. This is in fact the case in terms of respondents as 
a whole, but if the individual stakeholder groups are considered it shows strong support 
among groups such as academic Economists and Civil Engineers with somewhat less support 
among Councillors. For Councillors, public transport improvements and cheaper fares, 
banning and restricting vehicles in central areas and land use and transport planning strategies 
are viewed as more effective. 
As regards acceptability approximately 80 per cent of the respondents view urban road 
pricing as being publicly unacceptable. The more acceptable rclate to public transport, cycling 
and walking routes and a land use and transport planning strategy. IIcncc the problem with 
respect to urban road pricing. In terms of proposition I it is not clear whether urban road 
pricing is likely to become more acceptable the more serious the level of congestion and 
pollution are perceived to be. Clearly if one takes London Borough Councillors, dicy vicw 
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both congestion and pollution as being more serious than do County Councillors but they 
view the implementation of urban road pricing as less acceptable. 
There are however a number of measures which can be undertaken in order to address the 
situation. First, if the revenue raised from urban road pricing is allocated to specific areas it 
will improve acceptability. Evidence from the national survey supports proposition 2, 
although not on the basis of three equal parts. The results of the survey suggest devoting over 
50 per cent of the revenue to improving public transport, with an overall preference for local 
as opposed to national expenditure. This view is consistent among the various stakeholders. If 
the revenue is allocated as suggested, as part of a package of measures, then the level of 
acceptability increases substantially with over 50 per cent of the respondents viewing it as 
acceptable. Hence confinning proposition 3. 
Second, issues of concern require careful consideration with respect to urban road pricing. 
The main area of concern relate not to issues of principle but practical issues most notably 
public transport provision once urban road pricing is introduced and how the revenue raised 
from urban road pricing is to be utilised. Thus in terms of proposition 4 the evidence would 
appear to support the view that how the revenue is utilised and clarity of objectives are of 
major concern, with equity to a lesser extent and the invasion of road users' privacy an area of 
much Icss conccrn. What appcars clcar is that attcntion to dctail is all important in tcrms of 
gaining acceptability and saleability of any urban road pricing scheme. 
The type of technology utilised requires considerable thought. Evidence would suggest a 
simplified scheme at least in the first instance, possibly along the lines of Area Licensing. 
flence tentative support for proposition 5. 
Finally, there is support for an extensive trial of an urban road pricing scheme in the UK - 
proposition 6. 
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Having detailed the results of the national survey the following two chapters deal more 
specifically with a case study of an attempt to introduce an urban road pricing scheme in the 
UK. Congestion metering represented a sophisticated, high-tech approach to the problem of 
urban traffic congestion. What lessons, if any, can be learnt in terms of incrementalism? 
Chapter 6 provides a general overview of congestion metering. 
134 
Chapter 6 Pricing Road Space: The Cambridge Experience' 
'Cambridge demonstrated the technical feasibility of a more sophisticated form of 
urban road pricing. But it also demonstrated the need to develop grass roots support 
simultaneously with concrete proposals, especially ones as radical as the original 
Cambridge plan. It seems unlikely that any locality would accept a pricing scheme 
with unpredictable charges, at least in the absence of lengthy prior experience with 
less elaborate schemes. ' 
(Small and Gomez-Ibanez 1998) 
6.0.0 Introduction. 
This chapter provides a background to congestion metering, how the scheme was 
intended to operate and an outline of the field trials. This chapter does not attempt to 
deal directly with the propositions detailed in chapter 4, but rather to set the scene for 
the case study research which is analysed in chapter 7. Congestion metering as a 
method of urban road pricing surfaced in the Cambridge context in 1990. It is possible 
to trace the notion of congestion metering back to the Smeed Report (Ministry of 
Transport 1964). In the forward to the Report it was stated that '... charges would be in 
the nature of prices for using the roads, the prices varying from one place and time to 
another according to the costs - notably the congestion costs - involved in driving in a 
particular area at a particular time'. The Report also stated that 'when a pricing system 
is used on the roads, a useful general rule upon which to base prices is that the road 
user should pay a sum equal to the costs he imposes upon others. '. 
Cambridge is a free standing city, with a population in the region of 103,000. It is 
bounded by the A 14 trunk road to the north and the MII to the west. It has a 12-15 
mile hinterland, no urban sprawl, a congestion problem (Oldridge 1992) and appeared 
to ideally fit the bill for a provincial trial of urban road pricing. One of the conclusions 
1 This chaptcr is bascd in part on Ison (1996b) 
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reached by the Chartered Institute ofTransport ( 1990) was that 'it" i-naxii-nising benefits 
were the main concern then the first place to introduce road pricing would he London. 
However it would be desirable to gain experience with a scheme in a smaller free 
standing city. Having said that the move towards the introduction of road pricing in 
London should not he UndUly (ICIZIN'Cd hy a prolonged search for a provincial trial'. 
6.1.0 Congestion metering in Cambridge city. 
The original motivation for some kind Of' Urban road pricing scheme arose from the 
fact that Cambridge, with its narrow street layout and rapid economic growth rate, was 
suffering increasing levels of congestion. Over the period 1980 to 1990 traffic had 
grown by 47 per cent on the main radial routes into Cambridge city. It had also been 
estimated that there would be an increase in the number of jobs within the city of 
Cambridge, while in terms ofthe growth of the housing stock, there had been limited 
growth in the city. In fact, over 50 per cent of the total SUh-arca provision of housing 
was, and still is, outside the city. As such, currently 40 per cent of' the city's 
employment is undertaken by non-Canibridge city residents and commuters into 
Cambridge frorn the South Cambridgeshire region rely on the private motor-car as 
their main mode oftransport during the peak period. This can be seen in Table 6.1. 
'J'able 6.1 Peak hourJourney mode split in Cambridge (per cent) 
mode City residents South Cambridgeshire 
residents 
" Cvcle 35 3 
" Car 31 73 
" Walk 14 1) 
" 13LIS 6 17 
" Other 14 7 
Source: Cambridge City Council Deposit Draft Local Plan (. 11111C 1992) 
in l9M9 the ('aribridge Ranspwl Snowy MN) was prtmkicul hy ('andukIpAire 
CO(lilly COL11161. It Was dCSigllCd its it balimccd stratcgy incorporating various policics 
aimed at tackling Ow congewlion problcm. The proposals. it ninubcr (it' which have 
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now been implemented, included pedestrianisation within the central area, the 
extension of existing park and ride provision, bus priority measures, junction 
improvements by traffic management and the possible extension of residential parking 
areas. Also included within the strategy was a proposal for a light rapid transit system 
(LRT) taking a route from Trumpington in the south of the city to Oakington in the 
north, a new car park close to the city centre, a package of new road building 
measures including a Southern relief road and a tow-away scheme to remove illegally 
parked vehicles. The one element which was not initially in the CTS was congestion 
metering. The County was, however, keen to see some form of LRT system running 
north to south of the city and congestion metering was perceived not only as a means 
of limiting traffic growth but also as a way of meeting a proportion of the E70m it was 
estimated to cost. The LRT scheme met the governments investment criteria of an 8 
per cent rate of return and there was every indication that it would be eligible for a 
grant as part of Section 56 of the Transport Act 1968. The grant would have met 50 
per cent of the overall capital cost, with an estimated further LlOm-Mm being 
covered through an operating surplus in the future. This left a shortfall of E20m. 
Congestion metering was therefore added to the strategy in October 1990 as a fiscal 
approach to urban traffic management. As far as the Cambridge scheme is concerned, 
Cambridgeshire County Council (1990) perceived the objectives of congestion 
metcring as being: 
e to retain the economic prosperity of the city; 
4, to manage vehicular demand by containing traffic volumes to the 1990 flow; 
e to operate fairly on all vehicles; 
to be self policing; 
e to use the surplus income to fund a light rapid transit (LRT) systcm. 
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Although little formal consideration was given to congestion metering 2 by the County 
Council it was accepted in principle and they did agree to cooperate with the research 
programme into the concept. 
6.2.0 Proposed Congestion Metering within Cambridge city. 
There are essentially two forms of direct charging for road use, namely off-vehicle 
recording and on-vehicle metering. The former incorporates Automatic Vehicle 
Identification (AVI) whereas the latter involves the use of smartcard technology which 
forms the basis of the congestion metering scheme. The basic premise of the scheme 
as envisaged for Cambridge was that all vehicles within Cambridge city and within a 
12-15 mile radius should be fitted with an electronic metering device. It has been 
estimated that this definition of the catchment area would take account of 90 per cent 
of the journeys which are made into Cambridge daily. The meter would be connected 
to the odometer of the vehicle and would thus be able to monitor the level of 
congestion. The owner of the vehicle incorporating the metering unit and transponder 
would be issued with a unique smartcard (or cards). Initially these would have a zero 
value but could be 'charged up' electronically at a rate of say 50 units each time, which 
would cost E10 (if the price per unit was 20 pence), at such places as Post Offices or 
petrol stations. Once inserted in the on-vehicle meter, the smartcard would 'energize' 
the vehicle (Cambridgeshire County Council 1990). Outside the City cordon the meter 
would remain dormant, but on entering the City, fixed beacons installed at the side of 
the 17 radial roads (see Figure 6.1) would activate the meter by microwave thus 
charging the user for each unit of congestion caused. 
In the urban road pricing schemes currently in existence throughout the world the 
cordons or boundaries have tended to be arbitrarily drawn taking the form of natural 
2 Or in fact to any other form of urban road pricing scheme. 
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boundaries such as river crossings, as in Bergen (Larsen 1988), or distinct areas such 
as the Central Business District (CBD) in Singapore. The cordon in Cambridge would 
run along the line of the MI I to the west, the A14 to the north and the proposed 
Southern relief road, seen as the dotted line in Figure 6.1. The meter would remain 
'switched on'until the vehicle passed a beacon in an outbound direction. The on-board 
metering device would only commence charging when a combination of speed and 
distance travelled indicated that the vehicle was in a congested situation. For example 
the congestion threshold could constitute a vehicle failing to travel any distance of 
half a kilometre (or approximately one third of a mile) in a three minute period, i. e. 10 
kph, or a vehicle stopping more than four times in that half kilometre. This would be Ily 
monitored incrementally; so that a charge, if made, would be based on the last half 
kilometre travelled. In other words a constant half kilometre is created incrementally 
by rolling forward in 0.1 meter steps. 
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Figure 6.1 The city of Cambridge, with a series of fixed entry and exit beacons 
marked on existing and proposed roads. 
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When congested situations are experienced, the on-board monitoring device would 
deduct monetary units from the users smartcard at a predetermined rate. There would 
thus be a price payable per unit of congestion and the user would be aware that a 
charge was being inade since there would be an in-vehicle display indicating the 
number of units deducted. 
According to Oldridge (1992) it' congestion metering were applied at 20 pence per 
unit it would lead to an increase in the marginal cost of motoring in congested 
conditions frorn 6 pence to 66 pence per mile. The 6 pence was calculated to be petrol 
costs while the 66 pence represented petrol plus the congestion cost. The cost in a 
non-congested situation would rernain unchanged, with no charge being made. 11' 
congestion metering had been introduced in Cambridge city in 1995, then a typical 
journey of 5 km in a peak hour period would have consumed somewhere between 4 
and 8 units (Oldridge 1992). The situation would therefore be such that congestion 
would be paid for, when and where it Occurs, with those making Journeys at non- 
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congested times or 'reverse commuters' travelling in an outbound direction at peak 
periods being unlikely to face charges. The definition of congestion and the charging 
rate for a unit of congestion could be decided locally by the elected members. Careful 
thought would have to be given to setting the level of charge, bearing in mind its 
effect on congestion levels and any revenue surplus available for local investment in 
the infrastructure. 
if there were delays due to circumstances such as road works or accidents then it 
would be possible for a number of the beacons to be transported to the scene. These 
could then deactivate the vehicle on-board monitoring device so that charges were not 
made. 
The smartcard would be allowed to move into an overdraft situation without the 
vehicle being immobilised. However the system could be operated such that the 
smartcard would need to be recharged and any deficit paid off before a subsequent 
journey was made. If the card exceeded a predefined overdraft limit and the vehicle 
was stationary with the ignition turned off for a period of three minutes or more 
within the boundaries of the scheme, then the vehicle could not be restarted without 
the card being recharged. The initial concept of immobilization has been rather a 
weakness of the idea of congestion metering although there is certainly a need for 
detecting non-compliance. One such system using video cameras was demonstrated in 
the Cambridge trial and this could be viewed as a more practical approach than any 
form of immobilization. 
Road users from outside the 15 mile radius of Cambridge city or visitors would need 
to purchase a day ticket at one of the entry points to the City. 
In evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee on Urban Road Pricing 
(1995a), Professor A. D. May in terms of Cambridge, suggested 'that around L4 
million could be generated per year in the morning peaks alone by a cordon charge 
designed to reduce car journeys by 10 % (Smith et aL 1994). The technology 
necessary for a successful congestion metering scheme was developed by 
ADEPT (Automatic Debiting and Electronic Payment for Transport) which was 
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an EU funded research project forming part of the DRIVE (Dedicated Road 
Infrastructure for Vehicle Safety in Europe) ATT (Advanced Transport Telematics) 
programme. The ADEPT programme was developed on a number of fronts (Blythe 
and Hills 1994). For example, as well as being used to demonstrate congestion 
metering in Cambridge other potential uses involve acting as an automatic tolling 
mechanism, monitoring the state of traffic which drivers must contend with and the 
possibility of pre-booking parking places at a particular destination. 
6.3.0 Assessing Congestion Metering in Cambridge city 
The relative merits of any urban road pricing scheme can be assessed by using the 
various criteria laid down by the Smeed Report (1964) which identified a number of 
requirements for a road pricing system. It stressed the importance of charges being 
closely related to the amount of use being made of the roads, and also indicated that it 
should be possible to vary the prices to some extent for different roads (or areas) at 
different times of day, week or year, and for different classes of vehicle involved. 
Transparency, fairness, simplicity, reliability and being reasonably free from the 
possibility of fraud and evasion were also included as necessary requirements as well 
as the need for it to be applicable, if necessary, to the whole country. The Smeed 
Report also identified requirements which it considered as being desirable, but not so 
important. These included the need for avoiding the diversion of drivers' attention, 
enforcement measures that imposed as little extra work on the police force as possible, 
and a method that was amenable to gradual introduction commencing with an 
experimental phase. Other criteria have been subsequently added to those put forward 
in the Smeed Report (Chartered Institute of Transport 1990, Hau 1992b. Additional 
criteria include the need for anonymity and the ability to cater for the occasional 
visitor who has cause to enter the restricted area. It has also been stressed that the 
burden on the police of enforcing such schemes should be kept to a minimum. 
it is possible to identify a number of potential benefits of congestion metering which 
meet the requirements laid down in the Smeed Report: 
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6.3.1 Awareness of costs to other road users 
Congestion metering would make the motorist fully aware of the external costs 
imposed on other users. It is widely perceived that road users are likely to consider 
only their own private costs of a journey and not the external costs imposed on other 
motorists. The flow of traffic will thus be above the optimal flow and non-optimal 
pricing will lead to a welfare loss. Since there are spatial and temporal differences in 
the occurrence of congestion, a flexible approach is required to the charging of road 
users. 
A difficulty faced when considering any urban road pricing scheme is the problem of 
identifying what actually constitutes congestion. Some notion of this concept is 
necessary if the road user is to be charged an appropriate price. An efficient road 
pricing scheme will identify excessive congestion and charge for such congestion 
whenever and wherever it manifests itself. This charge will reflect the marginal social 
cost. It is not something which is achieved by the cordon pricing schemes currently in 
operation throughout the world such as that in Singapore and the Bergen tollring, 
since they are unable to fully discriminate between congested and non-congested 
conditions. In the case of the Singapore scheme the time periods when the licence is in 
operation 3 is taken to coincide with those periods of the day when demand for road 
space is perceived to be above some predefined level. Establishing the periods when 
the cordon price should be in operation can however create additional problems in that 
congestion may be temporally redistributed to the periods just before or after the 
restricted period. This is certainly something which occurred in Singapore where the 
morning restriction was initially 7.30am to 9.30am. as a result of motorists simply 
delaying their departure time from home or work respectively. In the Hong Kong 
experiment 'shoulder peak' charges were introduced, immediately before and after the 
morning and evening peaks in order to avoid the problems experienced in Singapore. 
in the 'shoulder peaks' the charge was half the normal peak charge. 
3 They now operate an ERP scheme. 
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Charging for entry into restricted zones at certain times of the day, as with the 
Singapore scheme, are rather crude methods of making motorists pay for the external 
costs imposed on other motorists. It means that certain motorists will be 
undercharged, whereas others will be overcharged at the given level of congestion, 
since the same charge will be imposed on each road user during the peak period 
irrespective of the level of congestion. This therefore raises the issue of equity. One of 
the main advantages of congestion metering is that it does not depend on past 
experience in determining where, when and how severe any current congestion 
actually is. In terms of the Singapore scheme, the time periods chosen were based on 
historical observation, although they were subsequently modified. With congestion 
metering, however, charging could take place at any time if the level of congestion 
should warrant it. It is therefore a more flexible system than the schemes currently in 
existence where charges are not directly linked to the level, of congestion and so 
cannot be varied to take account of the MSC. These schemes are based on 'flat fees' 
unrelated to the level of congestion. 
6.3.2 Charging relative to use 
Charging in a manner closely related to the use actually made of roads was identified 
by the Smeed Report as a main requirement of a road pricing system. With cordon 
pricing as practised in Singapore and Norway, no allowance is made for the distance 
travelled within the restricted zone. Those who simply enter the restricted zone and 
park, and those who travel extensively within the zone, are charged the same. This 
could obviously be remedied, as in the case of Scheme C of the Hong Kong 
experiment which consisted of 13 smaller zones and 185 toll sites designed to capture 
the shorter journeys within the zone (Hau 1990). This, however, adds to the 
complexity of the scheme and therefore the cost, whereas with congestion metering 
charging occurs whenever and wherever there is congestion. 
6.3.3 Intra-zonal travel 
Intra-zonal travel is one of the problems which is not addressed by cordon pricing 
since the vehicles are only charged on entry into, or exit from, the zone. This means 
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that those vehicles which only make journeys within the zone and never cross the 
cordon, are not charged. Journeys made within the cordon are just as likely to cause 
congestion as those trips for which charges are made, thus raising once more the 
problem of equity. In this context the advantage of Congestion Metering is that road 
users are charged for the congestion they cause when and where it appears 
irrespective of whether a journey starts inside or outside the cordon. If there was no 
congestion, then neither intra-zonal travel nor travel involving entry/or exit from the 
restricted zone would be charged. As a result, both residents and non-residents would 
be treated equally within the restricted zone, with the charge reflecting the level of 
congestion experienced. 
6.3.4 Protection from the invasion of road user's privacy 
Protection from the invasion of road user's privacy has been advanced as a 
requirement of any urban road pricing system (Chartered Institute of Transport 1990, 
Hau 1992b). In terms of the Hong Kong electronic road pricing experiment, each 
vehicle was identified in order to enable charges to be applied for the use being made 
of the road, and a bill was sent to the owner of the vehicle at the end of each month. 
one of the possible defects with the Hong Kong scheme was the problem of the 
invasion of road user's privacy (Borins 1988) since an important prerequisite for any 
system to be acceptable by the general public is anonymity. In fact it could be 
regarded as the sine qua non of any scheme which requires political acceptability 
(Hau 1992b). There is thus a distinction between road pricing systems which identijy 
as opposed to detect vehicles (Hills and Thorpe 1990). One of the positive features of 
the proposed congestion metering scheme is that given the pre-paid smartcard system, 
the road side beacon simply activates the on-board meter and thereafter deducts 
charges without the vehicle being identified. There is no central record maintained 
and movements of a vehicle inside the cordon cannot be monitored, thus ensuring 
complete confidentiality. 
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6.3.5 Simultaneous deduction of charges 
Unlike the Hong Kong experiment in which 2600 vehicle owners were sent monthly 
bills giving a breakdown of the toll sites crossed and the charges incurred, the 
congestion metering scheme requires no such 'paper trail' since the charge is deducted 
instantaneously from the smartcard. The benefits of this are threefold: 
" It is consistent with, and possibly an improvement on, the criteria laid down in the 
Smeed Report that payment in advance should be possible. The reason for this is 
that congestion metering allows immediate payment to take place via the 
smartcard, unlike the Hong Kong experiment; 
" Since payment is instantaneous it is more likely to make the driver aware of the 
direct link between the level of congestion and the charge made than if the bill was 
sent some time after the journey had been undertaken. This is possible since there 
would be an in-vehicle display unit (see 6.2.0) which would inform the driver of 
the monetary units deducted; 
"A scheme involving the insertion of a smartcard into the meter can be regarded as 
user friendly, being simple to understand and operate, thus meeting another criteria 
outlined in the Smeed Report. 
An additional advantage arises from the fact that the smartcard acts as a kind of 
ignition key; without which the vehicle would not operate. It could therefore 
potentially lead to a reduction in the insurance premium for the owner concerned. 
6.3.6 Return of the revenue to the network 
The Smeed Report identified 'fairness' as being a key requirement of an efficient road 
pricing system. It is certainly an important prerequisite of any scheme which sets out 
to be both politically and publicly acceptable. Fairness could be taken (Hau 1992b) to 
represent a situation where all the net revenues from urban road pricing, after taking 
into account the cost of the system, were returned to the users of the network. This 
could be seen as necessary since those who continue to use the network after the 
implementation of an urban road pricing scheme might perceive themselves as being 
worse off because they are now paying for something which was previously free. In 
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addition those who no longer use their vehicle and now use public transport might 
also see themselves as being worse off, as might the original public transport users 
who now suffer from an overcrowded service. The major beneficiary is, therefore, the 
authority (see Appendix 1). 
With regards to congestion metering scheme for Cambridge city, the objective was to 
use the surplus revenue to fund public transport improvements as a viable alternative 
to the car. 
6.3.7 Identification of non-payers 
The congestion metering scheme as envisaged for Cambridge city would require 
visitors with no on-vehicle meter to purchase a day ticket which would be displayed 
on the windscreen of the vehicle. The ticket would be recognised by the beacons at the 
entry points to the city and vehicles failing to display the ticket would have their 
registration number-plate photographed automatically. 
6.3.8 Self-policing 
It was intended that congestion metering in Cambridge with the automatic deduction 
of units from the smartcard should be self policing, unlike the Singapore scheme. 
6.4.0 Potential weaknesses of the scheme. 
Placing to one side the potential problem faced by the decommissioning of vehicles if 
the meter registers that the smartcard has fallen below a predefined overdraft limit, 
and the public disquiet which would emanate from this, there are additional hurdles 
which have to be overcome if political and public opinion is to be won over. 
6.4.1 Based on ex-postpricing 
The main difference between congestion metering and other urban road pricing 
schemes is that congestion metering is based on ex-post pricing whereas the others 
involve ex-ante pricing. In the case of the Cambridge scheme therefore charging 
would apply literally when congestion occurs. One potential drawback with this is that 
ex-post congestion based pricing does not modify travel behaviour as efficiently as ex- 
ante pricing would, in terms of route choice, the choice of mode and the decision as to 
the time of departure. As stated in section 6.4.0, one of the key operational 
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requirements is 'transparency' in that the price should be readily ascertainable by road 
users before a journey is undertaken. With congestion metering the road user is 
unlikely to know in advance exactly what charge he or she is likely to incur or in fact 
whether there will be a charge at all. Charges which vary both spatially and 
temporarily can create uncertainty in the mind of the motorist since it is not possible 
to determine the cost of a particular journey until after the journey has been 
undertaken. It is the case, therefore, that the motorist is unable to make a rational and 
totally informed decision. To counter this, it could be argued that as a rule the levels 
of congestion do not vary markedly from day to day and as such the motorist who 
travels within the restricted zone on a regular basis will quickly become attuned to the 
charges he or she is likely to incur. Added to this, smartcard technology means that 
the motorist will be aware of the charge being made, as and when it occurs. 
Nevertheless there is still a weakness in that according to the Smeed Report, charges 
should be stable and readily ascertainable by road users before they embark upon a 
journey. 
6.4.2 Possibility of an increase in accidents 
Of all the English counties, Cambridgeshire has one of the highest road accident 
casualty rates per head of population and within the county, Cambridge city has the 
highest concentration of accidents. 77 per cent of which involved cars. (Studdert and 
Sharpe 1993). One possible area of concern as regards congestion metering, therefore, 
is the fact that it may increase rather than reduce the incidence of accidents. The 
reason for this is that implementation of congestion metering may affect the general 
driving behaviour of motorists in that they could soon become aware of the road 
conditions and the situations in which the meter is activated, namely slow speeds and 
a predefined number of stops. This is likely to encourage 'rat running' and possibly the 
jumping of red lights as a means of avoiding meter tripping (Jones 1992). The overall 
effect could therefore be capricious driver behaviour, a heightening of driver stress 
and possibly a deterioration of road safety levels. 
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6.4.3 Extraneous circumstances 
One feature of the scheme outlined in section 6.2.0 was the possibility of exemptions 
deemed necessary as a result of extraneous circumstances such as road works. Events 
such as road works however are likely to have a severe knock-on effect throughout the 
whole road network rather, than simply a temporary local bottle-neck. There will thus 
be implications throughout the whole of the restricted zone in terms of the congestion 
charge faced by motorists. 
A concern has also been voiced as to the delays imposed on other road users by 
illegally parked vehicles, not least those loading and unloading. Road users travelling 
within a congestion management scheme would accept a high degree of enforcement 
of parking and loading restrictions. There would thus be a need for a vastly improved 
system of enforcement. 
6.5.0 Field trials. 
The field trial period as outlined by Blythe (1993) and Clark et A (1994) took place 
in October 1993 and involved the successful demonstration of Congestion Metering 
by the provision of a beacon on a single road to the south of the city. This beacon 
acted as an entry beacon. A system for taking a video photograph of vehicles violating 
the congestion metering scheme was also incorporated at the point of entry. An exit 
beacon was also positioned on Cambridgeshire County Council premises (at Shire 
Hall) and three vehicles of County Council employees were fitted with the in-vehicle 
equipment (IVE) in order to demonstrate credit units deducted from the smartcard 
when a certain level of congestion was being experienced (Figure 6.1). The trial also 
demonstrated that the 'rate' charged could be altered from the road side beacon and 
how the smartcard could be re-charged with additional credit units. 
6.6.0 Conclusion 
A great deal of interest was created by the trial, essentially because it was the first 
time any form of urban road pricing had been practically demonstrated in the UK. It is 
clear that congestion metering would appear to counter a number of the limitations 
experienced under cordon pricing schemes. The main advantage is that, if successfully 
149 
implemented, it could achieve the economic objective of charging the motorist for the 
costs imposed on other road users, such that the MSC is covered. In addition, there is 
also the perceived benefit of charging relative to use, intra-zonal travel would be 
charged, there is protection from the invasion of road user's privacy (given the use of 
smartcard technology), a simultaneous deduction of charges, a return of revenue to the 
network as well as being self-policing. There are however seen to be a number of 
weaknesses, not least, the fact that it is based on ex-post pricing, possibly leading to 
an increase in accidents and the difficulty in dealing with extraneous circumstances. 
Having detailed the background, the following chapter deals with the case study of 
congestion metering and more specifically with the perceptions of the decision-makers 
who had direct involvement with the concept, both Councillors and Transport 
officials. The chapter examines the reasons why the city of Cambridge presented an 
ideal opportunity for the implementation of some form of urban road pricing scheme. 
It addresses what was so peculiar about Cambridge? Was the level of congestion the 
major driving force, was there a particular individual or political group who acted as a 
catalyst, or was it the free standing nature of the city which made it the ideal location 
for a policy such as congestion metering? In addition, why did congestion metering 
fail to advance beyond the field trial? In this respect, the timing and level of 
sophistication can be viewed as important contributing factors. The chapter is 
constructed around the propositions detailed in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 7 Congestion Metering in the city of Cambridge: a case of so 
near and yet so far'. 
'The most economically efficient and most technically sophisticated programs produce no 
henefit if they are not adopted' 
(Rom 1994) 
7.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter is based on the series of interviews which were undertaken over the period May 
to June 1996, detail of which was given in chapter 4. As far as possible the structure of this 
chapter follows the framework laid down in chapters 2 and 4. In addition, it attempts to 
analyse 
e why the concept of congestion metering was considered in the context of the city of 
Cambridge; 
the potential advantages and disadvantages of congestion metering; 
why it was not continued with beyond the field trial; 
the acceptability of congestion metering. 
Note that in the Tables throughout this chapter a tick (&/) indicates each time a respondent 
refers to a particular issue in question. 
7.1.0 A concept in the right p1ace2 
It is important to ascertain why the concept of congestion metering was considered in the 
context of Cambridge. Was there anything peculiar about the city or did anything or anyone 
act as a catalyst for the investigation of congestion metering as a means of dealing with 
congestion? Respondents were asked 'Why was the concept of congestion metering 
This is title of a paper presented by Ison at the Transportation Research Board 77th Annual Meeting 
January 11-15,1998 Washington D. C. 
This section is based on an article by Ison (1998c) entitled 'A concept in the right place at the wrong time: 
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considered in the context of CambridgeT (see section 4.6.0). Table 7.1 summarises their 
response. 
Table 7.1 Reasons given for the consideration of congestion metering in the context of 
Cambridge. 
Reason Response 
Interest ofthe (former) Director of 
Transportation 
An effective means of dealing with VVVVVVVV Z7, 
congestion 
Cambridge is a free standing city t/VV 
The technology was available 
As a way of improving public transport 
To justify a road building programme 
Desperation 
A number of factors would suggest that the city of Cambridge represented an ideal location 
for the introduction of a scheme such as congestion metering. Most notably: 
7. LI The level of congestion 
Councillors and officers were asked the following three questions in terms of the level of' 
congestion in the city of Cambridge. First, "How serious do you consider the current levels of' 
traffic congestion to be in the city of Cambridge"?, second, "In terms of traffic congestion in 
the city of Cambridge would you say that the situation has got better or worse over the last 5 
years? " and third, "Based on past experience what do you think the situation with regards to 
traffic congestion will be in 5 years time in the city of Cambridge? " (see section 4.6.0), 
Eighteen of the twenty-one interviewed perceived the current levels of traffic congestion in 
the city of Cambridge to be serious or very serious. Comments were expressed such as: "the 
current levels are appalling ", "It is serious, all"Ost to the point qf strangulation "" verv 
serious and getting more serious all the time", "unwelcome, substanfial and a serious 
congestion metering in the city of Cambridge' Transport Policy, 5,1999,139-146. 
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problem which is a growing problem". On a more personal level a comment was made that: 
"Just as a traveller in Cambridge then I do find that the level of traffic congestion is serious, 
Ifind it annoying, I think that it is unpleasant, I think it impinges on my quality of life in a 
veryfine city". 
Given the level of congestion then comments were made with respect to congestion metering 
such as "there was an obvious problem and we need to reduce the problem and it was 
thought that a fair way of reducing the problem would be to tax motorists for causing the 
congestion in Cambridge", "We knew there was a problem and we thought it (congestion 
metering) was worthy of consideration", "I think that Cambridge was treating congestion 
seriously, I think that it was appreciated reasonably widely that congestion was one of the 
less tolerable features of living in what is a small but very attractivefiree standing city" and 
"Well we believed there was something needed and that if you wanted to keep traffic levels at 
some sort of tolerable level, I think we chose at the time the 1990 levels, you would need more 
than just physical measures and good encouragement, you have got to have some financial 
stick. ". Hence as shown in Table 7.1 eight of the twenty one respondents expressed 
congestion metering as an effective means of dealing with the serious congestion problem. 
7.1.2 A protagonist 
it is often the case that a new policy initiative is the result of a main protagonist. In fact, it 
could be said that the leadership of an inspired policy entrepreneur, one in a position of 
influence is a critical ingredient in making any major policy changes. In this respect the 
importance of the (former) Director of Transportation of Cambridgeshire County Council, 
Brian Oldridge, cannot be underestimated as a catalyst for the consideration of congestion 
metering. This is revealed by the fact that 17 out of the 21 interviewed (81 per cent) 
recognised the role the Director played. Typical statements included "The Director of 
Transportation was extremely keen in the development of this and basically it needed to be 
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tried", "it was one of the Director's little babies", "It was the previous Director of 
Transportation more than anything", and "I think congestion metering was considered really 
because it was very much the brain child of the Director of Transportation, who was in a 
position ofpersuading some influences that it did have a role to play in Cambridge.. " 
It was also suggested that the Director of Transportation had invented the idea and as such 
wanted to get it introduced nationally and perhaps internationally. In the words of one 
Councillor "I think he really believed in it, he had invested his own effort in it and he saw it 
as an ideal solution andfrom his position as Director of Transportation he thought he would 
have the chance to pioneer it and it would be a great success ". While the role of the Director 
of Transportation in Cambridge does not refute the notion of an incremental approach it is 
clear that events can be strongly influenced by the presence of a strong leader. This is an issue 
which will be returned to in chapter 9 section 9.3.7. 
The vested interest of the (former) Director of Transportation could be viewed as one of the 
possible reasons why congestion metering was not continued beyond the field trial. 
7.1.3 A sympathetic council 
Personal preference on its own would not have been sufficient to get congestion metering 
considered even in terms of a trial for it still required political support. In this respect it would 
appear that the majority of Councillors interviewed (i. e. on the Transport Services 
Committee) were sympathetic at least to a trial taking place. There didn't appear to be a 
political push to introduce congestion metering but they (the Councillors) did accept the idea 
in principle and did agree to co-operate with the research programme into the concept. This 
was certainly the case with the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Councillors, who formed 
the majority on the Council at the time congestion metering was being considered. Comments 
like "I think we were sympathetic, well not all of us, probably a good chunk of us were 
sympathetic to the idea because we couldn't see a better one. If anyone had come up with a 
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better idea then fine but nobody did in my opinion ", "I can't remember a lot of opposition to 
be honest, I don't remember any strong opposition to it from any of the parties, I think 
everybody had that in common they wanted to resolve the problems that were facing 
Cambridge". The Labour Councillors were less enthusiastic but they did however "allow an 
experiment or trial to go ahead which had already been arranged with our European 
partners to actually look how the system might operate but further than that we took no 
further part in it". 
7.1.4 An effective means of dealing with congestion. 
Comments were made such as "there was an obvious problem and we need to reduce the 
problem and it was thought that a fair way of reducing the problem would be to tax motorists 
for causing the congestion in Cambridge". "We knew there was a problem and we thought it 
was worthy of consideration", '7 think that Cambridge was treating congestion seriously, I 
think that it was appreciated reasonably widely that congestion was one of the less tolerable 
features of living in what is a small but very attractive free standing city" and "Well we 
believed there was something needed and that if you wanted to keep traffic levels at some sort 
of tolerable level, I think we chose at the time the 1990 levels, You would need more than just 
physical measures and good encouragement, you have got to have somefinancial stick. 
7.1.5 A free standing city 
The free standing nature of the city of Cambridge makes it an ideal candidate for the trial of 
congestion metering. "Cambridge is an island in the rural landscape and it only has 18 
access points around the edge of it so it is relatively easy to install the beacon " and "I think 
it was suggested that because Cambridge is a sub regional centre it hasn't got any other 
adjacent large cities so it is quite isolated, it was seen as quite a good city for an 
experimental scheme. You can put up monitoring points on 13 roads whatever it is and then 
everything which goes in and out you know exactly what is going on which you couldn't do in 
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some cities where you get two big towns that are connected with each other and it was the 
right sort of'sizejOr an experimental scheme 
7.1.6 The high-tech nature of the city 
An official noted that 'Cambridge has a fiel Qf the high-tech about it, the Science Park and 
the synergy between the University and Industry, and there is something about the idea, that 
new ideas, novel ideas might take route and might work more readily in Cambridge than 
elsewhere'. Given the above, Cambridge made an ideal location for the consideration of 
congestion metering particularly given its political and geographical make up. 
In terms of timing a number of issues can be raised as outlined below. 
7.2.0 The local situation 
Proposition I 
'Urban road pricing is likely to become more acceptable as a policy option the more 
serious the level of congestion and pollution are perceived to be in the towns and 
cities of the UK'. 
7.2.1 Congestion is not bad enough 
Even though congestion was viewed as being serious, five respondents stated that the 
situation was no different froin any other city as regards traffic congestion. One went as far its 
suggesting that the situation was not as serious as a lot of Cambridge residents believed, 
stating that "... I think there is a lot (ýf other cities that have got equal or worse problems. 
Everyone thinks theirs is the worst in the world and they go to some other city oil sonle 
particular da. v qfthe week and sail through it and the-y sa. y, lhe, y have solved their problems 
and you haven't, so I think the view of congestion is probablY exaggerated". Another state(I 
that "I think we sometimes make a mountain out ql'a inole hill about the frallic congestion in 
Cambridge ....... 
I don't think Cambridge tra. . ic is as serious as we sometimes make out ". 
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As such, the situation may not be serious enough for a policy such as congestion metering to 
be currently acceptable. In fact one councillor commented that "I think it (congestion) is very, 
very bad but the question is 
. 
'is it so bad that there is a consensus to get something done? ' 
and although I think something ought to be done I don't think it is quite bad enough for 
people to swallow bitter pills, it needs to get even worse and the only way is some form of 
pricing, it is a bitter pill but I can see there's an enormous amount going for it but it is 
politically unacceptable because it is publicly unacceptable and you have to have a climate of 
opinion that has been brought to such a point that they are prepared to take a bitter pill". In 
addition comments were made like "Ijust don't see how you could sell it until you have got a 
situation were everybody agreed it was totally unacceptable ", "things would have to get a lot 
worse before people are banging on the door and demanding congestion metering is 
introduced". 
7.2.2 The level ofpollution 
At the time congestion metering was being considered in the city of Cambridge comment on 
vehicle pollution and its environmental implications were conspicuous by their absence. In 
fact it would be fair to say that pollution was not perceived as a major issue. 
As regards the interviews, then it is interesting to note that just four of the twenty-one 
interviewed, perceived a more important question than the level congestion being the level of 
pollution. One councillor stated that ...... monitoring shows that there are certain parts of the 
city with serious pollution problems, I think the overall background levels are OK but the city 
centre streets, the canyon streets, get over the EC guidelines and there are a couple of streets 
which occasionally reach the EC limit values where the EC start to say there is a danger to 
health here .... ... Interestingly, 
it was stated by two respondents that if a concept like 
congestion metering were to be introduced it would be because of pollution and not 
necessarily congestion. "I think at the time it was a bit difficult. I think now the air quality 
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argument could be the clinching one ", "The situation isn't bad enough. It may come jroin the 
pollution angle, that's a problem which is with us now, its certainly been evident over the last 
couple oj'years. 
7.2.3 Not all the alternatives had been exhausted 
The phrase "political hot potato" cropped up on a number of occasions and councillors 
suggested that it would continue to be so "until all alternatives had been exhausted" and 
"Having tried all other things". As regards the alternatives table 7.2 provides a summary of' 
the options offered as the most effective means of dealing with traffic congestion in the city 
of Cambridge. 
Table 7.2 Policy options viewed as being the most effective means of dealing with traffic 
congestion in the city of Cambridge. 
Resp onse 
Policy options Councillors Officials 
Conservatives Labour Liberal 
Democrats 
" Public transport: 
Improved/subsidiscd V 
Park and Ride V VV 
BUS priority V V 
Rail V V 
" Physical controls: 
VchicIc han VV 
Pedest riani sat ion V V 
Parkin, - restrictions V 
Pricing: 
Road pricing VVV VV 
Fuel price 
Cycleways Vv 
Planning 
7.2.4 Public transport 
As indicated, public transport wits stressed as an effective means of' dealing with Cambridge 
city congestion and in particular Park and Ride. It appeared to have support across (lie 
po I It Ical parties. Thus, as stated by one respondent "We have got to get morepeolVe io choose 
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to use Park and Ride. That means Park and Ride has got to be comfortable, its got to be 
convenient and it has got to be economic for people to use otherwise they are not going to 
move out of their cars. So we have a lot of work to do on Park and Ride, but we have also got 
to do a lot of work on changing attitudes about using public transport as well". 
Even though public transport improvement possessed a wide degree of support an alternative 
point of view was expressed most notably "now we hear a lot ofpeople saying "Wellpublic 
transport is the answer, if we have got goodpublic transportpeople will not want to use their 
cars, but the problem is with public transport, it probably leaves at a time you don't want to 
leave, from a place that you actually don't want to leavefrom, and you arrive at a place you 
don't want to get to at a time you don't want to be there, and while the private car is so 
convenient as compared to the most efficient public transport, people are just not going to 
consider it 
7.2.5 Physical controls 
Physical controls, most notably banning vehicles from the city centre and/or transferring road 
space from motor vehicle to pedestrian use appears to have wide spread support. Comments 
like -Well the most effective means would be to keep much of it out of the city", and "the 
benefit of the stick of restricting access to the central parts of Cambridge to the car by a 
variety of means " gave a clear indication of the strength of support for such measures. 
7.2.6 Cycleways 
Support was expressed for cycleways as an effective means of dealing with congestion. New 
cycle lanes were perceived as one of the 'carrot' approaches to dealing with congestion. It 
was noted that "I actually think there is a great deal more we can do to persuade people to 
transferfrom the car to pedal cycle ...... the cycle can play a more important part". It was 
however made clear that on its own it was not the complete answer. In fact it was stated that 
"there has to be good clear cycleways but then again people don't like cycling if its raining 
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or if its wet and its cold. They want to use their car, so what we have got to get is a situation 
developed whereas the last choice of transport is to use the car" also "there is a move to 
encourage cycling and I think that the action that is being taken in putting in cycleways is 
obviously creating a better environmentfOr the cyclist, but all these things I think though they 
are going to take people out of their cars, better public transport, the cycles etc., they are not 
going to take people out of their cars faster than the rate of growth that people are going into 
them so we come back to the fact that you have got to somehow balance the advantage of the 
car against the disadvantage ofpublic transport. 
7.2.7 Planning 
Other areas mentioned where planning policies and congestion itself. One Councillor stated 
that planning policies are very important, although long term. Getting housing nearer to the 
city, getting employment where the housing is and in the even longer term changing the 
pattern of activity so that people spend more time working from home and reducing the need 
to travel was seen as a long terin solution. An official viewed congestion itself as an 
increasing stick. It was stated that "people will be increasingly cheesed off with having to 
stare down someone else's exhaust pipe". 
7.2.8 Roadpricing 
In terms of the alternatives then road pricing was considered an option. In fact 10 out of the 
21 interviewed suggested that road pricing had an important role to play in dealing with 
congestion. Table 4 shows that support was expressed by Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
Councillors. 
With regards to road pricing in general, comments were made such as "I suggest, would 
think some form of road pricing or tolls in conjunction with a good cheap public transport 
service, that's basically the way forward", "With road pricing the evidence is it can be very 
effective ......... undoubtedly economic measures, pricing measures can make a difference", "I 
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believe in the longer term that a. /orm of road pricing must come about. The onlY waY oj' 
controlling trciffic is through the pocket qj'the driver", "growth within the urban areas has 
got to be controlled by nioney (ý/* one sort or another" and "We have practised various 
restraint measures over many years, there aren't too many options left in the bag ..... restraint 
and improving alternatives has a limited scope and if you are really going to hold trciflic 
levels down road pricing is probably the only way". Although viewed as effective one 
respondent perceived road pricing as a vote loser: "I think they dejinitel-v are a vote loser in 
the short term there is no question about that. In. /act I was surprised during our dabbling 
with thisjust how anti people were who I would have thought were big enough to see beyond 
the immediate, but unless something like this is done there is no hope 11 . 
Interestingly, only four of the ten who mentioned road pricing as an efficient means of dealing 
with congestion in the city of Cambridge made specific reference to congestion metering. In 
support it was stated that "something like the type oj'scheme which was being suggestetl by 
the County Council had merit" whereas it was also stated that "I anz not certain that 
congestion metering would have been the most ejjýctive means (#'dealing with congestion ". 
7.3.0 The package approach 
Proposition 3 
* 'The support for urban road pricing increases if it is taken as part of a 
comprehensive package oftneasures'. 
As outlined, a number of policy options were put forward for dealing with traffic congestion 
in the city of Cambridge. In fact nine of the twenty-one Interviewed explicitly stated that (here 
was no one option, "it being a balancing tlct" "With a package required to deal 
with the issue" and "Well in a nutshell it has got to be restraint and improved alternatives ". 
A 'carrot and stick approach' was mentioned on a number of occasions by both councillol-s 
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and officials. Interestingly it was stated by one of the officials that "ideallv vou ivant to have 
some ij'not all qI'the carrots in place býftve you start wealding the stick but that doesn't 
mean you can't do some of' the stick measures straight awa. v". In support of a package 
approach it was suggested that "I think one of the problems has been that people have been 
touting magic bullet solutions, one thing and that's it. You have got to keep up the pressure 
on a whole range (#'polic-v areas... ". 
7.4.0 The potential advantages and disadvantages of congestion metering 
Before dealing specifically with the issue of 'concerns' it is important to consider what 
Councillors' and Officials' perceived as being the advantages and disadvantages of' 
congestion metering. 
7.5.0 Potential advantages 
A summary of the response in terms of the advantages are given in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3 The potential advantages of congestion metering 
Response 
Advantages Councillors Officials 
Conservatives Labour Liberal 
Democrats 
" Discourages driving into the 
V 
central area 
" Raises revenue 
" Indicates the true cost of V 
motoring 
Fair 
Simple to operate 
Not intrusive on the landscape 
It appears to work 
7.5.1 Discourages driving into the central area 
Rather surprisingly, given that one of* the olýjectives of congestion metering wits to 'nianage 
vehicular demand by containing traffic volumes to tile 1990 flow', as outlined in chapter 6 
section 6.1 . 
0, less than half ( 10 out of 2 1) viewed the advantage of congestion metering as 
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being the discouragement of driving into the central area. Comments were made such as "It 
is to keep the traffic flowingfor those vehicles which need to be on the road at certain times 
of the day and if it is affecting the pound in your pocket it is costing you money, obviously 
they are going to travel at different times and hopefully that should even out the traff1cflows 
and clear the congestion ", and '7 do think it is capable of reducing the amount of travel in 
congested conditions. I think that the price mechanism is a very powerful one of influencing 
behaviour and I think congestion metering does offer a very real way of reducing the amount 
of car activity at peak times ". Two of the ten whose response was 'it discourages driving in 
central areas' were however somewhat sceptical in that they suggested that "Well the 
advantage of congestion metering in Cambridge would be if it deterred peoplefrom entering 
the city at times when the road was over ladened". 
Even so, comment was made that "The advantages obviously are that people would be 
discouragedfrom cluttering up the streets. The problem is whether that is the most effective 
way". Interestingly no mention was made of the environmental benefits to be derived from 
the introduction of a congestion metering scheme. 
7.5.2 Raises revenue 
The revenue raising qualities of congestion metering were recognised although it was 
somewhat surprising that the income stream potential was not to the fore, particularly as one 
of the perceived objectives of congestion metering was to use the surplus income to fund a 
light rapid transit system. It was said "It would bring in a lot of money which you could then 
usefor other transport solutions", and "I think it is capable ofgeneratingfunds that can be 
used to help grow the carrots that we can deliver better alternatives to the private car with 
the resources that are capable of being generated by congestion metering 
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7.5.3 Indicate the true cost of motoring 
A potential benefit of congestion metering, outlined in chapter 6 section 6.3.1, is that it would 
make motorists aware of the costs imposed on other users with charges taking place at any 
time if the level of congestion warrants it. The idea that congestion metering has the 
advantage of indicating the true cost of motoring was supported by the Officials, as shown in 
Table 5. Two responses from officers stated that "I think trying to make more explicit the 
costs of our action is very, very important and congestion metering provided that ability I 
think by seeking to levy a direct charge for the amount of time one spent in congested 
circumstances. So I think that economically it is a very attractive, very pure and very credible 
means of road pricing, "I think it brings home to the driver the true costs of his motoring", 
and "Mat distinguishes it from road pricing generally is that you do modify the charge 
according to the level of congestion that people find themselves in so it does actually fit in 
very well with the economic theory that as the external costs increase you charge people 
more to cover those external costs". Reflecting the true cost of motoring was not however an 
advantage alluded to in the response of councillors. 
7.5.4 Fairness 
Mention was made of fairness as a potential advantage, "The system isfair in as much as the 
more you drove the more you actually paid, as against any other system that was suggested 
and I thought ultimately that people would actually see the sense of that ", "I thought the one 
thing about congestion metering is the more you use your car the more you actually paid. 
Now I couldforesee a situation with tolls that if you had them on the outskirts of the city, I 
could see people coming in, having to pay a toll, driving three hundred yards up the road and 
parking. Mereas somebody else would pay the same amount to go right into the city centre 
3 Refer to chapter 6 section 6.1.0. 
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and that didn't seem veryfifir to me. So congestion metering I thought was probably the 
fairest method ". 
The other advantages mentioned related to being simple to operate through smart card 
technology, not being an intrusion on the landscape or the environment and as one respondent 
commented "it appears to work" 
7.6.0 Potential disadvantages 
In response to the question 'What do you view to be the potential disadvantages with 
congestion metering' a number of issues where raised as summarised in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 The potential disadvantages of congestion metering 
Resp onse 
Disadvantages Councillors Officialls 
Couservatives Labour Liberal 
Democrats 
" Too cornplex/Logistically V, V., W, 
difficult 
" Acceptance of technology V V 
" Equity V, v/ V, V 
" Safety V VV 
" Effect on commercial life V 
" Uncertain ofamount to be paid 
for the use of the road in 
congested periods 
" Road user would have to pay 
for the use of the road in VV 
congested periods 
41, Public relations/political 
V 
v/ 
fallout 
7.6.1 The complexity and acceptability of the technology 
The complexity and acceptability of the technology were perceived as a ma. lor disadvantagc. 
In terms of complexity thcn two issues were to the fore, first, the practical/logistical 
difficulties of getting meters fitted in vehicles, "Pie ddlicultv o It, to put meters getting peop 
in cars is not really on, it issomething that Would have to be built into Ili,, cars Iliev are 
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made and of cause that sort of process has a long time lag" and second, the motorist's 
understanding of the scheme. In terms of the acceptability of the technology it related to the 
perceived resistance to having meters installed in vehicles. 
Comments were made such as "the absolutefundamental disadvantage was that the car had 
to befitted with the gadget. It was a big operation and that was perhaps the most logistically 
difficult thing to do". "The system being proposed was horrendously complicated, needed 
cars to be modified, raised questions about whether the warranty on the car would still 
apply, it just seemedfar too complex a way of doing things to actually give road pricing a 
good name and I think that's what happened that in the public mind the concept of road 
pricing got tied up with this very complicated infringement of personal liberty, you know 
tinkering around with my car John type of thing that I think it got quite a bad press, "it 
seemed to befairly complicated, its a complicated message to put over. It actually required 
gismos and gadgets to be installed in cars that begins to impact on personal freedom, why 
the blazes should I have this display and this smart card reader in my car. It is my car Ipaid 
several thousand pounds for it". "the thought ofputting a meter in someone's car ... .. was 
mentioned on a number of occasions. It was stated in terms of "the personal freedom" or 
, "the 
intrusion offorcing things on people they don't want, with everybody living within a 20- 
30 mile radius having to have a meterfitted in the car", and "I think there was perhaps some 
concern that people wouldn'tfully understand quite what it was they were payingfor". 
7.6.2 Equity 
The issue of equity was voiced as a disadvantage particularly among Labour councillors, 
raised in terms of 'ýpoor people being priced out but wealthy people still driving in ". In a 
similar vein it was perceived as being a moral issue, one that can be divisive and unfair to 
society as a whole 'ýpricing the poor off the road and allowing more road spacefor the rich ". 
Mention was made of alternative forms of transport, since it was noted that "less well off 
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members of society are the first ones to get hit by this and they are then forced onto other 
forms of transport and if they are not convenient or are expensive then you are having a 
major effect on the quality of life of the poorer sections of the community which in a 
democratic society is basically unfair". 
7.6.3 Safety 
Safety was an issue raised by a number of the respondents. It was a type of policy which 
"would encourage people to rat run ". it would "encourage people tojump the trafji'c lights " 
and "they (the motorist) would think ifl stop I would have to pay money so I am not going to 
stop I'll go round the wrong side of the bollards, I will do anything because people do not 
always behave in a rational manner". So the safety aspects were essentially one of erratic 
driver behaviour 'Jumping pedestrian crossings or tragic lights", "driving faster because 
they will get it into their mind that if they start to slow down they are going to incur 
penalties" and "raising the problem of accidents". It was also suggested that people may 
drive "watching the meter". 
Interestingly only one respondent mentioned the fact that 'ýYou are depending on what people 
think is going to be a congested route or day rather than what is and when people actually 
set out in the morning they don't really know what they are going to pay and so you are 
going to get somejunny effects doing it that way 
7.6.4 Road users would have to pay 
To tell road users that they would have to pay for the use of the road in congested periods 
was perceived as being a disadvantage, suprisingly by Conservative councillors. This was 
however not specifically related to congestion metering but to any road pricing system, "The 
disadvantage is of course the disadvantage you have with any system, people do not want to 
actually pay extra money, they look on it as a tax, which fundamentally it is, and people do 
not like taxes whatever they are". 
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7.6.5 Public relations andpoliticalfallout 
The public relations and political fall out was mentioned as a major disadvantage by all the 
political groups and the officials and the fact that its unpopularity is something that any 
political party that brought it in would have to face. The cost being the loss of votes since 
there would be "an outcry about it". In fact the sensitivity over bad publicity was mentioned 
and the need for political will with a policy of this nature. 
7.7.0 Issues of concern 
Proposition 4 
* 'The major concern with respect to urban road pricing relate to privacy, equity, the 
utilisation of the revenue raised and the clarity of objectives. 
In addition to the array of disadvantages a series of concerns where also voiced. These are 
summansed in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.5 Concerns with congestion metering 
Response 
Concerns Councillor s Officials 
Conservatives Labour Liberal 
Democrats 
Visitors Io/ V 
" Exemptions 
" How the technology works 
" How the revenue would be 
used 
" The alternative forms of' 
transport 
" The cost of installation and 
enforcement 
7.7.1 Visitors and exemptions 
Concern was voiced over the treatment of visitors "Its a tricky system lo deat with in a place 
like Cambridge which has so InanY people who are not regular users of flit, Cambridgeshire 
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road network, who are visitors and particularly visitors from overseas who travel by car 
would find it a big problem" and exemptions "you do have to have quite a fine system, you 
have got to allow for people with disabilities, there is quite a difficult question of mothers 
taking children to school but you have got to think these things through because if this is 
actually what comes up in public consultation 'well if you actually impose this how is this 
person going to do this' then you have really got to cover those angles and then that starts to 
make the system complicated". 
7.7.2 How the technology works 
Concem or doubts were also expressed as to whether the "technology was actually going to 
work, we didn't want thein to start installing anything until it was absolutely guaranteed to 
be reliable and effective andfool proof and we were dubious as to whether that could be the 
case ". 
7.7.3 How the revenue would he used 
"I was concerned as to whether the money would be properly used or whether it would be 
siphoned off by the govemment. My view was that the only proper use for that money would 
be to subsidise public transport effectively, so that people who were priced out of using their 
cars, which they would have to be, because otherwise it wouldn't be working, were then given 
an alternative means of transport". 
7.7.4 The cost of installation 
Two issues which were also raised as concerns were the need for a viable public transport 
alternative if congestion metering were to be introduced and the cost of installation and 
enforcement. One councillor put it thus, "Mat were the costs of installation going to be 
because as the technological side of this particular scheme became clear it became more and 
more obvious that it was a very expensive thing to implement unlike supplementary licensing 
or unlike a toll system, even electronic tolls are not as expensive as the congestion metering 
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system and as time went on it became more and more clear that nobody knew the answer to 
that question, nobody knew even the answer to the technology question itself as to how it was 
going to work because the technology hadn't been developed. If the technology hasn't been 
developed then you can't say how much it is going to cost and therefore the whole thing 
started to become more and more implausible", and "It would be quite a difficult scheme 
actually to administer, the cost of actually providing these, (the meters) ensuring that it is 
fitted, enforcing the system, penalising people who do seek to abuse it would be very, very 
troublesome. You would need a big infrastructure for it". 
At the end of the interview each respondent was invited to complete a questionnaire relating 
to congestion metering in the context of Cambridge and how concerned they are/were about a 
range of issues. The questionnaire was constructed in the Likert style with I representing 
Very Unconcerned and 5 Very Concerned, as shown in Table 7.6 
A summary of the responses for both councillors and officials is shown in Table 7.6 
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Table 7.6 How concerned are/were you about each of the following issues? 
Very/fairly 
unconcerned 
Very/fairly 
concerned 
Mean 
Invasion of road user privacy 12 3 2.30 
Fact that the introduction of congestion metering 
would mean that in congested periods the road user 11 8 2.60 
would have to pay for the use of the road 
Exemption for certain groups 9 9 3.00 
The impact on delivery vehicles and commercial 6 7 3.05 
traffic 
" Equity/fairness of the congestion metering scherne 5 11 3.30 
" The reliability and accuracy of the congestion 6 1 3.37 
metering equipment 
" The econornic impact on the urban area in which 5 12 3.50 
congestion metering is introduced 
Enforcement of the congestion metering scheme 4 12 3.68 
" How congestion metering would be integrated with 3 14 3.74 
other congestion management measures 
" The public transport provision once congestion 3 16 3.90 
metering is introduced 
" How the revenue ralsed fi-om congestion metering Z: I C5 
2 15 4.15 
would be used 
" The cost ofiniplernenting the congestion metering 1 16 4.16 
equipment 
" The need for clearly stated objectives, such as, the 
regulation of traffic demand, tile achievement of' 1 18 4.35 
environmental benefits and the raising of revenue 
for investment in transport systems 
The biggest potential area ofconcern related to the need for clearly stated objectives, the cost 
of' implementing the scherne "because the set lip costs would be enormous" and flow tile 
revenue raised frorn congestion metering would be used. 
In terms of Table 7.6 it can be seen that practical issues are viewed of greater concern than 
issue of principle. In fact issues of principle, namely invasion of' privacy, the fact thit tile 
introduction of congestion metering would rnean that in congested periods tile road user 
would have to pay for the use of the road and issues ofequIty and fairness are of' less concern 
than issues ofhow the revenue raised would he used, the cost of iniplenicritation and the need 
for clearly stated objectives. 
In terms of invasion of privacy one respondent stated that "I've neverftlt that was a big 
issue. When we talked to many many organisations and groups about our scheme that was a 
thing which was qften mentioned. people would say, wellyou know invasion (ýfprivac. y, but 
when you explained it to them I think most people had to accept that it wasn't any more than 
having a bank card is an invasion qf'privac. v ". 
7.8.0 The technology 
Proposition 5: 
e 'The simpler the scheme being proposed the more acceptable it is likely to be'. 
In terms of acceptance it was also important to explore the idea as to whether a less 
technologically advanced system (at least in the first instance) would have proved more 
politically acceptable. The response was mixed. Eight out of the seventeen who answered this 
question said no, five said yes and four were unsure. The respondents who said no where of 
the opinion that an alternative such as toll booths would be no more publicly and therefore 
politically acceptable. The reasons voiced included "an. vfortn oftaxation, people tire going to 
be against it", "toll booths would have been very expensive. ýfit had been the case qIje'etling 
cards into a harrier I coultIn't see much dý#ýrencejrom usi . 119 congesti . on metering", "It 
depends what sort oj'sývstem was envisaged but I suspect not. I'hey have allgot problems that 
is the thing", "A less technologicallY advanced sYstem would be more likely to work but I 
think the overriding public obj*ection would be to having to pa. v anYthing. lor what thev used 
to get. for. free in inverted commas and that would be bound to al, Wect the political perceptions 
of it so I don't think that would have made a diffý, rence from that point o 'view ", , It wolildn't 
necessarily have proved more acceptable any scheme is going to be controversial" and "/ 
don't think so, no I wouldsay there is a bialt in public reaction against road pricing and it is 
going to take time and very persuasive reasons. lim- people to be convinced ". 
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Respondents who expressed the view that a less technologically advanced scheme would be 
more acceptable suggested that "I think with this system (congestion metering) the public 
would automatically think that it was a bit like big brother watching over you or they were 
being forced to do something which they don't have any say in", "I think that in a sense if 
there is one important lesson to learn it is that congestion metering is actually too 
sophisticated, it has these disadvantages in terms of road safety and in terms of road rage in 
the psychological effects of being chargedfor the amount of time that other people force you 
to spend in congested conditions would really be quite serious. I quite like the technology and 
I think it is sufficiently robust to be usedfor motorway tolling and to be usedfor some sort of 
cordon road pricing system which is distance based, but I think using that technology to 
charge for the length of time that you spend in a queue where we all blame that on the people 
ahead of us in the queue would be unacceptable in terms of the attitude and the effect it 
would have on how we behave as human beings". 
In terms of the respondents who were unsure one interesting comment was "It is hard to say 
without looking at specific proposals but I would have thought that any form of localised 
congestion metering would have had the same problems and I 
don't think you can get round 
that by changing the technology", he goes on to say "The problem with toll booths is that 
they tend to develop a siege mentality, that could have a major problem on the economic 
system of the city, the commercial system, not so much the physical presence of the toll 
booths 
and the cost of the system, it would have been the perception, people saying, Oh God, I'm not 
going into Cambridge, I'd rather go to Peterborough or wherever and the effect on the 
commercial life in the city would have been disastrous. This would not have been the case 
with congestion metering since the driver has a choice. He is much more in control. With a 
toll booth its like checkpoint Charlie, somebody else is in control, you have someone there 
taking the money, the big brother aspect and the driver thinks well I ain no longer in 
control ". 
7.9.0 Why was the concept of congestion metering not continued beyond the field trial 
Table 7.7 summaries the response to the question "In your opinion why was the concept of 
congestion metering not continued beyond the field trial". 
Table 7.7 Why was congestion metering not continued beyond the field trial? 
Resp ons e 
Reason Councillors _ _ Officials 
Conservatives Labour Liberal 
I)emocrats 
" Vote loser/unpopular 
" No political push 
40 Change ofcouncil 
Director of transportation 
retired 
The technology 
All the alternatives had not 
been exhausted 
Before its time 
7.9.1 Unpopularl no political push 
As shown the political perspective was considered an important element and in fact the idea 
of unpopularity and the lack of political push are obviously interlinked. The lack of' political 
support was evident frorn statements such as "It was a political hot potato alul it was 
dropped because we could see that the public reaction was not goinK 10 accept it. It was 
going to be controversial", and "It ivas dubbed (m sorne quarters) as being (I pol/ t(lx on 
wheels ". 
7.9.2 Change of council 
The County Council elections in May 1993 were also suggested as a reason, "I Hunk it was 
because (ýOhe chall, ýe ofthe political "Ill? ' ill iStratioll ill /993. ", with the new mfininistmtion 
being less keen on the idea. This was partly due to the fact that the Conservatives had lost 
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overall control of the Council', the Chairman of the Transport Services Committee who had a 
positive outlook with regards to congestion metering failed to be re-elected, and it was also 
suggested that "things moved on to getting the Park and Ride up and running ..... so the 
agenda seems to have changed". A view was also expressed however that "had the 
Conservative group remained in control in the period 1993-1997 1 don't think they would 
have pushed ahead with it. They would have taken stock of the very valuable research that 
had been done, they would have noted the governments' view, and I don't think they would 
have pressed ahead with trying to initiate a scheme in Cambridge as a standard bearing 
exercise ". 
At the time of the May 1993 local elections the Labour Group on the County Council issued 
a Press Release. It stated: 
From the Labour Group on Cambridgeshire County Council: Labour-condemns 
Tory's 'Poll Tax on Wheels'. 
Tory proposals for a road pricing scheme in Cambridge are seriously flawed and 
would cost local motorists millions of pounds. 
The scheme, based on 'spy in the cab' electronic metering, would cost E26 
million to set up and would need to raise E15 million annually in Cambridge to 
cover costs. 
The E 15 million would come from charging motorists caught in city traffic jams. J 
Jones - Leader Labour group - described the scheme as fatally flawed - 'a Tory 
Poll Tax on Wheels. ' 
She said schemes cannot solve the city's traffic congestion. Far from eliminating 
congestion, it can only be funded by cars being stuck in traffic jams. Motorists 
4 it is fair to say that in the main they were sympathetic to the notion of congestion metering. 
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will then pay through the nose just to meet the massive E15 million per annurn 
running costs. 
This will deter people from coming into Cambridge and damage the local 
economy without solving the problem of congestion. 
D Kellaway labour spokesperson on Public Transport added - "with pollution 
levels running above EC standards in almost half of city sites sampled recently, 
action is urgently needed. Labour believed the best approach is not to price 
motorists out of their cars, but to price people into public transport. At the 
moment bus services are far too expensive". 
Conservative County Councillors have already agreed to put f: 100,000 into 
developing the congestion metering scheme. Field Trials will begin in September. 
Labour believes this money would be better spent developing a proper public 
transport network, with more Park and Ride. 
April 1993 
It is clear from the Press Release that the Labour Group, at least, had narrowed their attention 
to public transport, and Park and Ride in particular with congestion metering being no longer 
part of their agenda. 
7.9.3 Retirement of the Director of Transportation 
As stated in section 7.1.2, one of the main reasons for the consideration of congestion 
metering in the context of Cambridge was the interest of the then Director of Transportation. 
His subsequent retirement was perceived as an important reason for the scheme's lack of 
continuation after the field trials. Responses were made such as "With the disappearance of 
the Director of Transportation the impetus behind it also disappeared", "I can't remember 
when he (the Director) departed, I'm sure that must have affected it cos he was very much the 
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driving force from an officer point of view ", and "I think the drive behind the scheme went 
with the man ". 
7.9.4 The technology 
The technology was also expressed as a reason. The difficulty with making sure that 
individuals had meters fitted in their cars such that "the one main stumbling block was this 
business of putting the thing in peoples cars, the meter whatever it was, we couldn't see how 
we could get over that", the cost effectiveness of the scheme "it was debatable how much 
money would be raised" and the cost of implementation. 
7.9.5 All alternatives had not been exhausted 
The phrase "political hot potato" cropped up on a number of occasions and one councillor 
suggested that it would continue to be so "until all alternatives had been exhausted". 
7.9.6 Before its time 
Finally, it was stated that "It was a bit before its time and I think we will see it back before we 
are ten years older". 
If this is the case then how could the policy have been made more acceptable? 
7.10.0 The acceptability of congestion metering 
Legitimising policy is fraught with problems and particularly a policy like congestion 
metering. The councillors and officials were asked how they felt the concept of congestion 
metering could be made more politically and publicly acceptable and their response is 
illustrated in Table 7.8. 
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Table 7.8 Measures to make congestion metering more acceptable. 
Resp onse 
Policy Legitimacy Councillors Officials 
Conservatives Labour Liberal 
Democrats 
" Evidence of disquiet amongst V 
the public 
" Active policy promotion V V 
" Evidence of success elsewhere 
" Political timing Z: 5 V 
" Clarity V 
" Policy mix VV 
" Support frorn national 
government I 
7.10.1 Disquiet amongst the public 
By disquiet, the responses were referring to the fact that the situation was not its yet bad 
enough. Comments were made like "Ijust don'tsee howyou could sell it until You have got a 
situation were everybody agreed it was totallY unacceptable ", "things would have to get a lot 
worse beft)re people are banging on the door and demanding Congestion Inetering is 
introduced". In terms of the disquiet what also carne across strongly was the fact that 
congestion metering would only stand any chance of being acceptable if all other policy 
initiatives had been exhausted. In other words "Having tried all other things ". Interestingly, 
it was stated by two respondents that if a concept like congestion metering were to be 
introduced it would be because ol' pollution and not necessarily congestion. "I think tit flit, 
time it was a bit dýfticult- I think now the air qualirv argument could be the clinching one 
"The situation isn't bad enough. It maY comeftom the pollution angle, that's a problem 
which is with us now, its certainly been evident over the last couple ol'years. Overall the 
Irnpression was therefore given that CUrrently the situation with regards to congestion was 
not/and is not bad enough. 
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7.10.2 Active policy promotion 
Active policy promotion was referred to by both councillors and officials, see Table 7.8, as 
an important means of making the concept of congestion metering more acceptable. 
Comments like "I think the only way to manage to sell things is to put quite a bit in the press 
about it, have public meetings about it, try and explain it, get people to understand what it is 
all about". In a similar vein "It needs good PR work to get through to the members of the 
public. It has got to be sold to the public, by the radio, TV, newspapers. You can sell it and 
you could explain the reasons, and there are very good reasons why you need something like 
congestion metering" 
7.10.3 Lack of a scheme elsewhere 
It was stated "I think it would be useful ifyou had got a scheme like that running somewhere 
else, which you could point to and say look it is working there, "What would have made it 
more politically easier to accept was if it had been seen to work somewhere else. Ifyou could 
take councillors to some other city where they had gone through this process, because a lot 
of radical changes do settle down ..... there is 
however an argument against being the first 
guinea pig ". "There was no proven scheme anywhere for anyone to look at so you were 
really in the hands ofpeople telling you well it will do this and it will do that but with no real 
basic background at all". 
7.10.4 Political timing 
As regards timing it was interesting to note that a view was expressed that the timing was 
slightly wrong. If it had come on the back of the implementation of motorway tolling, it was 
argued the situation would have been easier. The congestion metering experiment was also 
unfortunately timed when viewed along side the County Council elections. 
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7.10.5 Clarity 
The issue of clarity was also raised in terms of acceptability. Clarity in terms of the issues 
involved, would the scheme work, and had all the pros and cons been considered. What came 
across was that if the scheme had been investigated more thoroughly then it would have been 
more acceptable to councillors. As one councillor put it "I think it could only be done if they 
had worked out what it was going to be first, had a clear idea what the costs and benefits 
would have been and could have persuaded that the benefits outweighed the costs but it was 
all too vague ". 
7.10.6 Policy mix 
With respect to policy mix a view was expressed that if congestion metering could have been 
brought in simultaneously with a vastly improved public transport system, so there was an 
alternative to "sugar the pill" then it could have proved acceptable. As one councillor put it 
however "To say to the public you are going to use it to improve public transport isfine but I 
would say at a guess the public would want to know how you are going to use it and they 
would want to actually see that develop ". 
7.10.7 National government support 
It was suggested that to make congestion metering more politically acceptable "it needed 
certainly more supportfrom national government. In the early 1990s the government were 
AC-DC on it for political reasons. They were very interested in what we were doing in 
Cambridge , all the concepts we were espousing, 
they had to because of pressures from 
journalists and others. It was being said look Cambridge is grasping the nettle and trying to 
give some thought to congestion what are you 
doing, and what the government did, they were 
largely pressurised by our initiative because it picked up a big head of steam nationally in the 
early 90s, was to commission the London Study into road pricing. That was a long job, it 
lasted several years, the results came out in dribs and drabs and it gave the govemment 
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breathing space. Anotherfactor in the equation was that during the early 90s the Minister of 
Transport, there were so many different Ministers of Transport, they lasted about a year at 
the most or less, and different Ministers kept making different statements about road pricing 
when pressed ...... it is certainly 
fair to say that the government would not have embarked on 
the London study had not the Cambridge thing been initiated. it put a lot of pressure on .... to 
make it more publicly and politically acceptable it needed a lead from national government 
which it didn't have. National government pretty much I think saw it was politically a dodgey 
one knowing it wouldn't be popular with the electorate at that time and therefore they 
weren't going to jumP in with both feet and so they studied it in London and that gave them 
time to. 
7.11.0 The Future 
in terms of the likelihood of a similar scheme in the next five years in Cambridge or 
elsewhere in the UK then eighteen of the twenty-one interviewed stated that they could 
foresee no such scheme in the period suggested however a number of buts were referred to. 
7.11.1 In terms of Cambridge: 
lo But I would say very serious consideration will be made in ten years. 
*I would have thought not in Cambridge, but I would think in the next five years I could 
envisage it being introduced in London or at least in a pilot scheme provided that the bugs 
have been knocked out of the technology. 
But the situation could get worse in the nextfive years and you could end up with gridlock 
so at that point something has got to be done. 
Not in five years but if we were going to get something I think it would be done on a 
regional or a sub regional basis because I think everybody has come to accept that it can't 
work in isolation so it has got to be much wider than the city. 
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e Its the cost which will control whether it is ever taken up. I am quite sure that if it was 
cheap then it might well go, but if it is going to be expensive the wayfinances are at local 
government and central government level I can't see it ever taking off. 
e But, within ten years some sort of scheme to get rid of the congestion will have to be 
brought in. It would stand more chance of getting a good run if it was represented by a 
quango or central government so as to take it out of the local political arena. 
*I don't think there would be a similar scheme, but the way technology moves I would say it 
is quite likely that somefonn of road pricing will come about which will be practical. 
Only one respondent, an Official, was of the opinion that there was quite a strong probability 
of a similar scheme but the push would come from air quality "Air quality is much more 
tangible and a lot more objective than congestion which is quite a difficult quantity to get 
hold of '. 
As regards elsewhere in the UK the response was one of uncertainty. As with the Cambridge 
situation however a number of buts were in evidence: 
e "Possible, but it is really a question ofpolitical will". 
* Don't know, but in the end it will come from national government looking for revenue, you 
can see this with motorway toll proposals". 
Well you can never say can you but there may well be some local authority who thinks its 
the greatest thing since sliced bread and introduces it". 
* I've no idea but I would have thought that with an increasing acceptance of high 
technology there could well be. This kind of scheme is going to come up again and again 
and somebody might say lets have a go at it". 
4p "Really I've no idea but I think its inevitable at some time or other its just a question of 
when". 
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"I think five years is a bit challenging but who knows. The great worry about road 
pricing is that it is always a rollingfive years away". 
"Nil infive years but probably if you said ten years I think perhaps there might be something 
somewhere but it wouldn't be congestion metering. I think it would be more Area Licensing 
or something like that, something which is practised elsewhere 
7.12.0 Conclusion 
Cambridge offered an ideal location for the trial of an urban road pricing scheme and there 
are six basic reasons for this. First, congestion was perceived by Councillors and Officials as 
being serious or very serious in the city of Cambridge. Second, in the Director of 
Transportation of Cambridgeshire County Council congestion metering had an important 
policy entrepreneur. In fact, the role of a protagonist in a position of influence should not be 
underestimated. Third, at the time Cambridgeshire possessed a sympathetic council, at least 
willing to let the trial take place. Fourth, it was perceived that there was a problem and that a 
concept such as congestion metering had a role to play. Fifth, the freestanding nature of the 
city made it an ideal location for the trial of an urban road pricing scheme, as did the high- 
tech nature of the city. In saying this, certain issues in terms of timing were raised namely, 
congestion was not seen as bad enough, pollution was not considered as an objective for 
introducing congestion metering, not all the alternatives had been exhausted, and, a package 
approach was put forward as the answer. In terms of the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of congestion metering, then discouraging driving into the central area of the 
city, raising revenue, indicating the true cost of motoring and fairness were perceived as 
advantages, whereas the complexity and acceptance of the technology, equity, safety issues 
and the public relations and political fallout were viewed as disadvantages. 
Issues of concern related to aspects such as how the technology would work, how the revenue 
would be used and the cost of installation. Overall a simpler form of urban road pricing 
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scheme was not perceived as being more acceptable since 'any form of taxation, people are 
going to be against it'. 
This chapter has indicated the potential difficulties encountered with a highly sophisticated 
'big bang' approach to the introduction of urban road pricing. Whereas the existence of a 
main protagonist and a sympathetic council allowed for the consideration of a scheme beyond 
that envisaged by the incremental approach it did not progress beyond a field trial. The 
ultimate lack of political push, the change of Council, retirement of the Director of 
Transportation, the sophistication and cost of technology, the fact that all the alternatives had 
not been exhausted and a concept ahead of its time, were all put forward as reasons. 
In terms of legitimising the policy disquiet amongst the public as to the level of congestion, 
active policy promotion, a public scheme operating elsewhere, political timing, clarity, policy 
mix and national government support were all detailed as important factors. 
The following chapter summarises the findings from this and the previous two chapters. It is 
constructed around the propositions detailed in section 4.7.0, chapter 4. 
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Chapter 8 Findings 
"Road pricing is well worth looking at as part of a strategy, but approaching it in an 
incremental way. Go for a simple scheme first, perhaps just a permit system or 
whatever, something which didn't require cars to be tinkered around with, a system 
which probably in economic terms was imperfect, but one you could actually sell to 
the public. Get that started". 
(City Council Official 1996) 
8.0.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to act as a brief summary of the findings of the previous 
three chapters with respect to decision-making and urban road pricing. This is based 
on the national perspective in terms of the national road traffic survey, and the city of 
Cambridge experience of congestion metering in terms of in-depth interviews of key 
players. This chapter is structured in line with the six propositions set out in chapter 4 
and used as a basis for chapters 5 and 7. The findings highlight the factors which need 
to be addressed when making decisions in the area of urban road pricing - how should 
the decision-making process be undertaken in order to achieve acceptance and 
therefore overcome potential barriers to implementation? Where possible the findings 
are compared with those detailed as part of the literature review, particularly the 
public attitude surveys. 
Both the National Survey and the research undertaken in the city of Cambridge with 
respect to congestion metering have generated findings which will drive the future 
decisions made by policy makers in terms of urban road pricing'. Whilst this chapter 
Unless stated, the quotes used in this chapter refer to congestion metering in the city of Cambridge. 
They are additional to those used in previous chapters. 
185 
is predicated on the incremental approach to decision-making in terms of the typology 
of policy analysis (detailed in chapter I section 1.0.0) this chapter seeks to provide 
policy research in terms of iiýforniationfior polic-v, that is research which intends to 
feed into policy making activities. A more detailed account of incrementalism and the 
empirical research undertaken is presented in chapter 9. 
8.1.0 The local situation 
Proposition 1: 
'Urban road pricing is likely to become more acceptable as a policy option the 
more serious the level of* congestion and pollution are perceived to be in the 
towns and cities of the UK'. 
8.1.1 Congestion and pollution are viewed as being 'serious 1. 
National perspective: In terms of the National Survey the seriousness of congestion 
and pollution were highlighted with 83.6 and 73.1 per cent of respondents viewing 
congestion and pollution as being serious or very serious in towns and cities of the 
UK. In addition, the more urbanised the area then the more serious the problem of 
congestion and pollution were perceived to be. For example, in London Boroughs, 
91.3 and 86.4 per cent of Officials viewed traffic congestion and traffic related 
pollution as being 'serious' or 'very serious', whereas with County Council Officials, 
it was 67.5 and 57.5 per cent respectively. This is consistent with the findings ot'jones 
(1991b) -see section 2.1.1, who in a comparison of twelve national surveys of' public 
attitudes to traffic related issues found that in the region of 80 per cent viewed the 
levels of traffic as posing a verv orftiirly serious problem. The problem rated more 
highly in London. 
If congestion is analysed purely on the basis of 'very serious' however then only 
Councillors view it as such, with 56.3,43.5 and 42.1 per cent respectively perceiving 
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it as very serious. In fact, for County Officials only 15 per cent view it as 'very 
serious' (see Appendix 4 Table 1). As regards pollution, in terms of 'very serious' all 
the key interest groups perceive it as more serious than congestion, with the exception 
of Metropolitan Borough Officials, Economists and Civil Engineers. In terms of 
Councillors then the figure for 'very serious' in London Boroughs, Metropolitan 
Boroughs and County Councils are 75.0,47.8 and 44.7 per cent respectively. 
Cambridge experience: 18 of the 21 interviewed perceived the levels of traffic 
congestion as being serious or very serious, with current levels being viewed as 
"appalling ", "very serious and getting more serious all the time ". 
8.1.2 There is mLred opinion in terms of the effectiveness of urban roadpricing as a 
measurefor dealing with urban traffic congestion. 
National Perspective: In terms of dealing with the problem of congestion then urban 
road pricing was perceived as being one, if not the most effective policy. In fact 81.6 
per cent of the National Survey respondents viewed urban road pricing as being 
, totally' or 'fairly effective'. This was not however a universal view since Councillors 
perceived public transport improvements, cheaper public transport fares, the 
development of a land use and transportation strategy and the banning of vehicles in 
urban areas as being more effective than urban road pricing. In fact, for Metropolitan 
Borough Councillors, urban road pricing was viewed as being the least effective of all 
the policy options. 
8.1.3 Urban road pricing is perceived as one of the least acceptable measures for 
dealing with urhan traffic congestion. 
National perspective: In tenns of acceptability, then urban road pricing was perceived 
as 'one of the least acceptable measures, along with other pricing options and the 
selective expansion of road construction for dealing with urban traffic congestion. In 
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fact, in the majority of cases urban road pricing was second only to an increase in the 
price of petrol to E5 per gallon in tenns of its unacceptability. Overall 79.7 per cent of 
respondents viewed urban road pricing as being 'totally unacceptable' or 'not very 
acceptable'. The most acceptable were the 'carrot' options of cheaper public transport 
fares, public transport improvement, the creation of a network of safe cycling and 
walking routes and the introduction or expansion of park and ride services. As such, 
it seems appropriate to infer that there is some way to go before an urban road pricing 
scheme is implemented. 
In terms of the National Survey there appears to be a great deal of overlap between 
what Councillors (County, Metropolitan and London Borough), perceive as being the 
most effective and the most acceptable options. Among Councillors there appears to 
be a consistent view that public transport is the most effective and acceptable policy 
option 2. That is, an improvement in the frequency and reliability, cheaper fares and the 
introduction or expansion of Park and Ride services. 
This reinforces the view obtained from the research undertaken by Thorpe and 
Jaensirisak (1998). In their study of public attitudes in the city of Cambridge 80 per 
cent of the respondents were of the opinion that improving public transport was totally 
acceptable (perhaps not too surprising), with road user charging only in the region of 
10 per cent. In terms of effectiveness, it is difficult to compare the findings of Thorpe 
and Jaensirisak with those of the thesis, since they refer to packages of measures and 
their effectiveness whereas the thesis deals with individual policies 3 Jones(1991b)in 
his 'poll of polls' relating to public attitudes lends support to the above findings. Jones 
2 This somewhat flies in the face of a aspect put forward by Jones (1991b) that measures identified as 
popular by the general public may not be effective, with popularity in fact based on ineffectiveness 
(see section 2.1-3). 
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reveals strong support for the provision of alternatives to car use, most notably 
improvements in public transport, Park and Ride schemes and the encouragement of 
cycling and walking. Some form of urban road pricing was only supported by a 
minority of those interviewed with a general increase in the price of petrol being even 
less popular (see section 2.1.3). 
8.1.4 There has got to be a climatefor change. 
Cambridge experience: Congestion is perceived as being bad in the city of 
Cambridge, but it is seen by some as being no worse than elsewhere, whilst others 
state that the situation has got to get worse or the problem is not bad enough for a 
policy such as congestion metering to be accepted such that for "people to swallow 
bitter pills, it needs to get worse ... and you have to 
have a climate of opinion that has 
been brought to such a point that they are prepared to take a bitter pill", however, 
"eventually people will getfed up of sitting in traffic jams and they will be crying out 
for some sort of action ". 
Given this section, it would appear the case that until congestion and pollution are 
perceived as being severe enough, decision-makers are likely to persevere with policy 
options other than urban road pricing as a means of dealing with the problem. Hence 
the incremental approach to decision-making, with urban road pricing likely to 
become more acceptable as an option the more serious the level of congestion and 
pollution are perceived to be in towns and cities of the UK - with more acceptable 
options (also viewed as effective) being exhausted in the first instance. 
3 This could be perceived as a superior form of survey question to the one used in this thesis (see 
Appendix 2) since it is packages of measures rather than stand alone policy options which are 
199 
8.2.0 The idea 
Proposition 2: 
'In terms of the money raised by urban road pricing one third should he 
considered as general tax revenue, either to reduce existing taxes or to increase 
social spending in accordance with the priorities of each country or locality, one 
third used for new road infrastructure and its associated maintenance, in 
locations again chosen in accordance with the varying national or local priorities 
and one third to improve the effectiveness of public transport, by a suitable 
combination of fare and service level improvements'. (Goodwin 1989) 
8.2.1 Care is needed in stating clearly where the money raised is to be used. 
National Perspective: In terms of how the revenue should be utilised the Natiomil 
Survey found that the largest proportion of the revenue generated should go to 
improving public transport, 56 per cent, particularly in the area in which urban road 
pricing is introduced. Lower amounts, 16 and 10 per cent should go to an improved 
road network and non transport areas respectively. As stated, in section 5.2.1 this is 
perhaps not too surprising, since one would expect decision makers and those close to 
decision makers namely Transport Officials, to favour utilising the revenue in the area 
of improved public transport. The allocation of revenue in favour of' public transport 
improvements could emanate from the stakeholders perceptions of the effectiveness 
and acceptability of various policy options, the pre-disposition of' the professionals 
surveyed. As detailed in section 5.1.2, the improvements in the frequency and 
reliability of public transport are perceived as being both effective and acceptable with 
effective in general. 
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77.4 per cent and 94.2 per cent respectively viewing them as either totally or fairly 
effective and acceptable. 
A similar question was posed as part of a survey undertaken by NEDO (199 1) among 
Londoners (see section 2.2.2). Whilst improving public transport in the London area 
received over one-quarter of the allocated points (26 per cent) this is substantially less 
than the allocation recommended by the various stakeholder groups which for 
Councillors ranged from 31.96 to 40.13 points and for Officials from 46.43 to 59.97 
(see Table 5-7). Londoners suggest that more revenue should be allocated overall to 
improving the roads nationally, reducing the Road Fund Licence nationally, spending 
on non-transport government services in London and nationally and reducing the Poll 
Tax both in London and nationally'. 
The research undertaken as part of the MIRO Project in the city of Cambridge (see 
Thorpe and Jaensirisak (1998) detailed in 2.2.2) reveals that the public response was 
for 32 per cent of net revenues from road user charging to be allocated to improving 
public transport facilities. So as with the NEDO Report this was somewhat less than 
among the stakeholders covered in the national survey' 
In terms of overall spending it was found that 76 per cent should be utilised locally, 
that is in the area where urban road pricing was introduced. This was a consistent 
opinion across all the key 'interest groups'. Overall there is support for the basic 
premise of Goodwin's 'rule of three' as the basis for eliciting widespread public 
support. 
4 It must be remembered however that the Poll Tax was extremely unpopular at that time. 
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8.3.0 The package approach 
Proposition 3: 
'The support for urban road pricing increases if it is taken as part of a 
comprehensive package of measures'. 
8.3.1 The support for urban road pricing increases if it is taken as part of a 
comprehensive package of measures. 
National Perspective: If the revenue was spent in the way suggested in the National 
Survey, that is as part of a package of measures, then it increases the acceptability of 
urban road pricing. Taken in isolation only 11.3 per cent of respondents in the 
National Survey viewed urban road pricing as being totally or fairly acceptable. 
Having specified how the revenue should be allocated in terms of specific options 
then the acceptability (totally or fairly) increases to 52.6 per cent. This increased level 
of support is consistent with the evidence obtained from the NEDO survey ( 1991) and 
the Thorpe and Jaensirisak (1998) paper (see section 2.2.3). Both show an increase in 
support for urban road pricing if the revenue is allocated to various policy options. In 
terms of the NEDO Report of Londoners views the increase was 43 per cent 'totally or 
fairly acceptable' before the revenue was allocated to 62 per cent after. In the research 
by Thorpe and Jaensirisak the increase was from 34 to 52 per cent. 
I Caution is required when making comparisons however, since the options offered in this thesis 
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8.3.2 It would appear important that all alternative options have first been 
exhausted. 
Cambridge experience: Until this had occurred it was suggested in the Cambridge 
context that congestion metering would continue to be a "political hot potato" and 
11 would continue to be so until all alternatives had been exhausted". 
8.3.3 For a policy such as urban road pricing to be accepted then a vastly improved 
public transport network is required. 
Cambridge experience: In terms of congestion metering, a view was expressed that if 
a vastly improved public transport system could have been introduced simultaneously 
with congestion metering then it could have proved more acceptable. As such, "I was 
concerned that ýI'you didn't get the right public transport provisions in place before 
you went to congestion metering you would have a big, big problem. That had to come 
first. But there was some thoughts at the time that congestion metering would pay. lor 
the public transport, to me that seemed the wrong way round" alternatively, "Pump 
primingfinance was required to actually get the public transport system up býforc 
you actually introduced the controls (congestion metering). Its the chicken and egg 
syndrome". On a rather pessimistic note one councillor stated "Pley (the officials) 
probably think well we will see some improvement in public transport but it won't be 
enough to make up for the extra inconvenience we (ire going to sul ' r. So I would ., 
je 
have thought that politicall-N, it is not a winner" 
8.4.0 Issues of concern 
Proposition 4: 
'The major concern with respect to urban road pricing relate to privacy, equity, 
the utilisation of the revenue raised and the clarity of Ajectives. 
where slightly different from those offered in the Thorpe and Jaensirisak research. 
I-ý 
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8.4.1 There is a need for clearly stated objectives, improved public transport 
provision and clear guidance as to how the revenue raisedfrom urban roadpricing 
is utilised. 
National perspective: Considering the whole issue of 'concerns' with respect to 
urban road pricing the survey revealed that issues of principle namely 'the fact that the 
introduction of urban road pricing would mean that in congested periods the road user 
would have to pay for the use of the road' and that it would be an 'invasion of road 
user's privacy' were of least concern. Issues such as 'the need for clearly stated 
objectives', 'the public transport provision once urban road pricing is introduced' and 
'how the revenue raised from urban road pricing would be used' were however of 
greatest concern. How the revenue raised would be utilised was the greatest concern, 
with 93.6 per cent of National Survey respondents being 'very' or 'fairly concerned'. 
in addition, 91.6 per cent of the respondents as part of the National Survey, were 
6very' or 'fairly concerned' about the need for clearly stated objectives. 
Cambridge experience: In terms of congestion metering it was stated that congestion 
metering "came along " after the main strateg and concern was voiced over its 
integration with other measures. In fact, a view was expressed that the "lack of clearly 
stated objectives was a real problem". A most interesting response to the question of 
objectives was to suggest that "the whole thing was product led and that they wanted 
to get this system in ... and therefore 
had to find reasons to just ffy it, so they say right 
this system would regulate the traffic .. then they'd say well its got environmental 
beneflts as well and you'd say what are the environmental benefits and you'd start to 
examine that and then they'd say well OK it does give a problem but the revenue it 
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raises would give us money to produce public transport so they were not thought out, 
they weren't clear in what they were trying to do". 
As with the national survey, how the revenue raised from congestion metering would 
be used was ranked alongside the 'need for clearly stated objectives' and 'the public 
transport provision once urban road pricing is introduced' as major areas of concern. 
In fact, one Councillor stated "I was concerned as to whether the money would be 
properly used or whether it would be siphoned off by the government. My view was 
that the only proper use for that money would be to subsidise public transport 
effectively, so that people who were priced out of using their cars, which they would 
have to be, because otherwise it wouldn't be working, were then given an alternative 
means of transport" and "I would be concerned it would go back to the centre rather 
than be available locally". Equally, as with the national survey there was less 
concern with congestion metering in terms of the invasion of road user's privacy 7 or 
the fact that the introduction of congestion metering would mean that in congested 
periods the road user would have to pay for the use of the road, than with other issues. 
Clearly 'road user's privacy' was less of an issue in the Cambridge context than with 
other types of urban road pricing scheme since as stated in section 6.3.4 'One of the 
positive features of the proposed congestion metering scheme is that given the pre- 
paid smartcard system, the road side beacon simply activates the on-board meter and 
thereafter deducts charges without the vehicle being identified, there is no central 
record maintained and movements of a vehicle inside the cordon cannot be monitored, 
thus ensuring complete confidentiality'. 
6 See chapter 6, section 6.1.0. 
7 12 of the 15 who responded to this question in the congestion metering survey were either very or 
fairly unconcerned. 
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In terms of the findings it would appear that the invasion of road user's privacy is not 
the major issue that it once was. In section 2.2.4 and 6.3.4 it was advanced as one of 
the main stumbling by the Chartered Institute of Transport (1990,1992). clearly 
advances in technology have helped in mollifying the fears with respect to privacy, 
although the issue of privacy of those who fail to pay the charge remains. 
8.5.0 The type of technology 
Proposition 5: 
'The simpler the scheme being proposed the more acceptable it is likely to be'. 
The research undertaken would tend to be sornewhat inconclusive in terms ol'the type 
of technology which is likely to gain acceptance. In terms of the national survey and 
the Cambridge experience then: 
8.5.1 Simple technology is likely to prove more acceptable. 
National Perspective: The results of the National Survey would appear to tentatively 
suggest that a method such its Area Licensing with the licence purchased dally, weekly 
or monthly allowing you to enter a designated area has the most acceptance and is the 
least unacceptable. The more sophisticated schemes including smartcard technology, 
as envisaged for the city of Cambridge were the least acceptable. Hence for Arca 
Licensing 40.7 per cent view it as 'totally' or 'fairly acceptable' whereas 42.0 per cent 
viewed it as 'totally unacceptable' or 'not very acceptable'. In terms of smartcard 
technology the figures were 31.3 and 53.0 per cent respectively. Tlic view Could 
therefore be put forward that a basic approach, namely an Area License, could prove 
to be the most publicly acceptable in the UK. This would appear to be borne out by 
the evidence ofcongestion metering in the Cambridge context in that: 
1 96 
8.5.2 There appeared to be a level of support for road pricing in the Cambridge 
context but not necessarily congestion metering. 
Cambridge experience: Congestion metering was viewed as being too complicated 
"good in principle but unsound in practice", and as such preference for a gradualist 
approach was expressed. Comments were made such as "Road pricing is well worth 
looking at as part of a strategy, but approaching it in an incremental way. Go for a 
simple schemefirst, perhapsjust a permit system or whatever, something which didn It 
require cars to be tinkered around with, a system which probably in economic terms 
was imperfect, but one you could actually sell to the public. Get that started". 
Congestion metering was seen as a complicated message to get across and a scheme 
which was "too ambitious" and a form of road pricing which was trying to run before 
it could walk. As such it was stated that "Anyone who proposes any change is taking 
a political risk. Then the next problem is that ifyou propose anything which isn'tfully 
worked out you look silly so congestion metering had that problem". It was also 
viewed as being "too vague", and concerns were expressed in terms of cost. "Mat 
were the costs of installation going to be", "Once I began to realise that the 
economics of the system were not stacking up and that we were not getting anything 
about start-up costs of the whole thing, what the payback period was going to be, 
what the debt charges were going to be, the whole thing, I began to get extremely 
concerned, and also "If all the money was put into implementing this then what else 
would go by the way side". Area Licensing was viewed by one Official as being more 
likely than congestion metering simply because of the logistics and the fact that "Area 
Licensing has much lower set up costs and it's something which could be introduced 
fairly quickly, it doesn't need high tech. " 
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In addition, as regards the safety implications, issues were raised, such as the 
potential for rat running, the jumping of traffic lights and irrational driver behaviour 
thus, "the impact it will have on human behaviour is such that it shouldn't be thefirst 
type of road pricing that we should try to introduce". As stated in chapter 7 by a 
Councillor "I think it could only be done if they had worked out what it was going to 
befirst, had a clear idea what the costs and benefits would have been and could have 
persuaded that the benefits outweighed the costs but it was all too vague ". 
What seems clear is that congestion metering listed as one of the five urban road 
pricing options in chapter I Table 1.4 meets with a number of reservations. This is the 
case when considering the evidence from the Cambridge experience and also in terms 
of the national survey. A simpler scheme than the one proposed in the Cambridge 
context is likely to prove more acceptable. The question is what type of scheme. The 
findings in terms of the national survey are somewhat similar to the NEDO findings 
of Londoner's views of road user charging (although it is important to remember that 
these findings were obtained in 1991). These findings are outlined in chapter 2 section 
2.3.3 and reveal that only 8 per cent supported a metering system. 
The national survey also shows that the cordon charge levied each time a vehicle 
enters a designated area has the least support among the four options offered. 29.4 per 
cent view it as totally or fairly acceptable whereas 58.9 per cent view it as totally 
unacceptable or not very acceptable. This would appear to be consistent with the 
literature review undertaken as part of chapter 6. Section 6.3.0 indicated a series of 
weaknesses in terms of cordon pricing in that: 
* an efficient road pricing scheme will identify excessive congestion and charge 
whenever and wherever it exists. As such, the charge reflects MSC. This is not 
achieved by a cordon charge (see 6.3. I)since they are not able to discriminate fully 
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between congested and non-congested conditions. Thus the motorist will be 
undercharged at certain times and overcharged at others; 
e with cordon pricing no allowance is made of the distance travelled within the 
restricted zone; 
9 intra-zonal travel is a deficiency with cordon pricing since vehicles are only 
charged on entry into/or on exit from the zone (see 6.3.3) 
As stated, overall Area Licensing would appear to be the most acceptable. This would 
appear to be somewhat at odds with the evidence presented by the Adam Smith 
Institute/The Smith Group (1999)8 which suggests that 'the bluntness of paper-based 
charging as a traffic management tool and its poor enforceability, rule it out of serious 
consideration for all but the simplest area schemes'. 
The technology with respect to urban road pricing is progressing apace (see for tn 
example I[TS 1996) and there is a need for further research in terms of the acceptance 
of particular types of urban road pricing technology (see 10.1.3). As for congestion 
metering and the interest it generated in terms of its ability to charge for congestion 
when and where it occurs there would appear to be a trade-off between economic 
efficiency and acceptance and as SLIch, it may be necessary to concentratc on 
acceptance in the first instance. 
8.6.0 An extensive trial 
Proposition 6: 
'An extensive trial of an urban road pricing scheme is required in the UK. 
199 
8.6.1 It would help if there had been a similar scheme to look at. 
National perspective: Extensive trials, as advocated by the DETR (1998,1999) are 
supported by the findings of the National Survey, supported particularly by Officials 
and Academics. In fact, 83.7 per cent of Officials and 82.6 per cent of Academics 
'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' in the need for an extensive trial. There was however less 
support from Councillors, although approximately 50 per cent agree or strongly agree 
with the need for an extensive trial. 
Cambridge experience: In terms of congestion metering the view is that it would have 
made it "easier to accept politically " if there were similar schemes to look at. Hence, 
an extensive trial of an urban road pricing scheme is required in the UK. Gomez- 
Ibanez and Small (1994) support this in that 'thorough study should reduce the chance 
of unpleasant surprises and may encourage planners to incorporate controversial or 
unproved elements if they are found to be essential for achieving ofpol icy goals'. 
8.7.0 Other findings. 
As well as the findings relating to the six propositions suminarised ahove there are a 
series of'other findings worthy of note. 
8.7.1 It is possibly the case that a leader is required to act as a catalyst. for change. 
Cambridge experience: In terms of congestion metering the role pkiyed by the former 
Director of Transportation was acknowledged by 81 per cent of those interviewed its 
being a major factor in raising the profile of congestion metering and placing it on (lie 
political agenda in the city of Cambridge, "He was the leading niat, tillel /je i1jillciteel 
our thinking on this". Similarly with the retirement ofthe Director then an element of' 
tnomenturn was undoubtedly lost. 
, See section 2.3.3. 
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8.7.2 It would appear vital that political stability is maintained throughout the 
period a concept like congestion metering is being considered. 
Cambridge experience: In terms of congestion metering County elections in 1993 
changed the political complexion with regards to Cambridgeshire and resulted in an 
administration which was less sympathetic overall to the continuation of congestion 
metering. 
8.7.3 It would appear to be clear from the responses obtained that a concept like 
congestion metering can not be considered in isolation. 
Cambridge experience: In other words it has to be undertaken on a regional or sub 
regional basis and possibly by central rather than local government as a means of 
taking it out of the local political arena. As such "It would stand more chance of 
getting a good run". As one respondent stated "I wouldfavour it being brought in by 
the government, I can't see a local council having the nerve which ever party, taking 
it on board. It has got to be a national trial. ". To reinforce this view "All the time 
that it is going to remain a political issue then how is anyone ever going to succeed" 
and "You need things to bed in and settle down, to run for at least sLx months to a 
year and not a sort of knee jerk reaction after a few weeks". The issue of votes in fact 
was one which was very much to the fore. As one councillor put it, "Well in principle 
all change is a vote loser and anyone who proposes any change is taking a political 
risk". The biggest vote loser was perceived by one councillor to be if you tried it and 
"it was a fiasco". There was also the view that "If Cambridge went it alone they 
would be putting themselves at an economic disadvantage compared with other 
places. If you had something similar in other places then I think that's another thing 
that would make it (congestion metering) more locally acceptable. 
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8.7.4 Airpollution could be the means by which a policy such as urban roadpricing 
is accepted. 
Cambfidge expetience: In terms of congestion metering an opinion given was that "I 
thought traffic congestion in itsetf would do it, I suspect it could be the pollution 
problem which might ultimately get people thinking something has to be done, 
particularly problems we see now with more and more children with asthma and that 
type of thing and there is no doubt on a hot summers day it is very unpleasant and I 
think that will be the main factor in the future, I really do. I think people have shown 
that they are quite prepared to sit in traffic jams which of cause makes the pollution 
problem even worse" and '7 think that pollution is the only thing that does unify 
public opinion and is a better way forward than congestion because all solutions to 
congestion are based on shifting the cost to someone else and I don't think you get 
long term consensus like that. Pollution and health are closely connected, people can 
see the connections already, I don't think that any kind of further public opinion 
change is needed there, especially parents". On the same track, it was suggested that 
"... air quality is much more tangible and a lot more objective than congestion which 
is quite a difficult quantity to get hold of, what do you mean by it. To some people 
congestion is a symbol of success, since a lot of people want to use a facility it's not 
actually a downside, whereas poor air quality... ". It was noted that anti smoking and 
drink driving campaigns were slow to establish themselves but when they were seen 
as being beneficial to the individual they took off. As such, air pollution and the 
effects on health are seen as the way forward for urban road pricing. As regards 
congestion metering then one respondent stated that "It was really the environmental 
benefits which interested me" although it would appear to be the case that congestion I 
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metering was only talked about in terms of congestion and not in terms of the 
environment. 
8.7.5 A policy like congestion metering needs to be understood and as such it 
requires promotion. 
Cambridge experience: In other words the idea needs to be sold. As one councillor 
put it "I think it was very much like Europe, people don't understand it. I think a lot of 
people are agin the common market because they don't understand it and people tend 
to be against things they don't understand and this is very much afactor. It was a new 
concept, the idea that you can'tjust get in your car and drive were you want you have 
got to pay to use certain bits and although people might have been used to paying a 
toll for a motorway on the continent somehow that infringement of your liberty 
translated into a Cambridge context was rather a different thing really". Refeffing 
back to 8.1.1 and whether the situation is serious enough for a policy such as 
congestion metering, one councillor put it that "if you are going to do it you have got 
to set about selling it and you have got to have the groundswell on which to do the 
selling. The ground swell is the public opinion, which comes back to the point that the 
problem isn't bad enough at the minute". One interesting aspect of the promotion of 
congestion metering was an initial idea that vehicles would be decommissioned if the 
smartcard had fallen below a predefined overdraft limit. There was a sense that this 
"was a downside of the whole concept because people got the wrong idea, that they 
would be driving along and if their smart cards ran Out theY would just stop in the 
Centre of the road and once it had been mentioned, once these ideas had been 
mentioned and got around, all round Europe, so people knew of the idea they also 
saw this hazard as they saw it, this downside ". This certainly acts as an important 
lesson that schemes of whatever complexion need to be sold in the right manner. 
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8.7.6 It would appear to be the case that there are "no prizesfor beingfirst". 
Cambridge experience: In terms of congestion metering it was perceived that the 
idea was ahead of its time being "sprung too soon and in to high tech a way on 
people". Ultimately however the belief was expressed that "somebody will grasp the 
nettle" or "bite the bullet". "Ultimately someone is going to have to get to grips with 
it, they wont voluntarily get people to leave their cars outside, they are going to have 
to do something to encourage them and that's going to have to be a financial penalty I 
suspect of some sort". A councillor, who is in favour of congestion metering stated 
that "there is no doubt that congestion metering is a scheme we shall see when the 
situation is bad enough". 
One rather astute comment was that "the great worry about road pricing is that it is 
always a rolling five years away. He went on to suggest that "Professor Smeed must 
continue to turn in his grave because he did so much clear thinking about the benefits 
of road pricing and we have made so little progress over the past 30 years ". 
One important conclusion with respect to the concept of congestion metering in the 
city of Cambridge can be summed up thus "I think we got to a point where really all 
we have had is an equipment trial and in my view that is the least important of the 
trials because the technology has been aroundfor a long time. I mean you may have 
updated technology, you may have better technology, I was thinking of the Hong Kong 
road pricing scheme in the 1980s. There is a choice about the sort of system you have 
and there's probably some technological tasks to make it as efficient as possible but 
there's no doubt that you can do it in technological tenns. Mere it is really difficult 
is whether you can sell it in political and social terms and I don't think that was ever 
really tested out". This may in fact be the real reason why congestion metering failed 
to progress beyond the field trial stage. "The officials were keen on the idea in theory 
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but they hadn't got a practical wayforward worked out and I think the were relying Y 
on the politicians to persuade the public of the soundness of the idea and I don't think 
the politicians understood it well enough to do that. 
8.8.0 Conclusion 
The aim of the chapter has been to provide a brief summary of the findings in terms 
of the national survey and the experiences of congestion metering in the city of 
Cambridge. It highlights the factors which need to be addressed when decision- 
making with respect to urban road pricing. How should decision making be 
undertaken in order to achieve acceptance and ultimately implementation? 
First, congestion and pollution are viewed as being serious or very serious in towns 
and cities in the UK and more specifically, in the city of Cambridge. 
Second, urban road pricing is perceived as being one of the most effective policy 
options for dealing with urban traffic congestion at the national level although this 
was not a universal view. It is however seen as one of the least acceptable. The most 
acceptable are the 'carrot' options. There is overlap between the effectiveness and 
acceptability of policy options for dealing with congestion, essentially public 
transport - particularly amongst Councillors. 
Third, there has to be a climate for change and in terms of Cambridge, at the time of 
the interviews, the situation was viewed as bad but seen by some as no worse than 
elsewhere. 
Fourth, care is required in clearly stating how the money raised from urban road 
pricing is to be utilised. 
Fifth, the support for urban road pricing increases if it is taken as part of a package of 
measures. In addition, it would appear important that all alternative options have first 
been exhausted, since until this has occurred, in terms of the Cambridge context, 
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congestion metering would continue to be a 'political hot potato'. The exhaustion 
would appear to include a vastly improved public transport network. 
SLxth, in terms of issues of concern, then the need for clearly stated objectives, 
improved public transport provision and clear guidance on how the revenue raised 
from urban road pricing is to be utilised are of greatest concern, both in terms of the 
national survey and the Cambridge experience. The invasion of road user's privacy 
and the fact that road users would have to pay for the use of the road in congested 
periods are of least concern. 
Seventh, in terms of the type of technology utilised, there would appear to be a level of 
support for Area Licensing from the national survey findings. From the Cambridge 
experience there appeared to be a level of support for urban road pricing but not 
necessarily congestion metering. A simpler scheme than the one proposed in the 
Cambridge context is likely to prove more acceptable. 
Eighth, it would help if there was a similar scheme to look at. The view in terms of 
the Cambridge experience is that it would have made it easier to accept politically. 
There was strong support nationally for extensive. trials among Transport Officials and 
Academics. 
Ninth, it is possibly the case that, a leader is required to act as a catalyst for change 
and that political stability is necessary through the period urban road pricing is being 
considered. 
Tenth, it would appear to be clear from the responses obtained that a concept like 
congestion metering cannot be implemented in isolation. In other words it has to be 
undertaken on a regional or subregional basis. As such, "it would stand more chance 
of getting a good run ". 
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Eleventh, air pollution is currently a major concern and it could be the means by 
which a policy such as urban road pricing is accepted. 
Twelfth, any policy such as urban road pricing requires promotion. 
Finally, it was stated by one Official in the city of Cambridge that it would appear to 
II --I 
be the case that there are "no prizesfor beingfirst". 
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Chapter 9 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions and Limitations 
'Emergencies may call for dramatic programs. Chronic problems, such as traffic 
congestion, do not. To increase their political acceptability, congestion pricing 
programs should be designed so that interests and institutions can gradually adjust to 
the changes and witness the benefits' 
(Rom 1994) 
9.0.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to detail the theoretical and empirical contributions and 
limitations shown by the research, including a theoretical underpinning to the 
literature on urban road pricing and decision-making. Before outlining the theoretical 
contribution made by the thesis a brief summary of the 'incremental approach' to 
decision-making is helpful. 
9.1.0 Summary of the incremental approach to decision-making 
The approach developed by Lindblom is covered in much greater detail in chapter 3. 
The main tenet is that for complex problems a rational approach to decision-making is 
not possible. The reason expounded is that the intellectual capabilities and sources of 
information of decision-makers is limited. As such, there is method in muddling 
through starting with policies which are currently in force and considering only 
incremental change. 
The incremental approach is based onfive features: 
9.1.1 Intertwining evaluation and empirical analysis. 
The idea that objectives should be clarified, and in advance of the examination of 
alternative policies, is appealing but when attempted with complex social issues it 
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raises difficulties. In terms of many critical objectives, the public, politicians and 
administrators disagree, thus administrators are often reduced to deciding policy 
without first clarifying objectives. In addition, decision-makers avoid spelling out 
their objectives since it could result in conflict. Evaluation and empirical analysis are 
intertwined, such that objectives and policies are chosen at one and the same time. 
Thus, one simultaneously chooses a policy to attain certain objectives and chooses the 
objectives themselves, focusing on marginal or incremental comparisons. Lindblom 
states 'As to whether the attempt to clarify objectives in advance of policy selection is 
more or less rational than the close intertwining of marginal evaluation and empirical 
analysis, the principal difference established is that for complex problems the first is 
impossible and irrelevant, and the second is both possible and relevant. 
9.1.2 Relations between means and ends. 
The incremental approach to decision-making is such that means and ends are chosen 
simultaneously, rather than means (various alternative policy options) being conceived 
to be evaluated and chosen in the light of ends (objectives) finally selected 
independently of and prior to the choice of means. 
9.1.3 The Test of 'Good' Policy. 
in the root method a decision is 'correct', 'good', or 'rational, if it can be shown to 
attain some specified objective, where the objective can be specified without simply 
describing the decision itself. With the incremental approach the 'test of a good 
policy' is not the attainment of some specified objective but agreement on the policy 
itselL 
9.1.4 Non-comprehensive analysis. 
It is not possible to take everything which is important into account since there are 
lir I nits on human intellectual capacities and on information which is available. As 
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such, administrators faced with a sufficiently complex problem must find ways to 
simplify. This simplification is achieved through the limitation of policy comparisons 
to those that differ in relatively small degree from policies presently in effect and by 
ignoring important possible consequences of possible policies; hence incremental 
differences in policy. Given the limits on knowledge within which decision-makers 
are confined, simplifying by limiting the focus to small variations from the present 
policy makes the most of available knowledge. Public attitude has a crucial role to 
play since there is a need for fundamental agreement on potentially disruptive issues, 
with consequent limitation of policy debates to relatively small differences in policy; 
small adjustments rather than sweeping changes. 
9.1.5 Succession of comparisons. 
Policy is not made once and for all; it is made and re-made endlessly. Decision- 
making is a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in which 
what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration. A wise decision- 
maker consequently expects that his/her policies will achieve only part of what he/she 
hopes and at the same time will produce unanticipated consequences he/she would 
have preferred to avoid. Incrementalism reduces the reliance on theory and by 
proceeding through a series of incremental changes the decision-maker avoids serious 
mistakes. This approach alleviates the uncertainty associated with the 'big bang' 
approach to the problem. 
9.2.0 Theoretical underpinning of the literature reviewed in terms of urban road 
pricing decision-making. 
The literature review of urban road pricing undertaken in chapter 2 lacks a theoretical 
underpinning. The literature is by its nature practical in orientation, dealing with 
issues that require careful consideration if an urban road pricing policy is to be 
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formulated with a likelihood of being implemented. Whilst it is not actually 
acknowledged, the literature with respect to urban road pricing is based on the 
'incremental approach' to decision-making. 
The literature reviewed in chapter 2 reveals the incremental approach in a number of 
areas: 
9.2.1 The gradualist, step-by-step approach is reinforced by the view that an urban 
road pricing strategy is more likely to gain policy acceptance when all alternatives 
have been considered. 
As such, urban road pricing can be seen as a final element in a balanced transport 
policy once other measures such as public transport and traffic management 
improvements have been exhausted. Pricing 'being held in reserve as a policy of last 
resort' and that in the mean time something less 'draconian' will suffice. There is thus 
a need to look to alternatives to urban road pricing in the first instance since as 
Higgins argues (1994) the concept is 'new and controversial', traffic congestion is a 
complex social issue and an urban road pricing scheme is only likely to succeed in 
conditions of severe congestion. 
9.2.2 Alternative transport services may have to be expanded in order to give 
travellers affected by pricing a choice of modes. 
This is important given the equity issue relating to urban road pricing and reinforces 
an incremental approach to the issue of urban road pricing. 
9.2.3 The incremental approach can also relate to the use of the revenue. 
Extreme caution is required as to how the revenue is utilised, particularly in the first 
instance. A 'step-by-step approach is required with the revenue earmarked initially for 
worthwhile transport-related projects. Ultimately, the revenue could be allocated to 
non-transport related matters since 'there could be poor value for money if low 
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priority transport projects were undertaken simply because of restrictions on the use of 
revenue' (DETR 1998a). 
9.2.4 The incremental approach and the type of technology utilised are inextricably 
linked. 
There are concerns over the reliability and accuracy of the equipment associated with 
urban road pricing. This is not helped by the lack of first-hand experience of 
successful schemes. As such, a system which progresses from, say Supplementary 
Licensing to full point of use pricing may be the best option. The incremental 
approach would suggest the adoption of a manual 'low-tech' approach in the first 
instance at a price which does not attempt to change driver behaviour but to 
accustornise drivers with the idea of road pricing. In other words, sacrificing 
theoretical optimality for practical feasibility and acceptability. As such, the decision- 
maker avoids serious mistakes, alleviating the uncertainty associated with the 'big 
I bang' approach to the problem 
9.2.5 A more overtly political dimension to the incremental approach is that it 
reduces the prospect of a comprehensive national backlash which could lead to a 
moratorium on roadpricing schemes. 
A 'step-by-step' approach is required, not least because of the role played by public 
attitudes and thus the need to move cautiously and experimentally. 
9.3.0 The theoretical contribution. 
The empirical work undertaken has shed light on the 'incremental approach' in a 
number of ways. As such, this section details the areas in which the research, using 
The big bang approach and the level of uncertainty which ensued was a major problem faced by 
congestion metering. 
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urban road pricing as the focus, either confirms, refutes or augments the 'incremental 
approach' to decision-mak-ing. 
9.3.1 T1,; e test of a good policy is agreement on the policy itself (confirm) 
This is bome out by the empirical evidence. At the national level, Councillors, the 
traditional decision-mak-crs, view Park and Ride, public transport improvements, 
cheaper public transport fares, the banning or restriction of vehicles in central areas 
and a land use and transport planning strategy as being effective policy options for 
dealing with urban traffic congestion and certainly more effective than urban road 
pricing. In terms of acceptability then the main thrust is in terms of public transport, 
with the "carrot approach' prevailing. With Councillors there is a degree of overlap 
between effectiveness and acceptability in the area of public transport improvements, 
cheaper fares and Park and Ride. A public transport strategy would appear to be the 
main focus of policy in the UK at the present time lending support to the incremental 
approach that the test of a good policy is agreement on the policy itself There is 
currently however no such agreement in terms of urban road pricing. The National 
Survey showed that there is not common agreement as to the 'effectiveness' of urban 
road pricing. Whereas 92 per cent of Economists viewed urban road pricing as being 
'totally or fairly effective' it is viewed as being less effective among Councillors. In 
fact, Metropolitan Borough Councillors perceived urban road pricing as being the 
least effective of all the policy measures. It would thus appear necessary for there to 
be a 'package approach' to the urban traffic congestion problem and that various 
options need to be exhausted before a policy such as urban road pricing is considered 
acceptable. 
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9.3.2 77te need for fundamental agreement on potentially disruptive issues, limits 
thepolicy debates to relatively small differences in policy (confirm). 
Ile evidence, in terms of urban road pricing, would appear to confirm this aspect of 
incrementalism. Ilere is currently low acceptance of urban road pricing and as such 
an approach which seeks to address important issues such as, the use of the revenue, 
the type of technology and the public transport provision is more likely to lead to a 
successful outcome. It was argued in the previous chapter that the time is not yet right 
for a policy such as urban road pricing to be accepted. As such, all alternative options 
need to be exhausted, most notably public transport improvements and Park and Ride, 
before urban road pricing is seriously considered. Hence the incremental approach to 
decision-making in terms of urban traffic congestion. In a similar vein, it would 
appear to be the case that until congestion and pollution are perceived as being severe 
enough, decision-mak-crs are likely to persevere with policy options other than urban 
road pricing as a means of dealing with the problem. Hence the incremental approach 
to decision-making, with urban road pricing likely to become more acceptable as an 
option the more serious the level of congestion and pollution are perceived to be in 
towns and cities of the UK. 
9.3.3 Policy is made and re-made endlessly, proceeding through a series of 
incremental changes avoiding serious mistakes (confirm). 
This approach alleviates the uncertainty associated with the a 'big bang' approach to 
the problem. As stated by Cambridge Councillors there was a lack of information, 
uncertainty as regards reliability and cost and a range of safety issues associated with 
congestion mctcring. With a more incrementalist approach big jumps that require 
predictions beyond the decision-makers knowledge are not required. it was certainly 
the case that with congestion metering there were a series of unknowns: 
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" "I began to wonder about die technology "; 
" "the idea it-as good in principle but unsound in practice 
" dda logistically difflicult thing to do". - 
" ': /ar too complex"; 
" What were the costs of installation going to be"; 
"As time went on it became more and more clear that nobody A: new the answer to 
the questions". 
In terms of the National Survey an Area Uccncc scheme was perceived overall as the 
most acceptable. It would appear that a less sophisticated scheme in the first instance 
is likely to keep the costs down and reduce the uncertainty both in terms of reliability 
and accuracy and as such more likely to be accepted as a policy option. 
9.3.4 Political aspects to incrementalUm (confirms) 
Central to incrcmcntalism is the notion that muddling through is the only possible 
approach to dccision-making since there is a lack of available knowledge to take 
account of all possible situations. Whilst this is valid there is another facet to 
incremcntalism which is equally important, namely the political expedient. 77his is 
touched on as part of the incremental approach but requires more careful 
consideration. In terms of urban road pricing there is likely to be political fallout (see 
7.4.11). As such, there is a need for a gradualist approach. Ibc limits of knowledge 
and the political constraint are closely linked. The incremental approach allows an 
improvement in understanding with respect to urban road pricing. This improvement 
assists in terms of the acccptance of urban road pricing, which allows further steps to 
be taken in terms of road pricing which by definition improves understanding and aids 
acceptance. Tbc incremental approach is thus inextricably linked to acceptance. 
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In saying this there are two factors which may aflow urban road pricing to move at a 
pace not envisaged by the incremental approach, namely the role of a catalyst and the 
timing. 
9.3.5 Clarity of Objectives (refute) 
The whole area of acceptability and decision-making with respect to urban road 
pricing is fraught with difficulties, as spelt out in previous four chapters. As such, one 
would view it as politic not to clarify objectives in order to avoid conflict between the 
stakeholder groups as set out by the 'incremental approach. This is not however borne 
out by the research in terms of urban road pricing. In fact the need for clearly stated 
objectives is of major concern as substantiated both by the National Survey and the 
evidence obtained in the city of Cambridge. 
In terms of the National Survey 92 per cent of respondents were very or fairly 
concerned with respect to the need for clearly stated objectives in terms of urban road 
pricing. This view was consistent among all the key stakeholder groups and is a line 
supported by Langmyhr (1999). 
In terms of congestion metering in the context of Cambridge the lack of clarity of 
objectives was the issue of greatest concern, with 18 of the 19 who responded being 
'very' or 'fairly' concerned. A view was expressed in terms of congestion metering 
that the 'lack of clearly stated objectives was a real problem'. 
Overall the research would suggest there is a need to clearly state objectives even in 
terms of a complex social issue such as urban traffic congestion and in an area where 
there are potentially a series of objectives such as the regulation of traffic demand, the 
achievement of environmental benefits and the raising of revenue for investment in 
the transport system. 
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9.3.6 The choice of means and ends simultaneously (augments). 
In terms of congestion metering the means and ends were not chosen simultaneously 
as suggested by the incremental approach. In fact, the 'means' appear to have been 
chosen before the ends. This created an element of uncertainty as stated by "the 
whole thing was product led and that they wanted to get this system in ... and therefore 
had to find reasons to justify it, so they say right this system would regulate the 
traffic ... then they'd say well 
its got environmental benefits as well and you'd say what 
are the environmental benefits and you'd start to examine that and then they W say 
well OK it does give a problem but the revenue it raises would give us money to 
produce public transport so they were not thought out, they weren't' clear in what 
the were trying to do ". In addition, it was stated by one Councillor that "everybody Y 
was lookingfor a quick easy solution that would be popular and of course there was a 
tendency to lookfor a high tech solution because we are a very high tech community, 
because of the University and the Science Parks and we are very electronically 
motivated, and I think to some extent the whole project was product lead rather than 
market led. What the County Council didn't do, and the Director of Transportation at 
the time, who had a patent on those idea, so he had a vested interest in making this 
thing work but what he didn't do was actually analyse the needs within the city, define 
the market, and then design a project to meet that market and those needs. What he 
did was to design a product, tried to establish a market, and then said it will meet 
certain needs, he went about it the wrong way. It was product led, it was technology 
led and everybody was seduced by the smarteard type technology. We were moving 
into the next century with all this gadgetry and it was going to be great ..... 
The product led nature of congestion metering, searching for a justification was one 
reason for its lack of progression beyond the field trial. It is certainly the case that 
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selecting the 'means' and then striving to justify the 'ends' results in a lack of clarity 
and uncertainty. 
9.3.7 The role of a catalyst (augnients) 
It is fair to say that the incremental approach fails to take account of the role a policy 
entrepreneur may play in advancing ideas and seeking acceptance of those ideas. A 
central figure would appear to be important in any new policy initiative. This is 
certainly the position in terms of congestion metering. 
Congestion metering as outlined in chapter 6 can not be viewed as part of an 
incremental approach to the urban traffic congestion problem. Congestion metering 
was a rather sophisticated, high-tech measure requiring a great amount of detailed 
information, in-vehicle equipment and thus expenditure. The fact that the scheme was 
considered at all is testimony to the role played by a policy entrepreneur; namely the 
then Director of Transportation (see 7.1-2). The point made is that strides can be made 
in terms of policy initiatives and decision-making beyond that suggested by 
smuddling through' but this involves the clear focus or character of a policy 
entrepreneur. 
While this is the case, the thesis has focused on the rational and incremental 
approaches to decision-making and as such, the theoretical literature on the role of 
leaders in policy-making is not detailed in chapter 3. There is however a body of 
literature relating to the role of leaders/catalysts in policy and decision-making (see 
for example, Bennis and Nanus 1985, Bryman 1992,1996, Bryman, Gillingwater and 
McGuinness 1992 and Flyvbjerg 1998) and this is an area which requires further 
research in terms of urban road pricing. 
9.3.8 Timing (augments) 
Timing is all important and is an area neglected by the incremental approach. If a 
number of factors come together at the same time it is possible for decisions to be 
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made not envisaged by the incremental approach. Timing involves the coming 
together of a number of factors which not only includes the existence of a policy 
entrepreneur but also sympathetic politicians who support a policy initiative. In 
addition there has to be agreement on the nature of the problem requiring action; a 
problem serious enough to require change beyond that predicted by the incremental 
approach. This was certainly present in some measure in terms of congestion 
metering (see chapter 7). As stated in chapter 7 however a number of issues can be 
raised in terms of timing. 
9.4.0 Theoretical limitations 
Chapter 3 section 3.8.0 outlined what is perceived as the theoretical limitation with 
respect to the 'incremental approach' to decision-making. In summary, it states that 
the 'incremental approach is said to possess a high degree of generality. It is viewed 
as being conservative in outlook, reinforcing pro inertia, a policy of no change, anti 
innovation and justifying no effort. The approach is seen as valid only if the policies 
currently utilised are generally satisfactory, if the problem is relatively stable and if 
the means for dealing with the problem are available continuously. A fatal flaw is 
perceived to be the approaches lack of prescription. How can decision-making be 
improved? How do decision-makers muddle better? How large is an increment 
allowed to be? A limitation also levelled at the incremental approach is that decisions 
are assessed not by their ranking or some objective criteria but simply by 
acceptability in a particular situation. Incrcmentalism is also seen as costly in that 
failure to explore radical alternatives to existing policies offers no means of informing 
participants that a sub-optimal solution is in fact costly relative to other measures. 
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Finally, incremental change is only a form of adaptation which leaves basically in tact 
what ought to be changed. The rational-comprehensive model at least stimulates 
administrators to get a little outside their routine. 
While it is possible to agree with the sentiments of the theoretical limitations outlined 
above, most notably in terms of, it leaving intact what ought to be changed, they are 
not however bome out by the evidence: 
9.4.1 A radical alternative 
In terms of urban traffic congestion, urban road pricing and congestion metering in 
particular could be viewed as a radical alternative to more traditional policy options. 
In terms of congestion metering, one of the benefits outlined in chapter 6 section 6.4.1 
was perceived to be the fact that motorists would be fully aware of the external costs 
imposed on other motorists, the charge taking place at any time if the level of 
congestion warranted it. In addition, the charge would be closely related to the use 
actually made of the road network, with the road users charged for the congestion they 
cause when and where it appears. While this is so, such an approach is fraught with 
difficulties. As stated, urban road pricing has long been advocated as the best way of 
tackling congestion, the best way of bridging the gap between MPC and MSC (see 
Appendix 1). The more sophisticated the scheme, as facilitated through smart card 
technology, the closer it can get to achieving the social optimum solution. This is one 
of the reasons for the great amount of interest shown in congestion metering by 
academics, planners and politicians, 'charging when and where congestion occurs'. 
What is the most sophisticated, efficient and 'economically pure' scheme however, 
appears to be the least popular. Congestion metering was perceived as a complicated 
message to get across and a scheme which was "too ambitious" and a form of road 
pricing which was trying to run before it could walk. In addition, "Road pricing is 
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well worth looking at as part of a strategy, but approaching it in an incremental way. 
Go for a simple scheme first, perhaps just a permit system or whatever, something 
which didn't require cars to be tinkered around with, a system which probably in 
economic terms was imperfect, but one you could actually sell to the public. Get it 
started". Area Licensing was viewed as being more likely than congestion metering 
simply because of the logistics of the fact that "Area Licensing has a much lower set 
up costs and its something which could be introduced fairly quickly, it doesn't need 
high tech". This is supported by Rom (1994) in that in order to improve acceptability 
urban road pricing should be designed so that there can be adjustment to the changes. 
9.4.2 Good decisions are not accepted by their ranking but simply by acceptability. 
This limitation does not appear to be supported by the evidence in terms of urban 
traffic congestion. In fact in terms of Councillors, the traditional decision-makers, 
there is a close relationship between the ranking of the effectiveness of policy options 
for dealing with urban traffic congestion and their acceptability (see section 5.1.3). 
This is no doubt why authorities throughout England are currently pursuing, as the 
main thrust of transport policy improvements in the frequency and reliability of public 
transport, the introduction or expansion of Park and Ride services, the banning of 
vehicles in urban areas and developing a land use and transport planning strategy. This 
leads to: 
9.4.3 The incremental approach is only valid if policies currently utilised are 
generally satisfactory, if the problem is relatively stable and if the means for dealing 
with the problem are continuously available. 
In terms of urban road pricing the 'incremental approach' would appear to be the valid 
approach. Certainly at the current time (in terms of Councillors) if the National Survey 
is to be believed, the policy currently utilised is generally satisfactory. In addition, 
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while the problem of urban traffic congestion is perceived as being serious or very 
serious the problem has got to get worse before a policy such as urban road pricing is 
perceived as acceptable (see 7.2.1 and 8.1.1). In terms of the city of Cambridge 
"eventually people will getfed up ofsitting in trafficjams and they will be crying out 
for some sort of action". In addition, the means to deal with the problem are 
continuously available. As stated in 5.1.3 and 7.2.3 all traffic management initiatives 
may have to be exhausted before a policy such as urban road pricing is considered 
acceptable, "having tried all other things" and "until all alternatives had been 
exhausted". Urban congestion is a chronic problem but "despite this most drivers 
would put up with congestion getting much worse before they would change their 
patterns of travel". 
9.4.4 Leaves intact what ought to be changed. 
It could certainly be argued that incrementalism leaves in place what ought to be 
changed in that "the best policy to deal with urban road congestion is likely to be 
some form of road pricing". Given the previous points however an incremental 
approach is likely to be the most functional. 
9.5.0 Empirical contributions 
Whilst much has been written with respect to urban road pricing and research has 
been undertaken in terms of the relative pros and cons of various pricing options and 
the analytical soundness of proposals there is a dearth of research on the decision- 
making process with respect to urban road pricing. As such, a central feature of this 
thesis has been to address this shortfall and in particular how decision-making can be 
undertaken in order to bring about the implementation of an urban road pricing 
scheme in the UK. In analysing the decision-making process with respect to urban 
road pricing the main vehicle has been the use of a National urban road traffic survey 
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and evidence derived from the first ever trial of an urban road pricing scheme in the 
UK. 
9.5.1 Decision-makers and those who influence opinion 
Since the thesis concentrates on the decision-making process with respect to urban 
road pricing it is important that the attitudes of decision-makers are ascertained, as are 
the opinions of those who influence the decision-making process. In undertaking the 
literature review (chapter 2) it is clear that the majority of attitude surveys have been 
public attitude surveys. Whilst important, the attitudes of decision-makers have been 
largely neglected and this is something the thesis has sought to redress. As stated in 
chapter 4, the key stakeholder groups are taken to be the traditional decision-makers 
namely Councillors with Officers, with Academics and certain interest groups 
influencing that process. 
A sample of Councillors were targeted, namely those for County Councils, 
Metropolitan and London Boroughs who were Chair of the Committee which included 
transport. The view being that they would have an expert opinion on issues relating to 
traffic congestion and the various policy options for dealing with the problem, 
including urban road pricing. Transport Officials who work closely with Councillors, 
and the Transport Committee in particular were also targeted, as were transport 
academics (Economists, Planners and Civil Engineers) who are an important 
ingredient in the decision-making process. In addition, certain transport interest 
groups were also consulted, since they have an important bearing on public opinion. 
Chapter 2 showed that public attitude surveys have been undertaken in selective 
Countries throughout the world but only limited work has been undertaken in the UK 
and then in. terms of public opinion rather than key stakeholder group opinion. 
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9.5.2 National coverage 
Chapter 2 stated that research which has been undertaken has been rather limited in its 
location. This was addressed by the thesis through the use of a national survey. The 
aim was to obtain detail at the County Council, Metropolitan Borough and London 
Borough level and academics throughout the UK. This comprehensive survey has not 
been undertaken before and provides rich detail with respect to decision-making and 
urban road pricing. 
9.5.3 Criteriafor a valuable attitude survey 
The Chartered Institute of Transport (1992) laid down criteria for undertaking opinion 
surveys in terms of urban road pricing if the results are to be of value in informing and 
guiding the policy debate. The Chartered Institute of Transport states that the attitude 
of the general publiC2 to any proposed policy initiative is an important consideration 
for decision-makers in a democratic society, with urban road pricing being no 
exception. It is important from the outset to state that the subject of urban road pricing 
abounds with myth and special pleading. As such the results of 'opinion poll' surveys 
like the one undertaken as part of the thesis should be treated with a degree of caution. 
The main criteria are perceived to be: 
e Those surveyed should have direct experience of using congested transport 
networks or of living in congested areas; 
The survey should allow respondents to establish the importance of transport 
problems relative to other problems within an urban environment; 
People should not be faced with a single choice of do-nothing or road pricing; a 
range of policies for dealing with traffic congestion exists and needs to be 
evaluated; 
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e Ideally the survey should alert respondents to increasing congestion in the future as 
a consequence of existing policies; 
9 The question of what will be done with the money raised from road pricing should 
be included in the survey. 
These criteria are seen as important if opinions are to fully reflect the overall policy 
context in which urban road pricing is a viable option. As far as possible the criteria 
was incorporated into the national survey. The respondents to the survey had direct 
experience of urban areas and therefore of congested transport networks. This is 
especially true of Councillors and Officials in Metropolitan or London Borough areas. 
Academics were without exception located in Universities in urban areas. As such, 
they had first hand experience of the issues involved as well as being experts in the 
area of transport 3- 
The questionnaire offered a range of policy options (see Appendix 2). It was not 
simply a case of urban road pricing or do nothing, since respondents were given the 
chance to choose from a range of options both carrot and stick. In addition, 
respondents were asked how the revenue raised should be allocated. There are certain 
limitations with this approach as revealed in section 9.6.2. What it does reveal 
however is a package approach. 
9.5.4 Case study of thefirst ever trial of an urban r0adpricing scheme in the UK. 
Congestion metering as considered in the city of Cambridge between 1990 and 1993 
was a unique situation, the first ever trial of an urban road pricing scheme in the UK. 
2 As well as that of key stakeholder groups in the decision-making process. 
3A brief but by no means exhaustive list of the position of a number of the respondents clearly 
illustrates this point. In terms of Councillors: Chair Of the: Environment Committee, the 
Transportation Committee, Strategic Planning and Transportation, Highways Committee, and the 
Planning, Highways and Transportation Committee. In terms of Officials: head of Highways and 
Transportation, Principal Engineer (Transportation), Director Planning, Transportation and 
Environmental services, head of Transportation Policy Unit and Team leader - Transport Policy. 
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It met the criteria as suggested by the Chartered Institute of Transport (1990) in that it 
would be desirable to gain experience with a scheme in a smaller free standing city. 
Cambridge is a self contained, small free standing city. It also generated a great deal 
of interest internationally. As such, Cambridge presented an ideal opportunity in 
terms of undertaking research in the area of decision-making and urban road pricing. 
A number of important lessons can be gleaned from the study, such as why 
congestion metering was worthy of consideration, the role of a central character 
instrumental in getting the concept on the agenda, the nature of the city, attitudes to 
road pricing and the type of technology envisaged. The fact that it did not progress 
beyond the field trial may represent something of a failure however, the knowledge 
gained not least in terms of the pitfalls to avoid are of real importance. 
The research undertaken of a localised scheme complements the research of urban 
road pricing undertaken at the national level making an empirical contribution to that 
area of transport policy. 
9.6.0 Empirical limitations 
9.6.1 National survey and the criteria proposed by the Chartered Institute of 
Transport. 
If there is a limitation of the national survey in terms of the CIT criteria (see 9.5.3) it 
is the fact that it did not establish the importance of transport problems relative to 
other problems in an urban environment. Only absolute problems were considered. In 
addition, it was not spelt out that increasing congestion would be the result of existing 
policy options. In saying this, the basis of the research is focused on 'key interest 
groups' who should possess a greater awareness of these issues than the general 
public. 
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9.6.2 National survey limitations. 
The use of any questionnaire has by definition built in restrictions. In terms of the 
National Survey (see Appendix 2) a number of limitations can be noted: 
o Whose views were being ascertained? It was stated in the covering letter (see 
Appendix 2) that the survey was interested in the respondents personal view. In 
saying this, questions 3,5 and 6 of the National Survey asked how publicly 
acceptable do you think ... This did not appear to generate comment, although as 
outlined, a number of Officials stated that the questionnaire had been completed on 
a personal basis and that the views did not necessarily represent the policies of the 
respective Council; 
When obtaining responses from Councillors it would have been useful to have 
obtained inforination on their political affiliation. This would have allowed 
comparisons to have been made in the same way comparisons were made with 
respect to congestion metering as detailed in chapter 7; 
Question 4 of the National Survey sought to ascertain how the revenue raised from 
urban road pricing should be allocated. In order to codify and analyse the responses 
the respondent had 100 units of money available to allocate to ten options. Whilst 
this is undertaken for administrative ease it does generate certain limitations: 
" The respondents may not allocate all 100 units of money, which did occur 
in a limited number of cases; 
" The ten policy options may not adequately reflect the areas the respondent 
wishes the revenue to be spent. This was certainly the case with a number 
of respondents who made reference to additional policy options such as, 
improved pedestrian and cycle infrastructure, traffic calming measures, 
improved safety and awareness campaigns; 
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In terms of the previous point, a number of respondents did in fact allocate 
monetary units to the additional policy options. Certain respondents may 
have wanted to but didn't. As such, a element of caution is required when 
interpreting this question. 
In terms of question 6- given the response to question 5, which suggests that urban 
road pricing would be more publicly acceptable if the revenue was spent in the way 
suggested by the respondents, it is unclear why each of the urban road pricing 
methods outlined in question 6 are not on the whole acceptable. In addition, in 
question 3 effectiveness and acceptability are expressed in terms of 'the 
implementation of urban road pricing (a payment made by motorists for the use of 
urban roads at certain times). It is not specified in terms of particular forms of 
urban road pricing such as, cordon pricing... It is difficult however to envisage how 
this could have been achieved in the confines of a postal survey. These are 
certainly two areas which would benefit from further research. 
Question 7 refers to the level of concern felt with respect to a range of issues 
relating to urban road pricing. One respondent was of the opinion that the level of 
importance would have been a better benchmark. 
With respect to the interviews undertaken in terms of congestion metering in the 
city of Cambridge (see chapter 7) differentiation was made in terms of the various 
political parties, namely Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat. Such a 
distinction was not made in terms of the National Survey. As stated in 4.1.1, the 
name of the Chair of the respective Transport Committee was obtained via 
telephoning each Local Authority. Ascertaining the political persuasion of the 
various Councillors was an oversight, and one which was difficult to rectify once 
the process had been undertaken. 
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9.7.0 Conclusions 
This chapter has detailed the theoretical and empirical contributions and limitations. 
In terms of the theoretical contribution an underpinning has been given to much of 
the literature relating to urban road pricing. Implicit within the literature has been an 
incremental approach to decision making. The incremental approach has been 
confirmed by the research undertaken in terms of. 
e the test of a good policy is agreement on the policy itself, 
e the need for fundamental agreement on potentially disruptive issues, limits the 
policy debates to relatively small differences in policy; 
* policy is made and re-made endlessly, proceeding through a series of incremental 
changes avoiding serious mistakes; 
o the political aspects in terms of incrementalism, since in terms of a complex social 
issue such as the acceptance of urban road pricing there needs to be political 
consensus. Hence following the line of the epigraph at the beginning of this 
chapter, pricing should be designed so that stakeholders can gradually adjust to the 
changes and appreciate the benefits. 
There are however areas not specifically addressed by the incremental approach and 
here the theory has been augmented by the research namely in terms of- 
o the role of a catalyst, a policy entrepreneur. As such, a local leader can advance 
policy issues at a rate not envisaged by the incremental approach; 
e timing, in that the environment may be conducive to change not envisaged by the 
incremental approach. This would require agreement on the nature of the problem 
requiring action, political will and the presence of a policy entrepreneur. 
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Criticism has been made of the incremental approach, its theoretical limitations in 
terms of its high degree of generality, reinforcing pro inertia, with decisions assessed 
by their acceptability, leaving intact what ought to be changed. In tenns of the 
evidence however: 
9a radical alternative - whereas congestion metering was seen to be 'economically 
pure' it was a difficult scheme to get across; 
e good decisions are not accepted by their ranking but simply by acceptability. In 
tenns of urban traffic congestion however, certainly in tenns of Councillors there 
was a close relationship between policy options viewed as acceptable and also 
effective; 
the incremental approach is only valid if policies currently utilised are perceived as 
generally satisfactory. As such, all traffic management initiatives may have to be 
exhausted before a policy such as urban road pricing is considered acceptable. 
As for the empirical contribution, then the thesis has concentrated on: 
* an area where there is a dearth of research, namely decision makers attitudes to 
urban road pricing; 
e national coverage - via use of a national survey; 
* the criteria laid down by the CIT (1992) - so as to fully reflect the overall policy 
context in which urban road pricing is a viable option; 
*a case study of the first ever trial of an urban road pricing scheme in the UK. 
As for the empirical limitations they tended to be in terms of the questionnaire design. 
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Chapter 10 Recommendations for Further Research 
10.0.0 Introduction 
The whole area of urban road pricing is rich with potential research opportunities. 
The reason for this is based in part on the fact that there are only a few schemes in 
existence world wide and as such there are still a number of areas of uncertainty. In 
addition, there is a dearth of research in terms of decision-making and urban road 
pricing. The research undertaken as part of this thesis has raised a series of issues. 
10.1.0 Issues arising from the National Survey 
A number of issues arose from the national survey which would benefit from further 
research: 
10.1.1 In-depth interviews. 
Time and resources did not allow, but it would have been useful to have undertaken 
in-depth interviews with a sample of those who responded to the national survey, most 
notably Councillors and Officials in the three Local Authority areas of County 
Councils, Metropolitan Boroughs and London Boroughs. This would allow certain 
areas to be considered in more detail. Such areas include: 
10.1.2 The effectiveness of urban roadpricing. 
Metropolitan Borough Councillors in particular perceived urban road pricing as being 
the least effective of all the policy measures. Why is this the case? One would have 
thought large urban areas with a chronic problem of congestion would have been more 
disposed to urban road pricing than other groups, County Councillors in particular. 
In-depth interviews would in fact provide the opportunity to probe whether urban road 
pricing offers the most appropriate method of dealing with urban traffic congestion. 
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10.1.3 Acceptability of urban roadpricing. 
Referring to the national survey and the acceptability of urban road pricing before and 
after the revenue has been allocated to various policy options (see section 5.3.0) - then 
approximately 30 per cent of those surveyed were still of the opinion that urban road 
pricing was 'not very acceptable' or 'totally unacceptable' even after revenue had 
been allocated to specific options. If possible, it would be useful to revisit the 30 per 
cent of respondents who were of this opinion and compare urban road pricing with 
other ways of raising the same amount of revenue for these purposes. In addition, it 
would be beneficial to undertake further research in terins, of why 11 per cent of 
respondents (see section 5.3.0) would accept urban road pricing without any guarantee 
of reinvesting the revenue raised form urban road pricing. 
10.1.4 Acceptance of the technology. 
The study has been rather inconclusive in terms of the type of technology which 
would appear to be favoured. It was certainly the opinion of those interviewed in a 
Cambridge context that a less high tech solution is the way forward. The type of 
technology chosen, based on acceptance, is likely to be a location specific issue and 
this is an area which requires further research. 
IaI. 5 Needfor an extensive trial of an urban roadpricing scheme. 
Why are Councillors less keen on the extensive trial of an urban road pricing scheme 
than other stakeholder groups? (see section 5.5.0). The reason may be based in part 
on the 'suck it and see' mentality, without the need for the use of extensive field trials, 
with decision-makers often feeling more at ease 'flying by the seat of their pants'. 
10.1.6 Areas of concern 
The national survey detailed a series of issues which were of concern to the various 
key stakeholder groups. There was a remarkable level of similarity between the 
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groups which in-depth interviews could have elaborated on. This was an area covered 
in terms of the in-depth interviews in the Cambridge context and a national view 
would be worthy of further research. 
Breaking the Logjam (1998) earmarks a number of issues requiring consideration by 
traffic authorities when drawing-up proposals for a charging scheme. These include: 
the expected effects of the scheme on the local area; implications for neighbouring 
authorities; complementary traffic management measures; implications for public 
transport; and any privileges and exemptions from the charge. These issues of 
practice are areas of concern and as such further attitudinal research would prove 
worthwhile. 
10.1.7 Repeating the national survey 
As with all attitude surveys of this type they are simply a snap shot at a particular 
point in time. Again resources permitting, it would be worthwhile repeating the 
survey in order to ascertain how attitudes have changed since the survey was initially 
undertaken. By definition, this would not be the same Councillors or Officials, but it 
could be the same post holders. 
10.1.8 Widening the sample base. 
It would prove useful to widen the sample area for the use of the survey. As such, the 
survey could be undertaken in selected towns and cities throughout the EU or in 
certain States in the US in order to obtain an international comparison. 
10.1.9 Public attitude survey. 
The survey could be undertaken in order to ascertain public perceptions. Not least, 
this would allow for a comparison with' decision-makers and opinion formers. In 
particular there has been increased awareness of environmental issues in recent years 
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and this has considerable consequences for both public and decision-maker 
perceptions with respect to transport policy. 
10.2.0 Areas arising from the Cambridge case study 
It is the case that each advance in technology or new proposal such as congestion 
metering generates research opportunities not least in terms of the practical and 
public acceptability of such measures. Congestion metering and the research 
undertaken as part of this thesis, has certainly generated a range of areas for further 
research: 
10. Z1 A comparative study of the Cambridge experience and a location in jvhich all 
urban roadpricing scheme has been introduced, such as Trondheim. 
The question as to why one city successfully introduced a pricing scheme and the 
other failed to advance beyond the field trial is worthy of further research. The 
academic literature for example, details the case of Trondheim (see for example 
Langmyhr and Sager 1997). A direct comparison, in fact 'A tale of two cities, 
relating to the decision-making process and how it should be undertaken in order to 
achieve acceptability and awareness of the potential barriers to implementation would 
prove invaluable for decision-makers in the UK. 
10.2.2 Pedestrianisation of Cambridge city centre 1993. 
As stated in chapter 6, section 6.1.0 Cambridgeshire County Council produced the 
Cambridge Transport Strategy in 1989. This included a range of measures including 
pedestrianisation within the central area, extension of the Park and Ride provision and 
although not part of the original strategy, congestion metering. Pedestrianisation 
stimulated a great deal of debate particularly from those who had commercial, retail, 
and educational interests in the historic core of the city. As such, the scheme faced 
fierce opposition from certain quarters not least Cambridge University, some local 
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traders and the City Council. There were various motives for objecting. The 
University envisaged problems of accessing the numerous college and faculty 
buildings in the central area whereas local traders feared that footfall would plummet 
and with it trade. The City Council were of the opinion that the scheme would reduce 
accessibility particularly for the elderly and disabled. The case was resolved by a 
Public Inquiry chaired by an independent inspector. The scheme was finally 
introduced in 1993 (see Hughes and Ison 1994). Issues raised included exemptions, 
cycle accessibility, public transport provision, the boundary effect and compliance. 
In 1995, the County Council devised the Core Traffic Scheme as a means of removing 
traffic from sections of the road network close to the pedestrianised area. Approval 
has been obtained for the scheme to be introduced in three stages with sufficient time 
between the introduction of each in order to allow the effects to be assessed. The 
reason for the staged approach rests with the view that the travelling public can only 
take so much disruption at any one time and that the effects of the scheme are 
unknown and consequently local authority politicians want to be in a position to halt 
further developments if they are perceived to be too adverse. 
Research with respect to the process of pedestrianisation and the core scheme in the 
city of Cambridge would provide invaluable evidence relevant to decision-making and 
urban road pricing. The changes were, unpopular when first debated, there were (and 
still are) a number of uncertainties and it has proceeded in a step-by-step 'incremental' 
manner. How can the lessons learned from the experience of pedestrian isation be 
utilised in the context of urban road pricing? 
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10.2.4 Public education campaigns - and their effectiveness in getting across the 
message of decision-makers with respect to urban roadpricing. 
Research would be invaluable as to what type of public education campaign would 
have been effective in terms of transmitting the message with respect to congestion 
metering or various forms of urban road pricing in the city of Cambridge. In this 
respect lessons could be learned from the experience of pedestrianisation. 
10.3.0 Wider issues 
A series of wider issues are worthy of consideration with respect to further research. 
10.3.1 Why certain locations appear to consider urban roadpricing more seriously 
than others? 
In the UK, Cambridge was the first ever authority to trial an urban road pricing 
scheme. A trial has subsequently taken place in Leicester and at the time of writing 
approval has been given for pilot road user charging schemes in Leeds, Edinburgh and 
Bristol. Research into the specific nature of these cities in terms of the: 
e seriousness of their traffic congestion problem; 
decision-making process; 
e the political complexion of the authority; and the 
presence of policy entrepreneurs, 
would prove invaluable in terms of the current transport debate. 
In addition it would appear that historic cities throughout the UK might experience 
rnore acute traffic congestion problems than do other locations (Nevin and Abbie 
1993). As such, further research, possibly through in-depth interviews in selected 
historic cities in the UK, building on the work undertaken as part of the national 
survey and the Cambridge experience could prove invaluable. Do the opinions differ 
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greatly between historic cities such as Cambridge, York and Winchester from that of 
other urban areas of the UK? 
10.3.2 Leadership styles 
The role of a catalyst was certainly important in the Cambridge context. The Director 
of Transportation gave the whole proposal an impetus and focus, which was lost once 
he retired. The whole area of leadership, styles of leadership and the policy 
entrepreneur requires more careful consideration in tenns of urban road pricing. 
10.3.3 Coniniercialising the road network 
The research as part of this thesis has been undertaken in terms of the current 'state of 
play' with the urban road network managed as a public sector asset. Work by 
Newbery (1994,1998), Heggie and Vickers (1998) and Roth (1998) consider the 
possibility of commercialising roads. In the UK, this could be achieved by 
transferring them to a new company possibly called Roadtrack regulated by a new 
'Office of Road regulation (OFROAD? ). Newbery (1998) states that 'A regulated 
Roadtrack would have the advantage that it would be able to secure funding to allow 
the efficient planning of investment... Road track would be encouraged to adjust the 
structure of road charges to improve efficiency, perhaps eventually replacing fuel 
taxes by more sophisticated road prices, without running into opposition by motorists 
fearing that road pricing would be additional to existing road taxes'. Thus 
commercialisation whereby roads are brought into the market place, putting them on a 
fee-for-service basis, might reduce the opposition of motorists to road user charging. 
As such, public and decision-makers attitudes to road user charging in a 
commercialised framework is worthy of further research. Would such an environment 
lead to a more acceptable road user charging scheme? One of the potential benefits of 
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commercialisation. could be the divorce from the tax raising idea of urban road 
pricing. 
10.4.0 Conclusion 
The research undertaken has raised a series of issues worthy of further research. The 
summarise these are: 
First, there are the issues raised by the national survey. The survey would benefit from 
being repeated in order to ascertain how attitudes have changed. In addition, 
international comparisons and a public attitude survey would be worthwhile 
obtaining. 
Second, in terms of the city of Cambridge a comparison between the Cambridge 
experience and that of say Trondheim would generate interesting findings. 
Third, why has a scheme such as pedestrianisation in the city of Cambridge been 
accepted and implemented? What lessons can be learnt and utilised. in the context of 
urban road pricing? 
Fourth, research in tenns of leadership styles and the role played by the policy 
entrepreneur are also worthy of consideration. 
Finally, the whole area of the 'free-for-service' commercial isation of the road network 
and as such the attitudes to urban road pricing would benefit from further research. 
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Chapter 11 Conclusions for Policy 
"Indeed, while there are many technically fascinating issues involved in designing a 
congestion -pricing system, understanding the politics of congestion-pricing should be 
a first priority if there is to be any realistic hope of actually using this approach to 
traffic management. " 
(Colgan and Quinlin 1997) 
From the outset it should be acknowledged that it has only been possible to scratch the 
surface of what has become a major issue in the area of traffic demand management 
and one that is likely to remain so for some time to come. 
At the time of writing this conclusion' it is not certain whether the interest in urban 
road pricing simply represents a justification for undertaking a wide range of research 
studies in order to improve our understanding or whether it offers a real opportunity 
for the widespread implementation of such schemes which will have a major influence 
on the way in which human activity is undertaken in towns and cities in the UK. 
While this study offers little in terms of definitive answers to what is a complex social 
issue, it does provide an insight into decision-making and urban road pricing. It is also 
important to say that policy analysis is not an exact science, as such it is at a high level 
of generality and involves trying to understand and explain events in situations, in 
which we never have complete information about what happened and why. 
Whilst it is true that the theoretical basis for urban road pricing has been clearly 
stated, a sound economic rationale does not by itself guarantee political acceptance. 
At the time of writing, the Transport Bill which includes reference to urban road pricing was 
progressing through Parliament. If passed the Bill will grant Local Authorities the power to 
introduce urban road pricing as part of their Local Transport Plan. 
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The aim of the thesis has been to study decision-making' with respect to urban road 
pricing as a means of combating road traffic congestion in urban areas of the UK. In 
addition, in terms of the conclusions for policy, a research aim has been to drive 
future decisions made by policy makers in terms of urban road pricing. How should 
decision-making be undertaken in order to achieve acceptance and overcome one of 
the major barriers to implementation? In terms of policy research this has meant 
dealing with both analysis for policy and analysis of policy, providing policy-makers 
with policy recommendations 'information for policy' and 'analysis of policy 
determination'. The main tenet of the thesis has been that the incremental approach to 
urban road pricing is the most appropriate in terms of decision-making in the UK. In 
essence the argument has been that for complex problem areas such as dealing with 
urban traffic congestion it is not possible to utilise the rational approach to decision- 
making. The root method, the best way as a blueprint or model, is not workable for 
complex policy issues. There is in fact, method in the apparent irrationalism of 
muddling through with authorities restricting their attention to relatively few values 
and alternative policies among the countless alternatives; starting with policies which 
are currently in force. 
The idea underpinning the incremental approach is that decision-making involves 
achieving agreement between groups. This is certainly the case in terms of urban road 
pricing. In fact, as stated in the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter 
"understanding the politics of congestion-pricing should be a first priority if there is 
to be any realistic hope ofactually using this approach to traffic management. " 
2 The research has concentrated on local decision-makers and stakeholders who have a major 
influence on decision-making rather than on national decision-makers or the public. These have 
been a neglected group in terms of research. 
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The study has identified a series of important policy areas to which decision-makers 
need to devote careful consideration in order to improve the acceptance of urban road 
pricing. The empirical research as part of this thesis has been based on a national 
survey and congestion metering as trialled in the city of Cambridge. Congestion 
metering was a sophisticated high-tech method for dealing with urban traffic 
congestion, charging for congestion when and where it occurs. It stimulated a great 
deal of interest not only because it was the first ever trial of an urban road pricing 
scheme in the UK but because of its economic purity. Congestion metering is only one 
type of urban road pricing option but it does however raise important issues and aid in 
our understanding of how decision-making should, or shouldn't be undertaken in 
order to achieve acceptance. It is ideally placed to shed light on the rival models in 
terms of the rational and incremental approaches to decision-making. 
In terms of the conclusions for policy: 
It could be argued that there is a need for drastic radical change in a whole range of 
policy areas in the UK and as such there is a need for more than simply incremental 
change. It appears however that society seems incapable, except in emergencies, of 
acting more boldly than in increments. Emergencies may call for dramatic 
programmes but chronic problems, such as traffic congestion do not. Thus, in order to 
increase the acceptance of urban road pricing schemes they should be designed so that 
interests and institutions can gradually adjust to the changes and witness the benefits. 
There is method in muddling through, starting with polices which are currently in 
force and considering only incremental change. Administrators faced with a complex 
problem must find ways to simplify. This is achieved through the limitation of policy 
comparisons to those that differ in relatively small degree from policies presently in 
effect, thus making the most of available knowledge. The research would appear to 
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suggest a continuation of the policies currently in force, with urban road pricing likely 
to gain in acceptance once all the alternatives have been exhausted. Urban road 
pricing is seen as the final element in a balanced transport policy. In the city of 
Cambridge it was suggested that until this had occurred congestion metering would 
continue to be a "political hot potato". As such, there is need for a vastly improved 
public transport network, which it was suggested in the Cambridge context "had to 
come first" it being the "chicken and egg syndrome". In fact, a major concern is the 
issue of public transport provision once urban road pricing is introduced. Continuation 
with existing policies is also likely to be the case since urban road pricing is perceived 
as one of the least acceptable measures for dealing with urban traffic congestion. In 
addition, urban road pricing is not universally perceived as the most effective policy 
option for dealing with congestion in urban areas. In fact, for Metropolitan Borough 
Councillors, urban road pricing is seen as being the least effective of all the policy 
measures. 
C 
A related issue is that acceptance is likely to improve when congestion is perceived as 
being bad enough. Congestion was viewed as being bad in the city of Cambridge, but 
it was seen by some as being no worse than elsewhere, whilst others state that the 
situation has got to get worse or the problem is not bad enough for a policy such as 
congestion metering to be accepted. As stated in Cambridge, for "people to swallow 
bitter pills, it needs to get worse ... and you 
have to have a climate of opinion that has 
been brought to such a point that they are prepared to take a bitter pill ". The research 
supports the line advanced by Jones (1998) that the lack of need for road pricing is 
argued on the basis that road traffic conditions are not bad enough to warrant the use 
of such an extreme measure with people rather putting up with the delays. In addition, 
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motorists may view congestion as an internalised cost and as such stressing 
environmental externalities maybe more effective. In the Cambridge context it was 
stated that "... air quality is much more tangible and a lot more objective than 
congestion which is quite a difficult quantity to get hold of, what do we mean by it. To 
some people congestion is a symbol of success, since a lot of people want to use a 
facility it's not actually a downside, whereas poor air quality... " 
The incremental approach, states that the test of a good policy is agreement on the 
policy itself. In terms of Councillors, the traditional decision-makers, there appears to 
be agreement, with public transport improvements, cheaper fares and Park and Ride 
being perceived as both effective and acceptable. There is currently no such agreement 
in terms of urban road pricing. 
Whilst the incremental approach suggests that it is politic not to clarify objectives in 
order to avoid conflict between the various stakeholder groups this is not consistent 
with the research findings. The need for clearly stated objectives was perceived as one 
of the major concerns both by the respondents to the national survey and in evidence 
obtained from the city of Cambridge. In terms of congestion metering, the 'lack of 
clearly stated objectives was a real probleyn'. As such, the research would suggest a 
need for clearly stated objectives even in terms of a complex social issue such as 
urban road pricing. 
In terms of objectives, as stated above, stressing an acceptable level of air pollution 
could be the means by which a policy such as urban road pricing is accepted 
suspect it could be the pollution problem which might ultimately get people thinking 
something has to be done". In terms of congestion metering it was stated "it was 
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really the environmental benefits which interested me" although it would appear to be 
the case that congestion metering was only talked about in terms of congestion. 
It is now widely accepted, not least by the government, that hypothecation is all 
important, with the revenue earmarked for specific areas and improved transport 
facilities in particular. The research confirms this with "how the revenue raisedfrom 
urban roadpricing should be used" being the issue of major concern both in terms of 
the national survey and in the city of Cambridge. Allocating the revenue raised is an 
important aspect of decision-making with respect to urban road pricing, not least since 
a factor underpinning the incremental approach is that decision-making involves 
achieving agreement between groups. It is certainly the case that agreement on the 
allocation of revenue is a necessary but not easily obtained condition for urban road 
pricing to become acceptable. This research suggests that the largest proportion of the 
revenue generated from urban road pricing should be utilised to improve public 
transport, particularly in the area in which urban road pricing is introduced. This is 
perhaps not too surprising since one would expect decision-makers and those closely 
associated with decision-making namely Transport Officials to favour utilising the 
revenue in the area of public transport. Clearly stating where the revenue is to be 
utilised increases the support for urban road pricing. Allocating the revenue in the way 
. suggested, such 
that urban road pricing is part of a package of measures substantially 
increases the acceptance of urban road pricing. It is important to state, that how the 
revenue raised should be allocated is likely to vary from authority to authority based 
on local priorities, and as such, will require careful consideration. 
244 
With respect to the type of technology utilised, whilst the suggestion made by Nevin 
and Abbie (1993) can be discounted, in that perhaps relatively low-tech solutions such 
as toll gates could be used in the first instance, equally there are reservations with 
respect to high-tech solutions. The research offers no clear cut answers as to which 
urban road pricing scheme should be pursued in order to foster acceptance. The 
research does however confirm that there are concerns over the reliability and 
accuracy of the equipment associated with urban road pricing and this is not helped by 
the lack of first hand experience of successful schemes. At the time of writing this 
conclusion, trials are being undertaken most notably in Leeds and Bristol. The use of 
extensive trials are supported by the research but this support is by no means 
universal. Councillors are less enthusiastic than the other groups. In fact, in terms of 
Metropolitan Borough Councillors, whilst 34.7 per cent agree or strongly agree with 
the need for an extensive trial of urban road pricing 56.5 per cent disagree or strongly 
disagree. It is pure conjecture as to the reason for this although one critical insight put 
forward by Rom (1994) is that 'Congestion pricing becomes politically possible only 
through political action. Congestion pricing is likely to be rejected, or to fail if 
adopted, if it is designed, ratified, and implemented by experts. No analytical 
framework can replace a political system that allows participation, debate, and voting 
by the affected parties. No analytical cleverness can replace dedicated, persistent 
advocacy'. Again this would lend support to the incremental approach in that 
decision-makers may feel more confident 'flying by the seat of their pants'. 
The research undertaken would tend to be rather inconclusive as to the most 
appropriate way forward in terms of the type of technology which should be utilised 
and the acceptance of urban road pricing. Although non of the schemes outlined as 
part of the national survey reveal a high level of acceptance, the most acceptable was 
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perceived to be an Area Licensing scheme along the lines of that introduced in 
Singapore in 1975. It is certainly the case that technological advance is progressing at 
a pace and that there are major benefits to be derived from this advance, however it is 
also the case that the incremental approach avoids serious mistakes, alleviating the 
uncertainty associated with a big bang approach. According to Rom (1994) 
programmes of whatever form are more politically attractive when there is substantial 
evidence that they will work as advertised. Certainly in terms of congestion metering 
there was a lack of information and certainty, not least in terms of the issue of safety. 
There may be a need to sacrifice theoretical optimality for practical feasibility and 
acceptance, in the first instance. The evidence derived from the Cambridge experience 
would suggest this. Congestion metering was perceived as being too complicated and 
it was suggested "Road pricing is well worth looking at as part of a strategy, but 
approaching it in an incremental way. Go for a simple scheme first, perhaps just a 
permit system or whatever... ". In addition, it was suggested that "Area Licensing has 
much lower set up costs and it's something which could be introduced fairly quickly, 
it doesn't need high tech". It is clear that congestion metering meets with a number of 
major reservations and as such "it shouldn't be the first type of road pricing that we 
should try to introduce". High-tech schemes could provoke a significant backlash and 
the incremental approach is less likely to evoke opposition. 
An important lesson drawn from the Cambridge experience was that the whole 
concept was product/technology led Le. "design a product, try to establish a market, 
and then said it will meet certain needs ... everybody was seduced by the smartcard 
type technology. We were moving into the next century with all this gadgetry and it 
was going to be great". This is clearly something that decision-makers need to be 
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aware of given the advances in technology, and their desire to take advantage of it. 
There appeared to be a flaw in the Cambridge experience in terms of putting forward 
technology and then trying to justify it. 
The invasion of road users' privacy has long been advanced as a stumbling block to 
the successful introduction of an urban road pricing scheme. In fact, it has been seen 
as the sine qua non of any scheme requiring acceptance. Both the national survey and 
the Cambridge experience reveal that there is less concern with the issue of the 
invasion of road users' privacy than with other issues. This is a consistent view across 
all stakeholder groups. In terms of congestion metering this may be linked to the type 
of technology considered, since one of the advantages of smartcard technology is its 
ability to identify as opposed to detect. 
Whilst the basic tenet of this study has been an incremental approach to urban road 
pricing, continuing to explore alternatives, possibly starting with a simple scheme, 
paying assiduous attention to the use of the revenue and the need for clearly stated 
objectives, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that the timing is such that a 
scheme finds favour, incorporating change beyond that envisaged by the incremental 
approach. This involves the coming together of a series of factors, such as the 
existence of a policy entrepreneur, in situ, who is convinced of the merits of urban 
road pricing and is able to drive the process forward, and a sympathetic council, one 
offering political stability throughout the time a scheme is being considered and in the 
period of implementation. It is certainly the case that the Director of Transportation 
for Cambridgeshire County Council acted as a major catalyst for change in terms of 
congestion metering in the city of Cambridge. He is acknowledged as being the main 
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protagonist in terms of raising the profile of congestion metering and placing it on the 
political agenda in the city. Similarly, with the retirement of the Director, an element 
of momentum was undoubtedly lost. Equally, County elections in 1993 changed the 
political complexion with regards to Cambridgeshire and resulted in an administration 
which was less sympathetic overall to the continuation of congestion metering. One 
word of caution in terms of the policy entrepreneur relates to them being above 
reproach. Certainly in terms of ERP in Hong Kong the central figure had an image of 
being a promoter of unpopular policies, whereas the Director of Transportation in 
Cambridgeshire was perceived as having a vested interest in the success of congestion 
metering since he had a patent on the idea. In fact, one Councillor interviewed 
responded that one reason why congestion metering did not progress 'might have been 
the fact that Brian Oldridge (the Director of Transportation) had some financial gain 
to make, which meant that those who were arguing against the whole concept used as 
well as thefact that the technology had not been properly developed'. 
In addition, there needs to be agreement as to the extent of the problem. Is the 
problem of urban traffic congestion serious enough to precipitate change beyond that 
predicted by the incremental approach. In the context of Cambridge it was stated that 
"I think it (congestion) is very, very bad, but the question is 'is it so bad that there is a 
consensus to get something done? ". It is the case that radical proposals can fail 
because congestion has not yet become unbearable. 
In a sense this is a somewhat pessimistic note on which to conclude. It appears to be 
the case that the great worry about urban road pricing is that it is always a rolling five 
years away. Time will tell whether the legislation introduced as part of the Transport 
Bill will result in the introduction of an urban road pricing scheme in a town or city in 
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the UK over the next 5 years. A sentiment expressed in the Cambridge context was 
that "it would appear to be the case that there are no prizes for being first" although 
the respondent went on to say "somebody will grasp the nettle or bite the bullet" in 
that "Ultimately someone is going to have to get to grips with it, they wont voluntarily 
get people to leave their cars outside, they are going to have to do something to 
encourage them and that's going to have to be a financial penalty I suspect of some 
sort ". 
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Appendix 1 The Basic Economics of Urban Road Pricing. 
As road space is a valuable and scarce resource, it is natural that economists should 
argue that it should be rationed by price - road-users should pay the marginal social 
cost of using the road network if they are to make the right decisions about whether 
(and by which means) to take a particular journey, and, more generally, to ensure 
that they make the correct allocative decisions between transport and other activities' 
(Newbery 1990) 
A. 1.0 Introduction 
The aim of this Appendix is to deal with the nature of congestion, the economic 
fundamentals of urban road pricing, the welfare implications of urban road pricing and 
the difficulty in calculating an optimal charge that is variable with respect to vehicle 
type, road type and traffic conditions. 
A. 2.0 The nature of congestion. 
Congestion arises in that vast middle ground between 'pure public goods' and 'pure 
private goods' and can be analysed via the 'theory of clubs'. A public good, referred 
to as a collective good, was defined by Samuelson (1954) as one 'which all enjoy in 
common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no 
subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good'. Ile emphasised 
that public goods differ markedly from private goods, which 'can be parcelled out 
among different individuals'. According to Deserpa (1978) 'It is widely acknowledged 
that the pure public good is a very rare - perhaps extinct - bird'. It is not easy to 
perceive of goods or services that perfectly satisfy the non-rivalness definition of 
Samuelson (1954) although the properties of pure publicness could be applicable to 
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roads used infrequently. ' Eventually however a point is reached where 'the unkind rub 
of human activities on one another' (Rothenberg 1970) begin to reduce the benefits of 
the road for all concerned. Congested roads, experience rival consumption and since 
there is free access, motorists are not excluded from the use of this scarce resource, 
thus there is overuse. This situation is therefore characterised by nonexcludability and 
hence market failure. In essence congestion arises since property rights are not clearly 
defined. The addition of more and more vehicles onto a road will increase the travel 
times of all motorists, so that congestion is a situation in which there is excess 
demand for a given road network over a particular period of time. There is thus an 
arguable need for government intervention, as for example through the introduction 
of a urban road pricing. Such a charge would to some extent overcome the problem of 
nonexcluclability and the identified market failure 
2. 
A clearer picture of congestion can be obtained by emphasising a distinction between 
pure public goods and pure private goods (Samuelson 1954) with impure public 
goods existing between the two extremes. In fact congestion can be viewed as an 
intermediate region between a pure public and pure private good (Porter 1978, Winch 
1971). Table A. 1 identifies four categories of goods. Goods in category A are both 
non-rival and non excludable and as such can be classified as pure public goods. Here 
according to Buchanan (1965) the optimal sharing group includes an infinitely large 
number of members. The goods to be found in category D are pure private goods. In 
this situation the optimal sharing arrangement, or according to Buchanan (1965) 'the 
preferred club membership' is one person. Goods in category C are rival in 
Roads used infrequently can be characterised as a public good with non-rival consumption since the 
benefit which those roads yield are enjoyed by more than one user at the same time. 
Market failure is caused by the inability to exclude motorists from the use of crowded streets (Ilau 
1992a) . 
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mile) in a three minute period i. e. 10 kph, or a vehicle stopping more than four times 
in that half kilometre (see chapter 6 section 6.2.0). 
Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) state that the origin of club theory can be traced back to 
Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924) and their work on tolls on congested roads. By 
determining the tolls on the congested road, Pigou and Knight were essentially solving 
a club problem, since the toll would restrict users and, thereby, determine the 
'membership size' for the congested highway. Porter (1978) made reference to the 
economic theory of clubs when analysing the economics of congestion. He stated that 
done way .... of limiting access to a congestable facility is through the formation of a 
club. The essence of the club is that membership gains access to the facility while non 
members are excluded. 
An issue raised by Buchanan (1965) is that goods which are not perfectly public may 
be better supplied within the market. There are however issues raised by the private 
ownership of roads. Since alternative routes are not perfect substitutes for each other 3 
the private ownership, given the lack of competition (and in the absence of regulatory 
restraint) may seek to extract a monopoly profit from the motorist 4- This could be 
criticised from both an efficiency and equity point of view. Essentially, although the 
urban road network could be viewed as a club good and thus open to private sector 
provision, the current position of public ownership would appear to be institutionally 
preferable (Hau 1992a). 
A. 3.0 Urban road congestion (in the Short Run). 
The earliest thinking on the economics of road traffic congestion can be traced to the 
work of Dupuit (1844,1849), Pigou (1920), Knight (1924) and Walters (1961). Their 
analysis is based on neo-classical principles and incorporates, a number of restrictive 
assumptions. Before the assumptions are dealt with it is important to state that 
congestion is a diverse phenomenon and as such creates a problem when theorising. 
The discussion which follows is based on partial equilibrium analysis. This can be 
3 This would be a particular problem in a urban area since duplicate roads of similar alignment would 
be difficult, if not impossible (Hau 1992a). 
4 Charging a price above marginal cost. 
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seen as much cruder than general equilibrium analysis where the arguments would 
take account of the effect changes in an urban road price and in the level of 
congestion, would have on the use of other congestable facilities, on prices in general, 
and on the distribution of income. Its benefit however lie in its intelligibility and 
implementability (Dorfman 1984). 
The assumptions made are: 
a) There is a homogeneous traffic flow along a single stretch of urban road in one 
direction without junctions. A homogeneous traffic flow means that the vehicles 
are identical in terms of speed, fuel consumption and the way they are driven; 
b) The road has a fixed beginning and end points; 
C) As stated, resource allocation is concerned only with the road itself. This means 
that it ignores the interaction with other sectors of the economy; 
d) The only factor which determines the speed at which the traffic flows along a 
particular route are the number of vehicles on the road in relation to its 
capacity. Thus factors such as the weather, the number of pedestrians, time of 
the day and so on are assumed constant; 
e) Density is said to be uniform at every point on the road and any changes in the 
now will cause density to adjust instantaneously; 
f) Each vehicle can be assumed to carry one person and contribute the same as all 
other vehicles to congestion; 
g) The motorists demand curve represents the demand for a number of vehicles to 
complete their journey along a particular stretch of road, over a particular period of 
time; 
h) All motorists have the same value of time. Thus, given assumption a), then all 
motorists face the same costs; 
i) Other externalities are excluded from the analysis. 
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Figure A. 1 Derivation of the speed-flow and travel -time curves. 
The starting point is the relationship between speed and density. Figure A. la 
illustrates that as vehicle density increases (i. e. as more vehicles enter the road) the 
speed at which the vehicles travel decreases and the travel time lengthens. The Figure 
shows a linear relationship, although in reality it is likely that there will be a non- 
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linear speed-density relationship. Traffic flow, illustrated in Figure A. 1b, is derived 
from the speed-density figure. It is given by speed times density, with the flow of 
vehicles at a particular speed represented by the appropriate rectangle under the speed- 
density relationship in Figure A. Ia. 
In Figure A. lb it can be seen that in the upper section of the curve, as the flow 
increases the speed decreases until a maximum flow of Fmax is reached at a speed of 
Sm* This is called the 'critical density', with the maximum flow of vehicles depending 
on factors such as the grade of the road and the mix of vehicle types5. The speed-flow 
curve given in Figure A. Ib can be converted into a travel time-flow curve as in Figure 
A. 1c. 
In terms of economic analysis the relationship between travel cost and flow is all 
important and this is illustrated in figure A. 2. In the figure the average variable cost 
curve (AVC) is obtained by multiplying the time taken per mile by the value of travel 
time, to which the vehicle operating costs are added. 6 Although vehicle operating 
costs (which include fuel, oil, maintenance and depreciation costs) can be assumed to 
be fixed, as the traffic flow increases there will be an increase in travel time which 
will have an (opportunity) cost associated with it. The accepted convention (Nash 
1976, Button 1982) is to sum the vehicle operating cost and time cost in order to 
obtain the'Generalised Cost'of ajourney. It is the summation of the two which gives 
the cost-flow relationship labelled average variable cost (AVC) in Figure A. 2. The 
upward sloping portion of the AVC curve is essentially the result of the increased 
travel times and the cost associated with it. It is normally the case that as more traffic 
Care must be taken when interpreting the speed-flow curve. As stated by Newbeq (1988) 'road 
users demand completed trips rather than the use of a particular stretch of road, so ideally the 
speed-flow relationship should measure the relationship between average speed over a given trip 
from start to destination, and some measure of the traffic flow in the relevant area. In particular, it 
is not very useful to estimate speed-flow relationships for particular links in a network, at least 
without integrating these into representative trips'. 
6 It can be argued (Keeler and Small 1977, Morrison 1986) that vehicle operating costs are 
independent of traffic flow. The reasoning behind this is that if the volume of traffic is low then 
the speed at which vehicles travel will be relatively high, and so therefore will be fuel costs. If the 
traffic volume is high however then the speed will be much lower, and the fuel costs will be much 
the same given the inefficiency due to the increased amount of accelerating and decelerating 
present on a more densely populated road. 
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enters the road the flow will increase as will the cost along the range of the average 
variable cost curve AB. It could however be the case that demand for the road space 
was sufficiently great that it exceeded the maximum flow possible of Fmax. In such a 
situation speed would decrease more than proportionately, with the result that the flow 
would be less than the maximum, i. e. along the backward bending section of the AVC 
curve BC, and the cost would be higher because of the increased time taken due to 
congestion. Figure A. 2 also includes the short run marginal cost curve (MC) which 
reflects the extra cost of the addition of a vehicle to the flow. The MC curve 
approaches infinity as the flow approaches full capacity. 
Generalised 
Cost of a 
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Figure A. 2 Cost-Flow relationship. 
A conventional downward sloping demand curve (DO) representing willingness to pay 
and marginal benefit (MB) can be added to Figure A. 2. In the absence of an urban 
F2 F1 FO Fmax 
Flow (vehicles per hour, per lane) 
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road price the flow of FO will occur where the demand intersects the AVC curve, at 
point E. In such a situation any road user who values the trip at more than the cost 
will undertake the journey. This is seen to be a stable equilibrium, with a generalised 
cost of CO. At the flow of FO, the extra cost to society exceeds the benefit derived by 
the last road user. The cost to society can be given by the vertical distance between 
the AVC and the MC curves which represents the external costs the motorist has not 
taken into account. The motorist has only considered its own private costs and as such 
the AVC curve can be viewed as the motorists decision curve. There is a welfare loss 
due to non-optimal pricing (see section A. 4.0). The optimal flow is represented by FI 
in Figure A. 2, with an equilibrium of point G where the demand curve intersects the 
MC curve. In order to achieve this flow an urban road price or Pigouvian tax of GH 
should be imposed which will be equal to the external cost caused by congestion. It is 
important to note that in the preceding analysis congestion is assumed to be the only 
externality, and up to a flow of F2 there is no congestion. If we allowed for pollution 
which occurs from exhaust gases at low mileage then the AVC curve would be rising 
at a point to the left of F2. 
In extreme situations, certainly during 'the peak of the peak', congestion could be such 
that a flow associated with a point on the backward-bending section of the AVC curve 
is reached. Figure A. 3 is identical to Figure A. 2 but with demand being originally 
much lower than in Figure A. 2, at say Dl, with an equilibrium at L As demand 
increases (to D2) it could reach point E, as in Figure A. 2. It is possible however in 
extreme situations for demand to be such (i. e. D4) that a stable equilibrium of K is 
reached. This is associated with high density and high cost. A situation such as K 
could be viewed as one of hyper-congestion defined by Vickery (1987) 'as a condition 
where so many cars are attempting to move in a given area that fewer vehicle miles of 
travel are being accomplished than could be if fewer vehicles were in the area but 
could move more rapidly... ' 
As the peak rush hour period nears its end the demand curve would move from say 
D4 to D3 and therefore from points K to L. A further reduction in demand (D2) could 
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take us to point M after which, if demand falls further the situation would return to the 
upward-sloping portion of the AVC curve, such as point L It is worth noting that point 
J in Figure A-3 is an unstable equilibrium position (Walters 1987) and is never 
reached in reality. 
Generalised 
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Figure A. 3 The peak of the peak. 
It is exactly because of the issues outlined above that some form of urban road pricing 
has found considerable support in recent years, particularly among economists, 
Flow (vehicles per hour, per lane) 
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although there are certain difficulties in implementing such a policy (Button and 
Pearman 1983). 
Although urban road pricing would appear to be accepted by economists as a means of 
improving societies welfare, there is still a great deal of mistrust as covered in the 
previous chapters. Economic theory can shed light on this mistrust Following the 
introduction of urban road pricing two distinct groups of motorists can be identified, 
each perceiving themselves as being worse off: 
a) Those who remain on the road after the urban road price has been introduced, will 
find the charge they pay, on average, outweighs the benefit of the resulting time 
savings; 
b) Those who are priced off the road and onto other modes will also see themselves as 
being worse off since the public transport mode may be viewed as an inferior good, 
being less convenient, reliable and so on. 
The main party to benefit from the introduction of an urban road price is in fact the 
authority implementing the charge, whether it be central or local government. This is 
for the simple reason that they receive the revenue. As such, decision-making with 
respect to urban road pricing needs to pay careful attention to the use of that revenue 
(see sections 2.2.3,5.2.1,7.7.3, and 8.2.0). 
A. 4.0 The welfare implications of Urban Road Pricing. 
Three distinct approaches to the welfare implications of road pricing can be identified 
(Hau 1992a): 
The first approach measures the welfare gain or losses of the implementation of urban 
road pricing. In Figure A. 4a, following the introduction of an urban road price, of AB, 
the flow of traffic would fall from FO to Fl. This would increase the generalised cost 
of travel from CO to CL The loss to the road user in terms of reduced trips could be 
measured by the area a+b+c whilst the saving to the traveller from not making the 
trips plus the benefit to society from reduced congestion is the area a+b+c+d. It is 
therefore the case that the net benefit of introducing an urban road price is area d, 
which can be viewed as the welfare gain. 
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Figure A. 4a Welfare implications of introducing urban road pricing in the peak 
period. 
A variation of this can be considered. At the optimum flow of FI the net benefit is 
given by e+f+g i. e. the area between the demand curve (which represents the 
willingness to pay) and the marginal cost curve (which relates to the marginal social 
cost for the new trip- maker and the existing road users) (Button 1982). At the non 
optimal flow FO, the net benefit is e+f+g-d which is therefore lower than that achievcd 
at the flow of Fl. 
The second approach can also shed light on the welfare implications of road pricing 
and is illustrated in Figure A. 4b. 
Fl. FO 
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Figure A. 4b Welfare implications of introducing urban road pricing in the peak 
period. 
Both Gwilliam and Mackie (1975) and Smeed (1964) perceive the net benefit of urban 
road pricing to be the area g+i (which is the user cost reduction, net of tax) less the 
consumer surplus loss of j (incurred by the users who are 'tolled ofr the road by the 
urban road price). This would be equivalent to area d in Figure A. 4a. 
Using this approach clearly illustrates that those who are tolled off the road are worse 
off, having experienced a loss of consumer surplus equal to the area j. In terms of 
those who carry on using the road (the tolled) the analysis would seem to suggest that 
they are better off, by the area g+i, which represents time cost savings. However, as 
revealed in Figure A. 4b, the road users pay a charge of f+h+g+i which represents 
revenue to the authority. It is collected from one social group and is available for 
redistribution to others. The road users in fact experience a loss of consumer surplus 
F1 FO 
Flow (vehicles per hour, per lane) 
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of the area f+h and although they benefit by reduced travel times they do so by 
exchanging money for time. ' 
Generalised 
Cost of a 
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CO 
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C2 
Figure A. 5 Welfare implications of introducing an urban road price in the peak 
period: Hyper-congestion. 
So economic theory would tell us that through the implementation of urban road 
pricing which, in Figure A. 2, A. 4a and A. 4b reduces the flow of traffic from FO to FI 
we have moved from a Pareto sub-optimum to a Pareto optimum position. As stated, 
7 It is important to remember that all motorists have a uniform value of time. If this assumption is 
relaxed then it will still be the case that road users on average will be made worse off by the 
introduction of urban road pricing although those with a high value of time will be made better off 
at the expense of those with low time values (Hau 1995) 
0 FO F1 Fmax 
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the main beneficiary from urban road pricing is the authority with revenue equal to 
f+h+g+i in Figure A. 4b. 
In order to assess the benefit to society, however, one has also to consider the revenue 
collected by the authority which is in fact a transfer payment. The net welfare gain 
depends upon those 'tolled off the road being compensated from the revenue raised by 
the road user charge. This is stronger than the Hicks-Kaldor compensation criteria, 
where the gainers hypothetically compensate the losers. 
A. 5.0 Hyper-congestion. 
In Figure A. 5 it can be seen that the traffic density is such that both the traffic flow 
and speed have fallen, resulting in a flow which is less than the maximum, Fmax. In 
such a situation (extreme though it is) the generalised cost is CO and the traffic flow is 
FO, given by point A in Figure A. 5. The introduction of an urban road price of BC 
would achieve the optimal flow, Fl, and place travellers on the positively sloped 
section of the AVC curve at point C. Having introduced the urban road price it can be 
noted from Figure A. 5 that the generalised cost subsequently decreases from CO to CI 
which results in an increase in traffic flow from FO to Fl. This is an extreme situation 
in which everyone, from a road user point of view, is made better off, or are they? 
A. 6.0 Lack of information. 
It has been argued by some economists (Sharp 1966) that the notion of urban road 
pricing is too simplistic. First, there are difficulties in calculating the cost and demand 
curves, taken as given in sections A. 3.0 and A. 4.0, thus there may be insufficient 
information in order to calculate the correct charge. The theory outlined in section 
A. 3.0 assumed a single stream of traffic on a single track and that spare capacity was 
available on alternative routes. This implied that vehicles diverted off one route would 
be accommodated on another. What will tend to occur in practice is that tile increascd 
flow on the other routes will delay the motorist and therefore increase costs. This cost 
cannot be ignored. 
8 The extreme situation represents a clear Pareto improvement. Evidence (see chapters 5 and 7) 
would suggest that congestion is not currently bad enough for urban road pricing to be generally 
acceptable. In fact it may need to be of hyper congestion magnitude before support is forthcoming, 
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According to Else (1986) in practice, junctions with conflicting flows of traffic can be 
a more important source of congestion. In general, the greater the delay on the 
intersecting road, the greater the delay on the original road. Thus the cost curves in 
Figure A. 2 would be pushed upwards and to the left. It would also widen the distance 
between the AVC and the MC curves and would therefore affect the optimal level of 
congestion tax. Second, there is also the major problem in that urban road pricing is a 
first-best solution to dealing with urban congestion, since it assumes full marginal cost 
pricing throughout the rest of the economy. This is not however the case, and a 
second-best solution raises complex issues. It may also be the case that motorists 
under perceive their private costs. In fact the road user may perceive little else beside 
their travel time and fuel costs, thus undertaking journeys where the private cost 
exceeds their benefits. Motorists may also be optimistic and under estimate their 
travel times and therefore the cost of delay. If this is the case then it could be justified 
to charge motorists an urban road price above their marginal social cost in order to 
encourage them to perceive their costs correctly. Third, in terms of the demand curve 
outlined in sections A. 3.0 and A. 4.0 it was assumed to have a stable demand function. 
In practice this is unlikely to be the case. 
A. 7.0 Calculating the optimal charge. 
As stated, there are difficulties in calculating the cost and demand curves. The basic 
theory outlined in sections A. 3.0 and A. 4.0 is precise as to the optimal charge i. e. GH 
in Figure A. 2. However what should the optimal charge be in practice? First there is 
the difficulty of calculating externalities. If congestion is the only externality then in 
terms of time savings what is the 'average' value of time? Second, there is the issue of 
short run and long run costs, and which should be used to calculate the optimal 
charge. Short run costs relate to current use, whereas long run costs should prevail if 
capacity is to be optimally adjusted to the expected traffic volume over time. As stated 
by Morrison 0 986) 'If current capacity is less (greater) than optimal capacity, long-run 
tolls will be less (greater) than short-run tolls. The main advantage of using short run 
costs is that an urban road price aims to make the most efficient use of existing 
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capacity. Third, the theory outlined in sections A. 3.0 and A. 4.0 suggests that the 
urban road price should vary with the flow of traffic i. e. the urban road price should 
change depending on the time of day or the day of the week. It was suggested by Else 
(1981) that vehicles at the start of the peak period should be charged more than 
subsequent traffic since they cause delay to following vehicles. In this case, urban 
road price should vary over the course of the peak period. A problem with this 
however is that one of the attributes of a 'good' urban road price (Ministry of 
Transport 1964, Chartered Institute of Transport 1990, Hau 1992b) is transparency, in 
that the system should inform the user of the price charged ahead of time and space, 
so that the correct decision can be made on whether to make the trip. This is one of 
the criticisms which has been levelled at the proposed Cambridge congestion 
metering scheme, as outlined in chapter 6 section 6.2.0. 
A. 8.0 Urban road pricing and public transport provision: the incidence of costs. 
The implementation of a successful urban road pricing scheme depends on the 
effective use of the generated revenues in the subsidising of public transport 
provision as outlined in chapter 5 section 5.2.1. This is also supported by survey 
findings undertaken for NEDO (1991)' which, in its executive summary findings, 
stated that 'Road user charges on their own would not be acceptable to the majority of 
those surveyed' and 'Road user charges would only be acceptable provided revenues 
were reinvested in public transport, improved roads or in other measures... 
Subsidisation can operate in one of two ways (Button 1992). First, it can act as a 
Pigouvian subsidy. In such a situation the generator of the negative externality (i. e. 
congestion) is given a subsidy (which can be viewed as a bribe) in order to reduce tile 
scale of activity (i. e. the traffic flow) to a level seen as being the social optimum. The 
second method involves subsidising modes of public transport, which cause less 
congestion. This is a policy which has been extensively used in many European 
countries. Subsidising public transport, such as the guided bus, can be analysed by the 
use of Figure A. 6, where guided bus can be viewed as an alternative to the private car. 
See chapter 2 section 2.2.3. 
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A number of assumptions are made, namely; 
a) In Figure A. 6 the marginal private cost (MPQ and marginal social cost (MSC) 
curves (Walters 196 1) can be used as a proxy for the AVC and MC curves as used 
in the previous analysis. 
b) The marginal cost of the guided bus is assumed constant and the fare charged is set 
as equal to marginal cost. 
c) Guided bus has no adverse effect on the environment and as such there is no 
divergence between private and social cost. The private car, however, causes 
congestion externalities. 
iv) The total number of trips is fixed. 
Given the assumptions and mode choice based on private costs, the split between 
modes can be given by point Q*. 
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Figure A. 6. Subsidising Guided Bus. 
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At the margin, travellers are indifferent (in terms of marginal private cost) between 
the two modes. Given this situation the total number of trips by private car is OQ* 
whereas guided bus trips total AQ*. This cannot be viewed as the optimal mix since 
at Q* the marginal social cost of trip making by private car (MSCpC) outweighs the 
marginal social cost of guided bus (MSCGB) and a reallocation of trip making 
between the two modes would improve social welfare. 
The optimal mix is Q** and this could be achieved by the introduction of a subsidy 
equal to ab or an urban road price of cd, as seen in Figure A. 6. The optimum position 
will be reached whether it is the tax-payer who subsidises public transport or the road 
user who pays the congestion price. The two strategies are very different however 
when considered in terms of equity. 
The case for a public transport subsidy rests heavily on the argument that the cross 
elasticity of demand between private and public transport is non-zero. Empirical 
evidence would seen to suggest (Webster and Bly 1980, Goodwin 1992) that the cross 
elasticity of demand is low. In fact Goodwin (1992) having surveyed 50 empirical 
studies found that the overall average elasticity was -0.4 1. 
There are other limitations with subsidies. First, international comparisons carried out 
by the Transport Road Research Laboratory (TRRL) and several studies of US 
operations (Anderson 1983, Pucher, Markstedt and Hirschman 1983) have found a 
positive relationship between the level of subsidy and cost levels among bus 
operators. There is therefore reason to suggest that higher subsidies lead to higher 
costs, with a significant proportion of the subsidies leaking into higher wages or into 
inefficient operations rather than being used for the benefit of passengers. 
Second, if there is latent demand for the use of road space then a switch of travellers 
from car to public transport, because of the subsidy (i. e. cheaper fares) will free up 
road space for those who previously did not make journeys. In other words traffic 
would be generated as a result of the subsidy. 
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Finally, as stated by Button (1992) 'Fare subsidies, for example, may be of social 
importance in income distribution terms but often it is quality of service (i. e. 
frequency, reliability, amenities, etc. ) which is of more importance to commuters. ' 
LIA 11 0 1, YTEC 11 NICNIVERS 
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Lr APPENDIX 2 National Urban Traffic Survey - Cot 
"U 
Questionnaire 
Date 
Councillor 
Dear Councillor 
Anglia Polytechnic University, in association with Loughborough University, is 
currently undertaking research into the views of key individuals, frorn local 
authorities, transport interest groups, professional bodies and leading academics, on 
urban road traffic issues. The aim of the research is to provide an insight into an 
important area of urban transport policy while also contributing to a better 
understanding of the relationship between key 'players' in the transport debate. 
As part of this research, we are distributing the attached questionnaire to selected key 
personnel within relevant organisations to ascertain their opinions on these issues. 
We would be very grateful if you would take time to complete this important survey. 
We are interested in your personal view and we would be pleased to forward you a 
summary of the results of the survey in due course. 
The contents of the questionnaire are confidential and information identifying the 
respondent will not be disclosed. 
We understand the various demands placed on your time but would be very grateful it' 
you could devote a few minutes to completing this questionnaire. 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the addressed envelope provided. 
Thank you very much for your time. 
Yours sincerely 
Stephen Ison 
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ýý answer the questions by marking the box which corresponds with your opinion. ýeý mark the appropriate boxes carefully, since your response will be read by computer. lbrk like -no using a blue or black ball point pen. IMPORTANT: DO NOT FOLD THIS FORM 
1! _H" serious 
do you consider the current levels of traffic congestion to be in the towns and cities of the UK? 
140 at all Serious Not Very Serious Fairly Serious Serious Very Serious 
serious do you consider the current levels of traffic related pollution to be in the towns and cities of the UK? 
4% at all serious Not Very Serious Fairly Serious Serious Very Serious 
The following policy options can be viewed as a means of reducing traffic congestion in the towns and cities of the JK These policy options can be assessed in terms of their effectiveness and public acceptability. Taking each option in 
Isn mark how you personally feel about the effectiveness and public acceptability of each option when dealing with 
Jban traffic congestion. 
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C-D r-- 
UMng of parking charges in 
IFF 
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4W policy options (Please State): 
4m@ft production 
4. If an urban road pricing scheme was introduced it would raise substantial amounts of revenue. How should 
that revenue be spent? 
Imagine you have 100 units of money to spend, which represents the total amount of money raised by urban road pricing. How do you think the 
units should be allocated to the various policies. Of course the more you allocate to a particular policy then the less you will have left for the other 
policies. (Please spend all the 100 units) 
0111213141516171819 
Improving public transport in the area in 
which urban road Dricina is introduced 
Improving public transport in urban 
areas nationallv 
Improving the road network in the area 
where urban road pricinq is introduced 
the urban network 
Excise 
Spending on non-transport government 
services, such as Health and Education, 
in the urban area where urban road pricing 
is introduced 
Spending on non-transport government 
services, such as Health and Education, 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
112131415161718 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
213141516171 
Reducing the Council Tax in the area 
where urban road pricinq is introduced 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
01112131415161718 
Council Tax 
Better enforcement of traffic regulations, 
surh q--; strenathenina Of Darkina controls 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
56789 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
12 w03456789 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
U02 4567 9 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
03456789 
TOTAL (Please remember the total should add up to 100) 
Other Policy Options (Please State) 
5. If an urban road pricing scheme was introduced and the money spent in the way you suggested in question 4, how 
publicly acceptable would you now think urban road pricing would be? 
Totally Not Very Neither Acceptable Fairly Totally 
Unacceptable Acceptable Nor Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable 
C-D C-D C--) C: D 
6. If an urban road pricing scheme were introduced how publicly acceptable do you think each one of the following 
methods would be? 
Totally Not Very Neither Acceptable Fairly Totally 
Unacceptable Acceptable Nor Unacceptable Acceptable Acceptable 
A cordon charge which is levied each time 
a vehicle enters a desionated urban area 
A daily, weekly or monthly Area Licence 
which once purchased allows you to drive 
within a desianated urban area 
A meter installed in the motor vehicle 
which monitors journeys undertaken in 
the designated urban area. An iternised 
bill is then sent to the vehicles owner 
(like a telephone bill) 
A meter installed in the motor vehicle 
which accepts a smart card which is 
Purchased in advance and from which 
monetary units are deducted when 
average speeds (for example) fall beneath 
a selected threshold 
The fact that the introduction of urban 
road pricing would mean that in 
congested periods the road user 
would have to pay for the use of 
the road 
How urban road pricing would be 
integrated with other congestion 
'The reliability and accuracy of urban 
'The cost of implementating an urban 
lEnforcement of an urban road pricing 
kh, 
0 
m 
0 
0 
0 
m 
m 
U 
0 
0 
- 
7. If urban road pricing was introduced how concerned would you be about each of the following issues? 
Very Fairly Neither Concerned Fairly Very 
Unconcerned Unconcerned Nor Unconcerned Concerned Concerned 
Very Fairly Neither Concerned Fairly Very 
Unconcerned Unconcerned Nor Unconcerned Concerned Concerned 
I Exemptions for certain groups CD C: D CD 
41 
Equity/fairness of an urban road 
The need for clearly stated objectives, 
such as, the regulation of traffic 
demand, the achievement of 
environmental benefits and the raising 
of revenue for investment in 
IM transr)ort svstems C 
The economic impact on the urban 41 
area in which urban road pricing is 
VA introduced CD 
The impact on delivery vehicles and 
on commercial traffic 
The public transport provision once 
%I iirhqn road nricina is introduced C:: ) 
j How the revenue raised from urban 
IM road nricina would be used CD 
Other issues (Please state): 
8. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the assertion that an extensive trial of an urban road pricing scheme 
is needed in the UK 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly 
Disagree Nor Disagree Agree 
ON CD Cý-: > (:: --D 
9. Details of person completing the form 
Name 
Position 
Department 
Organisation 
Address 
Post Code 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION 
Please return your completed questionnaire in the enclosed pre-paid envelope. 
Stephen Ison, Anglia Business School, 
Anglia Polytechnic University, Cambridge, CB1 1 PT 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
Appendix 3 Tables from the national survey 
Table I The seriousness of traffic congestion in the towns and cities of file 
Very Serious kill-ly 
Scl-IMIS 
Not Vciý Not ; if All 
Scl im]" Serious 
County Officials 15.0 52.5 
.1 
-1.5 
- 
County COLHICH101-S 42.1 50.0 7.9 
Metropolitan Borough Officals 21.4 57.1 
-11.4 - Metropolitan Borough Councillors 43.5 47.8 8.7 - 
London Borough Officials 30.4 60.9 s. 7 - 
London Borough Councillors 56.3 37.5 6.3 - 
Economists 33.3 50.0 8.1 8.3 
Planners 27.8 72.2 - - 
Civil Engineers 23.1 50.0 26.9 
Road User Interest Groups 14.3 57.1 
-18.6 
Environmental Groups 100.0 - - - 
Professional Bodies/Assoclations 16.7 33.3 33.3 10,7 
Table 2 The seriousness of' trail'ic related pollution in Ille tmý Ips :,,, (I (. itit. s ()I, III(, 
UK( f/e- ) 
Vc ry 
Scl IMIS 
Serious Fairly 
SCI-I'Mill 
Not VcrN N(it m ill 
SCI-IMIS SCI W111, 
County Officials -10.0 37.5 
.37. S COLIFIty ('()tll)Clll()I-S 44.7 42.1 1; ) 
Metropolitan Borough Officals 10.7 53.6 35.7 
Metropolitan Borough Councillors 47.8 30.4 17A 
London Borough Officials 50.0 36.4 f0 
London Borough Councillors 75.0 25.0 
Economists 25.0 37.5 
Planners 50.0 38.9 ý5.6 
Civil F11-11IM's 19.2 34.6 - 12.3 ;. 8 
Road User Interest Groups 14.3 57.1 2.8.6 
Frivironmental Groups - 100.0 
I)I-ol'Csslonal Bodics/Associations 33.3 33.3 
Table 3 The effectiveness ot'various policy options for reducing traffic congestion 
in towns and cities ofthe UK 
, 1, ()t, l IIý/ 
TahIc 3.1 Countv Officlak, Fairly 
II fect I Ve 
Totally/ 
FaIrlv 
Ineffective 
Mcall 
" Selective expansion of road construction in urban areas 36.6 51.2 2.7.1 
" The encouragement of horne working 22.0 41.5 
" The encouragement ofcar sharing 24.4 34.1 2.90 
" An increase in the price ol'petrol to E5 per gallon 63.4 17.1 1-1-1 
" The creation ofa comprehensive network ofsafe cycle & 
walking routes which do not involve the use of heavy 5,8.5 17.1 ISA() 
trafficked roads 
" Cheaper public transport fares 70.7 7.3 1.00 
" Introduction or expansion of park and ride services 73.2 7.3 0 S, 
" An improvement in the freqUency & reliability ofpublic 78.0 7.3 
transport 
A douhling o[parking charges in urban areas 85.4 4.9 
The dC%'ClOpIIICIIt Ofa Lind Use & transport planning strategy 
The implementation ofurban road pricing (a payment 
made by motorists for the use of urban roads at certain 8-5.4 2.4 3.98 
times) 
Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas 90. -1 4.9 20 
hle 3.2 County Councillors 
" Selective expansion ofroad construction in urban areas 
" Ali increase in the price ofpetrol to E5 per gallon 
" The encou rage men t ofcarsharing 11 
" The encouragement ofhome working 
"A doubling of parking charges in urban areas 
" Tbe implementation ofurban road pi-icing (a payment 
made fly motorists for the use of' urban roads at certain 
times) 
" The creation of a comprehensive network of safe cycle 
,, valking routes which do not IIIVOIVC the LISC of heavy 
trafficked roads 
" Cheaper public transport fares 
" Ail improvement in the frequency & reliability of'public 
tralls'port 
" The development ofa land use &. transport planning strategy 
" Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas 
" Introduction or expansion ol'park ý! nd ride services 
Total Iý/ Totally/ 
Fall IN, Fairly 
FATC CII %V IlleffectlVe 
32.4 48.6 
00.0 
. 
11.4 IN .1ý 
47.2 19.4 
S 5.6 16.7 
701 29.7 
71.4 17.1 3.54 
77.8 5.6 
78.9 7. () (H) 
2.7 jI, 
l-, 13.8 5.4 
1.14 2., ) 
7. 
Table 3.3 Metropolitin Borough Officials 
Totally/ 
I ý; II rly 
Tota I Iv/ 
-'a irIy 
Ineffective 
Mcall 
" The encouragement ot'horne working 21.4 39.2 
" The e ncou rage nient of car sharing 25.0 39.3 2.8 
" Selective expansion ofroad construction in urban areas 55.6 40.7 
" The creation of a coniprehensive network of safe cycle & 46.4 14.3 
walking routes which do not involve the use ofheavy 
trafficked roads 
" Introduction or expansion of park and ride services 5 
" An iniprovernent in the frequency & reliability of public 00.9 17.9 
transport 
" Cheaper public transport fares 64. 17.9 
" A doubling ot"parking charges in urban areas 04.3 7.1 3.5 7 
" An increase in the price ofpctrol to E5 per gallon 04.3 7.1 0 X' 
" The devc1opnient of a land use & transport planning strategy 71.4 3.6 
" The implementation of urban road pricing (a payment 
made by motorists for the use of urban roads at certain 89.3 10.7 3.9o 
times) 
" Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas 85.7 3.0 1 
able 3.4 Metropolitan Borough Councillors 
" The implementation of urban road pricing (a payment 
made by motorists for the use of urban roads at certain 
times) 
"A doublijig ofparkirig cliarges iii urban areas I 
" Selective exparision ofroad coiistructiori iii tirbari areas 
" The CrICOUragenierit ofhorne workirig 
" The ciicourageniew of car sharing 
" Ail irici-case iri the price ofpcIrol to 0 per alloll 
" The crcatjoii of a compreherisive rietwork of safe cycle & 
walkirig routes which do riot irivolve the Lise of heavy 
trafficked roads 
" hitroduction or exparisiori ol'park arid ride services 
Cheaper pLiblic trarisport fares 
" Ail improvement iii (lie frecliiericy & reliability ol'public 
tratisport 
" The developmeiit ofa larid use & trarisport plarmirig strat t., egy 
" Barining/restrictirig vehicles iii ceritral areas 
Totally/ Totally/ 
Fairly Fairly 
I -I ffect I vc III effect I VC 
47.6 42.9 2.90 
0 1(1 
40.0 M 
45.0 30.0 
-1 -1. () 23.8 
00.0 25.0 s N*ý 
85.7 4.8 .1 11) 
86.4 4.5 -4.1 .; 
100. () .1 . 
11 
91.1 .1 ") 
Table 3.5 London Borough Officials 
, [, ()t, llly/ 
Fairly 
Effective 
I/C 
Tou III y/ 
Fail]\ 
Ineffectl%c 
" Selective expansion ofroad construction in urban areas 17.4 73.9 2,09 
" The encou rage rnen t of car sharing 21.7 52.2 2.57 
" The encouragement of honie working 34.8 52.2 
" The creation of a cornprehensive network of safe cycle & 
walking routes which do not involve the use of heavy 54.5 27.3 
trafficked roads 
Introduction or expansion ofpark and ride services 13.6 
An increase in the price of petrol to 0 per gallon 09.6 8.7 1.74 
A doubling ofparkin- charges in urban areas 87.0 4.3 
An iniproveinent in the frequency & reliability of public 82.6 4.3 
transport 
" Cheaper public transport fares 78.3 8.7 
" The developinent ofa land use & transport planning strategy 81.8 1 1 
" The implementation of urban road pricing (a payment 
made by motorists for the tise of urban roads at certain 91.3 4.3 -4.17 
times) 
Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas 8'7. 4.3 A 0) 
Table 3.6 London Borou-11 Councillors 
Totally/ 
FairlY 
Totally/ 
FaIrk, 
0 Selective expansion of' road construction in III-1)"In areas 11.3 7 3. -1 
0 The enCOUragernent of horne working 26.7 40.0 )II 
" An increase in the price ol'petrol to E5 per gallon -18.5 
38.5 
" The encouragement ofcar sharing 21 S. 6 42.9 M) 
" A douhlin, o[parking characs in urban areas ', (I 
" TIhe implementation ofurban road pricing (a payrneilt 
made by motorists for the use ofurban roads at certain 71.4 21.4 3.511 
times) 
" Introduction or expansion ol'park and ride services 7 IA 7.1 
" The creation ofa comprehensive network of safe cycle & 
walking routes which do not involve the use ofheavy 71.4 7.1 
trafficked roads 
" The development ol'a land use & transport planning strategy S'S. 7 
Banning/restricting vehicles In central areas , 
5.7 14, 
Clicaper public transport fares 100.0 - 
An improvement in the frequency & reliability ol'public 100. () - 
17 X, 
Table 3.7 Fconoinists 
Totally/ 
Fairly 
l"I'fectiVe 
Totallv/ 
Fairly 
Ineffec(Ive 
NlL.; Il) 
" The encoura-einent oflionie working 12.5 59.3 
" The encouragement of car sharing 16.7 62.5 
" Selective expansion of road construction in urban areas 36.0 56.0 
0 Cheaper public transport fares 39.1 43.5 -) ()0 
" The creation of a comprehensive network of safe cycle & 
walking routes which do not involve the use ofheavy 45, ý 41.7 
trafficked roads 
" Introduction or expansion of park and ride services 54.21 
" The development ofa land use & transport planning strategy 66.7 5.0 
" An improvement in the frequency & reliability of public 75.0 25.0 
transport 
" An increase in the price ol'petrol to E5 per gallon N'T 5 1 ).. S S 
A doubling of parking charges in urban areas S7. 4.3 s7 
Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas 1. 4.3 
The implementation of urban road pricing (a payment 
made by motorists for the use of urban roads at certain 91.7 - 4.33 
Table 3.8 Planners Fairly Fairly 
" Selective expansion ofroid constrLIC11011 ill ilre; ls 11.1 88,9 (M) 
" The elICOUragement of home working 38.9 33.3 
" The encOLlragement ofcir sharing 27.8 27.8 
" -t f. ircs Cheaper pLiblic tianspoi 3 X. 16.7 
" Introduction or expansion ofpark and ndc services 5 5.6 27.,.,, 
" The creation of a comprehensive network of. safe cycle 
walking routes which do not involve the use of' heavy 5S. 0 10, / 
trafficked roads 
" A doubling of parking chm-cs ill urban areas 72.2 22.2 
" Ali increase ill the price of petrol to E5 per gallon 01.1 16.7 
Ali impromimit in the frequency & reliability ofpubllc 
transport 
The dn, clopment ofii land use & transport plannint, stratcý! v 7; 1 (H) 
The implementation of urban road pricing (a payment 
made by motorists for the use of' urban roads at certain 94.1 4.12 
times) 
Bimning/restricting vehicles ill central areas 
Tý hIc3.1) Ck iII iii c L, rs 
Totýillv/ 
FaIrk, 
FffectIVC 
1/1, 
Iv/ 
Fairk 
nC ffe c(I 
IX 
" The enCouragernent ofhoine working I r-I 11.1 37.0 2.67 
" The encouragement of car sharing zn 22.2 40.7 2.70 
" Selective expansion of road construction in urban areas 44.4 40.7 
" The creation of a coniprehensive network of safe cycle & 
walking routes which do not involve the tise ofheavy 17.0 29.6 
trafficked roads 
" Cheaper public transport fares 40.7 25.9 1-, 
" Introduction or expansion of park and ride services 46.2 26.9 ) 1) 
" An irriprovernent in the freqUerICY & reliability 01'PLIIIIIC 70.4 ýO 
transport 
" A doubling of parking charges in Urban areas 70.4 3.7 
" An increase in the price ofpetrol to f5 per gallon 70.4 11.1 
" The developinent of a land use & transport planning strate(Tv 7.7 
do Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas 7Tý, 7A 
Tbe implementation of urban road pricing (a payment 
made by motorists for the use ofurban roads at certain 88.9 11.1 4.07 
times 
Tahle 3.10 Road t Ner Interest Groups Fall. 1% Fall-1V 
I Ieffect I VC 
The CricouragcIncrit of' Car "lial-1,111, 14.1 71.4 
" The C11COUragernent of horne working 1 W7 06,7 0 
" The creation of a comprehensive network of' safe cycle 
walking I-OLItCS Wh]*Ch (10 not involve the use of' heavy ý7.1 
trafficked roads 
" An increase in the price of'petrol to 1: 5 per gallon 
" Selective expansion ofroad construction in urban areas -11.9 57.1 
" A doubling of parking clmrgcs In urban areas 57.2 42 9 . 
" The development ol'a hind use & transport planning strategy 57.2 42.9 
" Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas 71.5 28.6 
" Introduction or cxpansion of park and ride services 71.4 1.4.1 
" Cheaper public transport I'lires Oh 
" The implementation ofurban road pricing (a payment 
made bY motorists for the use of urban i-oads at ceirt. till 57.2 14.3 
thiles) 
" An improvement in tile frequency & rellahility ol'puhlic 100. 
transport 
Table 3.1 1 Environnientalist Groups 
Tolallv/ Totallv/ 
Fairly NIcan 
Fffective Ineffective 
" Selective expansion of road construction in urhan areas 100,0 1 0() 
" The encouragernent of car sharino 100.0 - 
" The encouragenient of horne working 100.0 
" Cheaper public transport fares 100.0 
" The creation ofa cornprehensive network of safe cycle & 
walking routes which do not involve the use ofheavy 100. 
trafficked roads 
" Introduction or expansion of park and ride services 100. 
" The development of a land use & transport planning strategy 100.0 - .4 (M) 
" An improvenient in the frequency & reliability of public 100.0 - .1 
transport 
" An increase in the price of petrol toE5 per gallon 100.0 - 4.00 
" A doubling ot'parking charges in urban areas 100.0 - -1.00 
" The implementation of urban road pricing (a payment 
made by motorists for the use of urban roads at certain 100.0 4.00 
times) 
" Banning/restricting, vehicles in central areas 100.0 (M) 
Table 3.12 Prol'essiorial Bodies aud Assoclittious 
, 1*()t; tll\/ 
Fairly 
I ITC CIiC 
Fo( it I IN/ 
Fairly 
111CITecilve 
Mc, 111 
" The ei-tcouritocuicut ot'car shariiig 83.4 1 
" The elICOUragerrient of' home workirity 10.7 66.7 
" Selective exparislori of'road coustructiori m iii-haii areas 00.7 
" The cremiori ol'a comprehensive rietwork ol'sffe cycle 
walkirig routes which do iiot irivolve the use of' heavy IM) 
tralTicked roads 
" Cheaper public trimsport I'lircs 33.3 
" Aii improvemerit, m the Crequeucy (V)- reliahility of'public 16.7 
transport 
" An increase m the price ol'petrol to E5 per gallou S0.0 16.7 
" fritroduc(iori or exparisiou ol'park md ride services 11-1-13 16.7 f, 
" The developmertt of'a larid use & trarisport plaimultv str; 1tegy 83.4 16.7 
" Barmirig/restrictirig vehicles iri ceritral arcits 06.7 - 
" A d0l1111111, " of parkmg chm-cs m urbim areas 100. .1 00 
" Tbe implementation of* urban road pricing (a payment 
made by motorists I*or thic use of urban roads at certain 100.0 4.67 
2X, I 
Table 4 The acceptability of policy options for reducing traffic congestion if] 
towns and cities of the UK 
I Tahle 4.1 County Officials 
An increase in the price of lictrol to 0 per gallon 
"A douhling ol'parking char. ges in urban areas 
" The implementation of urban road pricing (a 
payment made by motorists for the use of urban 
roads at certain times 
" Selective expansion of road construction in urban 
areas 
" Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas 
" The encouragement of car sharing 
" The encouragement oflionie working 
" IntrodUCtiOn or expansion of park and ride services 
" The development ofa land use & transport planning 
strate(ty 
" The creation ofa comprehensive network of safe 
cycle & walking routes which do not involve the tise 
ofheavy trafficked roads 
" An improvement in the frecltiency & reliability of' 
public transport 
" Cheaper puhlic transport fares 
Totally Totally 
/Fairly lillacceptablL. / 
Acceptable Not Very 
Acceptable 
'. 6 97.4 1 () , 
2.5 90.0 1 ()s 
2.5 85.0 
(). 5 78.0 
32.5 50.0 2 
45.0 20.0 
70.0 10.0 77 
90.0 5.0 .1 Ix, 
90.0 .;; I 
95.0 -100 
7 
I Tahlc 4.2) Comitv Councillors 
" An increase ki the pnce ofpcu-ol to C5 pci- oalloii 
" 'I'lle implementation of' urban road pricing (a 
payment made by motorists for the use ol'urban 
roads at certain times 
"A doubling o(pat-king chai-gcs III ut-han areas 
" Sclectivc cxpansion of road consti-tiction III urhan 
AIVýIs 
" BaIIIIIII&T/1'e-Sincting, vehicles III centi-al al-ews, 
" The eiicoui-aoement ofcai-sliai-kig 
" The encoui-aucmeiit ofhome woi-king 
" The devclopmeM of a hind use transpoi-t planimity 
St I"'Ite-gy 
" The creation ofýi compreliciisive netwoi-k ol'safe 
cycle & walking i-outes which do not Involve the use 
ot'heavy trafficked wads 
" An improvenient in the fi-equency & i-efiability of' 
puhlic trins'poi-t 
" lim-oduction oi- expansion ofpirk aml ride sei-vices 
" Chcapei- puhlic Irinspoi-t fares 
Totally Tolally 
InacceplabIC/ 
Not Very 
Acceptahle 
100.0 
13.9 86.1 1.92 
17.1 71A 
34.4 
40.5 48.6 
39.4 18.2 
5 1.4 14.1 
7.1 
2.9 5.7 
I OR 
() I 
T able 4.3 Mclroj)olilmi Boromfli Officials 
Totally 
/Fairlv 
Accel)table 
Totally 
Urmcceptahle/ 
Not Vcrý 
Acceptah1c 
" An increase in Ilic Imce ofl)ctrol to f5 per gallon 92.9 1 
" The implementation of urban road pricing (a 
payment made by motorists for the use of urban 855.7 
roads at certain times 
" A doubling of parking charges in urban areas Z-1 92.9 2 0.; 
" Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas 28.6 57.1 2.0 
" Selective expansion of road construction in urban 40.7 25.9 1.1 
areas 
" The encouragement ofliorne working 64.3 - 
" 'Flie encouragement of car sharing 64.3 3.6 
" The develolm-rient ofa land use & transport planning 82.1 - 
strategyy 
" Introduction or expansion of park and ride services 5. 3.7 
" The creation ofa compreliensive network of safe 
cycle & walking routes wliicli do not involve the use 96.3 - 
of' beavy trafficked roads 
" Cheaper public transport fares 96.4 3.6 .1 (d 
4, An Improvement in tlie fi-ccluency & reliability of 96.3 - -1 67 
public transport 
Tahlc 4.4 Mcn-opolitim Boimwfli Cotincillors 
Ali inci-casc in the price ofpetrol to C5 per gallon 
The implementation ofurban road pricing (a 
payment made by motorists for the use ofurban 
roads at certain thries 
A douhling ofpm-king, clmrges ill urhan areas 
Banning/restricting vchicles ill central areas 
Selective eximlision of' road Construction ill Ill-hall 
Areýls 
The eIICOLWý11ýelllCllt OH1011le working 
The cncouragcnicrit ofcm- sharing 
" Introduction or expansion of park and ride services 
" The development ofa land use & trimsport pkinning, 
stralegy 
" The creation of a comprehensive network ofsafe 
cycle & walking routes Much do not involve the Lise 
oflicavy trafficked roads 
" Cheaper public transport fares 
" An improvement Ill the fi-ccluency & reliability of 
public transport 
Tolallý Totally 
i 1-1 VI JilacceplahIc/ 
AL L Cj)tý]IWC Not Vvi\ 
AcceptahIc 
90.5 
4.8 85.7 I. o7 
(). () 
16.8 -17A 
45.0 
83.3 5.6 
8-4.2 
89-S 10.5 
Table 4.5 London Borough Officials 
Totallý 
/Fairk, 
Acccptahlc 
T()Iallv 
Unacceptable/ 
Not Verý 
Acceptable 
Mcj[] 
" An increase in the price ofpetrol to E5 per gallon 100.0 1.01 
" The implementation of urban road pricing (a 
payment made by motorists for the use of urban 4.3 78.3 2.09 
roads at certain times 
" Selective expansion of road construction in urban 17.4 78.3 1. 
areas 
" A doubling ol'parking charges in urban areas 17.4 78.3 
" BanninWrestrictin- vehicles in central areas 34.8 52.2 
" The encouragement of car sharing 45.5 9.1 
" Introduction or expansion of park and ride services 77.3 4.5 
" The encouraaernent of horne working L_ 69.6 4.3 1.91 
" The development of a land use & transport planning 72.7 - 
strategy 
" The creation ofa cornprcliensive network ofsafe 90") - II 
cycle & walking routes which do not involve the use 
ofheavy trafficked roads 
" An improvement in the frequency & reliability of 90.9 - 
public transport 
0 Cheaper public transport fares 95.5 - 
Tahle 4.6 London Borough Councillors 
Totally Totalk, 
Inacceptahle/ 
Not Verv 
Acceptablc 
" Selective expansion of road construction in urban 7.1 78.6 1 
areas 
" An increase in the price of'petrol to 0 per ndlon I 
" The implementation of urban road pricing (a 
payment made by motorists for the use ofurban 40.0 53.3 2.73 
roads at certain times 
" A dotililing ol'parking charges in urban areas C- 11 1 40.0 
" Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas Z-1 66.7 20.0 
" The encoura-einent. ofcar sharing 53.3 '10.0 
" The encouragement ofhome working 61.5 T7 
" Introduction or expansion o[park ind ride services 80.0 
40 The development ofa land use & ti-misport planning 100.0 
strategy 
" C'IICIPCI- pUblic transport fares 93.3 
" Air improvemerit iii the frequency & reliability of 100.0 
public transport 
" The creation ofa comprelicnsive network ofsafe 
cycle & walking routes which do riot involve (lie use I M), 
ot'heavy trafficked roads 
I Tahle 4.7 Economists 
" An increase in the price oflietrol to 0 per gallon 
" The implementation of urban road pricing (a 
payment made by motorists for the use of urban 
roads at certain times 
" Selective expansion ofroad construction in urban 
areas 
"A doubling ofparking charges in urban areas 
" BanninWrestricting vehicles in central areas 
" The encouragement of horne working 
" The e ncou rage nient of car sharing 
" The development of a land use & transport planning 
strategy 
" Introduction or expansion of park and ride services 
" The creation of a comprehensive network of safe 
cycle & walking routes which do not involve the use 
of' heavy trafficked roads 
" Cheaper public transport fares 
" An improvement in the fi-CClUency & reliability of 
Totally Totally 
/Fairly I Jimccepiahle/ 
Acceplahle Not VerN 
Acceplah1c 
64,0 
24.0 72.0 2.; 
24.0 72.0 
37.5 41.7 2.96 
58.3 12.5 1.71 
58.3 12.5 7s 
68.0 - ()o 
84.0 4.0 
80.0 1 
87.0 
100. () 
Me 4.8 Planners 
" An increase in the price ofpctrol to 0 pcr gallon 
"A doublino of'parking cliirges in urban ýircas 
" The implernentation of urban road pricing (a 
paynicnt made by motorists for the use of urban 
roads at certain times 
" Selective expansion ofroad construction in m-han 
ilrells 
" Banning/restricting velmles in central areas 
" Clicalm- public transport flires 
" The encouragement of car sharing 
" The development ol'a kind use & transport pkinning 
strate ITY 
" Intro(ILIC0011 or expansion ofpm-k- mid ride services 
" Tlic cricouragement offionie working 
" An improvement In the frequency & reliability of' 
PLINIC transport 
4p The creation ofa compi-chensive network ol'safe 
cycle & widking, routes which do not involve the use 
ofheavy trafficked roi(Is 
cplýlhlc No[ VerN 
Acccl)LINC 
ý. 6 88.9 
16.7 IN, II 
70.0 
7 7. N 
7 2. 
6 
89.9 S. 6 
00. () 
9-1.4 
Tahle 4.9 Civil Fngincers 
Tot, IIIy 
/Fairly 
Acccl)tahle 
Tola I IN, 
Jnacccl%'ihIe/ 
Not Vcrv 
AcceptahIc 
(11( 
" An increase in the 1)rlcc of I)etrol to E5 per gallon 7.4 92.6 
" A doubling of parking charges in urban areas 1 8'. 5 81.5 
" The implementation of urban road pricing (a 
payment made by motorists for the use of urban 11.1 74.1 2.11) 
roads at certain times 
" Selective expansion of road construction in urban I S. 00.7 
areas 
40 Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas 37.0 (1() 
" The encouragenient of horne workin,,, 37.0 25.9 3.30 
" The encou rage iric tit of car sharing 55.6 18.5 1.5() 
" The developinent ofa land use & transport planning 73.1 7.7 1. ()(1 
strategy 
" Introduction or eximnsion of park and ride services 74.1 - 
" The creation ofa cornpreliensive network of'safe 
cycle & walking routes which do not involve the use 85. 
ofheavy trafficked roads 
" Cheaper public transI)ort fares 1.7 
" An iniprovenient in (he frequency & reliability of' 90.3 
puhlic transport 
Tahle 4.10 Road User Interest Groups 
TotalIv 
/1"; 1irly 
Aý CI)LINC 
Tolalk. 
I JIuIcccpt; . IhIc/ 
No[ Vcrý 
Accep(able 
" An increase in the price ofpetrol to f5 per gallon 14.3 85.7 1 
" A doubling o[parking chrgges in urban 14.3 71 .1 
4, The implementation ol'urban road pricing (a 
payment made by motorists for the use ofurban 14.3 71.4 2A.; 
roads at certain times 
" Banning/restricting vehicles in central areas 41.9 
" Selective expansion of road construction in urban ý12. () STI 
areas 
" The encouragement ofhome working 50.0 16.7 
" The encouragement ofcar sharing 71.4 14.3 
" The development of a land Lise & transport planning 85.7 14.3 
strategy 
" Introduction or expansion of'park and ride services 71.5 - 
" The creation ofa comprehensive network ol'safe 
cycle & walking rOLItes which do not involve the Lise 715 
ofheavy trafficked rmids 
Cheaper public transport I'llres I 00J) 
0 An improvement III the f1-C(ILiency & reliability of 100. () 
Totalk, 
Table 4.1 1 Fnvlronmcnlalisi (irotips /Fairly 
TotallN. 
1,11acceplabIc/ ML-an 
No( Vcrý 
Acceptable 
"Zf 
" Selective expansion of' road C01I. StRICH011 in urban 100.0 1 
" The implementation ot`urban road pricing (a 
payment made by motorists for the use of urban 100.11) 2.011 
roads at certain times 
" Banning/restricting, vehicles in central areas - 100 -1 
" An increase in the price of'petrol to 0 per gallon 100.0 - .1 
" A doubling ol'parking charges in urban areas 100.0 .1 
" The encouragement of horne workin IT 
100. 
" The encouragernent ofcar sharing 100.0 ()f) 
" Cheaper public transport fares 100.0 5 (m) 
" Introduction or expansion ot'park and ride services 100.0 f)() 
" The development ol'a LIFId use & transport planning 100. (H) 
Strategy 
" An iniprovernent in the frequency & reliability of' 100. (H I 
public transport 
" The creation ofa comprehensive network ot'safe 
cycle & walking routes which do not involve (tie use 100.0 
ot'heavy trafficked roads 
Tahle 4.1 22 Prol't's', ionA 
Bodics mid Asmmaliow, 
Tomlly 
/Fýiirly 
AL C(I)LIble 
Totally 
I Inaccept; IhIc/ 
Not WrN 
Acceptable 
Mc. 111 
0 1\11 increase in (fie price ofpcirol to 0 per gallon 00.7 
" Tlie implementation of' urban road pricing (a 
payment made 1)), motorists for the use ofurban 16.7 H3.3 2.17 
roads at certain times 
" ges n urbmi iireas A doubling of1mrking char, I 16.7 60.7 
" Banning/restricting vehicles in central areits 16.7 50 0 . 
" Selective eximnsion ol"rold Construction H] urball II 4 50.0 
ill-cils 
" The encourweinent ofcmý sharing - 40.0 
" The encouragement ofhome working 20.0 -10.0 
" Introduction or expimsion ofpu-k in(] ride services 83.3 - 
" The development of ii hind use & ti-misport pkinning 6 6.6 
str, itegy 
" The creation ofýi comprehensive network ot'siife 
cycle & walking routes which do not involve the tuw IN, 
()fheavy trzifficked rwds 
" Cheaper public trmisport fares 81 
" An improvement in the frCLILMICY & I-Chilhility Of 100. () - 
Table 5 The allocation of' the revenue raised from tirban road pricing to %ariow, 
policy options by road user interest groups, environnienta list groups and 
professional bodies and associations 
Policy Options Rt ý IG EG PIVA 
I Improving public transport in the area in which urban road 42.14 90.00 47.50 
pricing is Introduced. 
Improving pUblic transport III Lirhan areas nationally z1- S. 57 
Improving the road network in the area where urban road 24.29 
pricing is IIItI-0ClLIccd 
Improving the urban road network nationally 4.21) 
ReCILICing Vehicle Excise Duty nationally 5.7 1 
Spending on non-tran-sport governnicnt services, such as I Icalth 0.71 
and Education, in the urban ai-ea where urban road pricing is 
introduced 
Spending on non-transport government services, such as I jealth 0.71 
and Education nationally 
RedUcing the Council Tax ill the area where urban mad pricilig - 
I. s introduced 
Reclucing the COLincil Tax nationally - 
fietter enforcement oftraffic regulations, Such as stf-Cligthelling 8.57 
of'parking controls 
Other 
10.17 
1 1.33 
7. 
1.67 
00 91,,, 
Total 94.99 100.00 90.07 
Table 6 The acceptability of urban road pricing: Before and after the reNvIIII(I 
has been allocated to varjous policy options. Disaggregated by stakeholder groop 
Table 6.1 County Officials Before revenue allocation After revenue allocation 
17( 
Totally acceptable - 
Fairly acceptable 2.5 57.5 
Neither 12.5 17.5 
Not \, cry acceptahle 65.0 22.5 
Totally LIMICCCI)MI)IC 20.0 2.5 
Table 6.2 County Councillors Bel'Ore I-eVC11LIe allocation 
C/( 
After reventic 
Totally acceptable 
Fairly acceptable 
Neither 
Not very acceptable 
2.8 
47.2 
38.9 
2.7 
51.4 
16.2 
29.7 
Table 6.3 Metropolitan Before revenue allocatioll Aftcr reventle al jo, 
Borough Officials 1/( 
Totally acceptable - 
Fairly acceptable - 32.1 
Neither 14.3 10.7 
Not very acceptable 64.3 3.6 
Totally unacccptable 21.4 3. o 
Tahle 6.4 Metropolitan Before revenue allocation After reventic allocation 
uýll Coulicill0l's Boro 
- Totally accepLible 
Fairly acceptable 4.8 36A 
Neither 9.5 18.2 
Not very acceptable 33.3 27.3 
Totally Unacceptable 52.4 18.2 
Table 6.5 London Borough 
Officials 
Totally acceptable 
Fairly acceptable 
Neither 
Not very acceptable 
Totally unacccptahle 
Before revenue allocation 
cIr 
4.3 
17.4 
60.9 
17.4 
After revenue allocation 
14 
17.4 
21.7 
4.3 
Table 6.6 London Borough 
Councillors 
Totally acccptable 
Fairly acceptable 
Neither 
Not very acceptable 
Totally unacceptable 
Before I-C\'ClItIC ý1110Cý16011 
6.7 
33.3 
6.7 
33.3 
20.0 
Ahci w%cmic ifflocation 
56.3 
18.8 
is. m 
6.3 
I Table 6.7 Economists 
Totally acceptahle 
Fairly acceptahle 
Neither 
Not very acceptable 
Totally tillacccPlable 
Bcl'orc reventic allocation 
8.0 
16.0 
4.0 
64.0 
8.0 
Aftci 
x. () 
00.0 
10.0 
10.0 
I Table 6.8 Planners liclore reventle allocatiOll I W% ('1111C 11101 . 111, ý11 
Total ly acceptable 
Fairly acceptah1c 
Neither 
Not very acceptahle 
Totallv tillacccptabl 
5.9 
23-5 
04.7 
5.9 
I Table 6.9 Civil Engincers Belorc lc%L. Iltlc alloLalloll k-1111t. allot all, m 
I, 
I Fotally acceptahle 
J. 'ilirly acceptahle 
Neither 
Not vcry acceptahle 
Toially tinacccptahli 
3.7 
14.8 
51.9 
29.6 
. 
4.7 
60.7 
11.1 
7A 
Tahle 6.10 Road User Before re%'CIILIC ýIIIOCM1011 After reventic allocalimi 
Interest Groups 
Totally acceptable - 
Fairly acceptable 14.3 71.4 
Neither 14.3 - 
Not \, cry acceptahle 71.4 28.6 
1 Totally unacceptable - 
Table 6.11 Before rc%cfluc allocati, 011 After rc%enue allocalion 
Environmentalist Groups 
Totally acceptable 
Fairly acceptable 
Neither 
Not %, cry acccptable 100.0 
I Fotally LIMICCCI)tabIC - 
Table 6.12 Professional 
Bodies/Associations 
Before reventic allocation 
, Y( 
; \ltc. i IC %t. fl(IC tIttt, it ii II 
Totally acceptahle 
Fairly acceptahle 
Neither 
Not very acceptahle 
Totally tinacceplahle 
16.7 
66.7 
16.7 
33.3 
16.7 
291 
Table 7 Concern with respect to urhan road pricing: Disaggregated by 
stakeholder groups 
Tahic 7.1 County Officials 
" Fact that the introduction of urhan road priCIII, " Would mean that 
in congested periods the road user would have to pay for the use 
()I the road 
" Invasion ofroad user privacy 
" The impact on delivery vehicles an(] commercial traffic 
" Exemption for certain groups 
" How urban road pricin- would he inteuratcd with o(her L- Cý 
congestion management measures 
" The reliability and accuracy ofthe urhan road pricing equipment 
" Equity/fairness ofthe urhan road pricing scheme 
" The cost ol'implemcming the urhan road pricing C(lUil)HICIII 
" I'mforcement ofthe urban road pricing scheme 
" The econornic impact on the urhan area in which urban road 
pricing is introduced 
" The puhlic transport provision once urhan road pricing is 
introduced 
" The need for clearly stated oh , 
jectivcs, such as, the regulation of 
(raffic demand, the achievement ofenvironmental bcnefits and 
the raising ofrcvenuc for invemment in transport system" 
0 I-low the revenue raised from Urhan I-Oad pricing ýkoUld he 111, C(I 
Vel y/fal 11), vel y/fal I ly Mc. 111 
I) C()flcc Inc (I C()11(.. C I 11L. 1 
I 
85.4 12.2 I. S0 
; 8.; 1 
14.6 0.4.4 3.1) 
7.5 0;. () 3. ('5 
17.1 70.7 
17.1 65.9 
12.2 80.5 3.93 
7.3 78.0 3.4)s 
7.3 8 11. ; 4,112 
9.8 85.4 4.17 
().,, S 87.8 4.2", 
7.3 N7. S 4.44) 
97.0 4. wo 
Table 7.2 Counly Councillors Vo ý /I aIIk Vcis /I al IkMt. III 
U110 )Ilk Cl fl(. t IIILTI licil 
0 Fact that (fie introdUCtiOn of' urhan road pricing would nicim that 
in congesied Pei-iOdS file I-Oild LJSCl- WoUld hilVC to J)ilý It)[ OW 11"c 54.1 27.11 
of the road 
0 Invasion of' road user privacy 48.7 30.8 
0 Exemption [or calain gioups 1 73.7 
0 The impact on dcli\-civ vchicIcs and commercial Iralfic 60.5 
0 1 low urhan road pricing would he imcgraled with other 5.3 8 11.6 .11t 
congeslion management measures 
0 The rcliahility and accuracy ol'Ilic urhan road imcnil, c(Impnicni 11). N Lor, 
0 iýLIUi(. V/f', 'li1-l1CSS 01'111C mhan load pricing , clicnic 10. MI. 'S 
0 F11101-ccincill of, file urball wild pricing "Clicillo: 10. 78.9 
0 The Cost of illipIcincilling file Lilball mild pricing Cquipillcill 5.3 M9.5 . 1.21 
0 The cconolnic impact Oil [lie (libiln aiea In which Ill han I oild 2. o 94.7 . 1, k, 
pricing is inlroduced 
0 The puhlic transpoit provision once urban road picing itý 
Introduced 
0 The need f'or clearly mated oh. icclivcs. such its, life icgulation oI' 
11affic demand, file achicvvincill o(clivirollilicnial hent-111% and 94.7 
file rilisin" of rewflue f'or ijl\c. slfllcli( ill if-an"Polt "\"Icilli, 
9 Ifi )w I 
lie reVC11LIC l-il1SCd fi-( )111 HICICI in 11 %\ ( Mid he 111, Cd 
I Table 7.3 Metropolitan Borough Officials Vcl 
- %/I; IIIk 
Very/f. tirly NIL.. III 
1111CMIL. C-1 ned CMICCI l)Cd 
" Fact that the introduction 01' urban road pricing would mean that 
in congested periods the road user would have to pity I'Or the use 78.6 10.7 2.11 
ol'the road 
" Invasion ol'road user privacý 67.9 17.9 2.32 
" How urban road PI-iCin. g Would he integrated with other 14.3 75.0 . 1.82 
con, estion manazement measures 
" Excniption for certain grOLIPS 7.1 78.6 . 11, W) 
" The impact on delivery vehicles and commercial traffic 3.6 78.0 4.00 
" Equity/Fairricss ot'llie urban road pricing scheme 10.7 71.4 4.00 
" The reliability and accuracy ol'the urban road pricing equipment 3.6 67.9 4.07 
" The cost ol'implernenting the ui ban road pricing equipment 3.6 92.9 4.3 6 
" The economic impact on the urhan area in which urban road - N9.3 4.46 
pricing is introduced 
" Enforccincrit ol'the urban road pricing scheme 92.9 4.4(1 
, Fhe need for clearly stated of) , 
jectives. such is, the regulation oI 
tralTic demand, the achievement ol'environmental benefits and 6.4 4.4(, 
the raising ol'reve[ILIC lor inves(inent in transport syslems 
The public transport provision once urban road pricing, is 1) 6.4 
introduced 
1 fow the revenue raised f'rom urban road pricing would be uwd 100.0 1..; 
Table 7.4 Metropolitan Borough Councillors V(-1 01.111 k Vc II 
II Ilk I )IR Cl I It*( It ýI It C1 lit't 
Fact that the inti-oduction of' urban road pricing Would Ificall that 
in convc,, (ed periods Ilic i-oad user would have to pay for the 0.4.6 27.3 2. 
of [Ile road 
Invasion ofroad uscr privacy 1.8 kilt) 
Fxemption lot- ccrinin groups 22.7 t, ;,, II 
0 The impact on dclivery vehicles and cominci-cial nallic 18.2 
0 1 1()\v tit han road pricing would he intepm ated with oflief 13. f) 
C01westion manavellicill measures 
-ban ioad pricing, equiptilciii The cost ofiniplementin, (lie tit 
" I-I'quily/1'. 0nicss ofthe tirban road pricing, scheme 
" The economic impýict on (lie urhan area tit Mnch urhan roýld 90.6) 
pricing is introduced 
" Fifforccment ol'thc urhan road pricing scheme ý 4.5 86.4 
ll lie reliahility and accuracy of1he urhan road pricing equipment 4.5 86.4 .1 21 
0 The need for c1carly stated oh * 
jccti\'CS, such as, [lie regulatim) oI 
fraffic demand. the achicvcnwrit ofenviioninctital Imictit'. and 4. MA 21 
(lie raising oI revenue for inve. slincill tit iran,, port system" 
0 1 low the revenue raised from urhan road pricing would he used 4.5 X6.4 . 1ý 
0 The puhlic transport pro\ i,, ion once tit han mid pi icing r, 4). 1 90.4) . 1. C5 
inIrOdLICCd 
Table 7.5 London Borough Officials Vcl 01,111 k VC1 \/I, ilj k Mc. 111 
11110111L. L. 1 Iled conccrtictl 
0 Fact that the introduction of' urban road pricing would mean Illat 
in congested periods the I-Oad User would have to pay I'Or the use 87.0 8.7 1.74) 
ol'the road 
0 Invasion ol'road user privacy 60.9 21.7 2.20 
0 FAcniption for certain groups 13.0 6;. 2 3.0; 
0 The impact on delivery vehicles and commercial trafTic 13.0 09.0 3.65 
* How urban road pricing would he intcuraled with other 17.4 69.6 . 
1.74 
congestion managenicni rnCaSUres 
0 The cost ol'implementing the urban road pricing equipment 8.7 73.9 3. ()() 
0 Equily/1airness ol'the urhan road pricing scheme 8.7 73.9 41.011 
0 The economic impact on (lie urhan area in which urban road - 82.6 4.1.4 
pricing is introduced 
0 The reliability and ZICCLINICý' ol'thc urban road pricing equipment 8.7 87.0 4.20 
0 Fril'orcenicilt of'(he urban road pricing sclicine 4.3 95.7 4.35 
0 1 low [he revenue raised from urban road pricing WOUld be use(] - 100.0 4. ; 2) 
0 The need lor clearlv stated oh. jectives, such as, the regulation oI' 
trafTic demand. the achievement of'environmental benefits, and 100.0 . 4. '4 
the raising of'revenue I'or investment in transport systems 
* The PLIhliC 11-MISI)OH 1)1-0ýildon 011CC tilhan load JNICIFIý IN 11111.0 
i WrOdUCCLI 
Table 7.6 London Borough Councillors VeIN/lank 
M'd 
Vi-IN/1.111k 
"IR Cl hV( I 
M, In 
" FACI (11,11 the iIIII-OdUCtiOll 01' Urban road pricing would mcall Illat 
in congested periods the road user would have to pay for (lie use 
oftlic road 
" InVilSiOll Ofl-Oild LISCI- privacy 4.1.8 2. Sl 
" The reliability and accuracy of file mhan load pricing equipment 31_1 50.3 
" flow Urban road pricing would he intc"I'llcd with 01her 87.5 
congestion I na nagC lite I) I IIICýISLjrcs 
" The cost ofimpkinenfing the urban road pricing equipmcm 12.; 75.11 
" The impact oil delivery vchicles and commercial fraffic 
" Enforcenicnt of the urban road pricing scheme 6,3 S7.5 
0 FXcIllplioll for ccl-I'lin groups 6.7 93.3 
0 Equity/fairness offlic urhan ioad pricing sclicnic o. 3 0.8 
0 The economic impact oil Ole urban area in which ulkill 11). Id - 10.1.8 .1 IIS 
pricing is introduccd 
0 1 low the rcvenuc raised from urban road pricing would he liscd 0.3 X7.5 4 
0 The nced for clearly staled ohicclives. such as, Ilic icgtll; ill()Ii of 
nafTic demand. the achio-cment of'cnvironmental berlefil. " and - k 
the raising of'revenuc for invcmmem in Iran"poil ýyslems 
0 The puhlic pim i,, ion oncc uthan io; id lit i( ini, 1" 1110,11 T(O) 
introduccd 
Table 7.7 Economists VC1 Ofail-IN, 
unconcerned 
VC1 v/1.1if IN 
concerned 
Mcan 
" Fact that the introduction of' urban road pricing would mean that 
in congested periods the road user would have to pay for the use 95.8 4.2 1.21) 
ol'the road 
" Invasion of'road user privacy 66.7 211.8 2.17 
" The impact on delivery vehicles and commercial tralTic 26.1 43.5 3.13 
" How urban road pricing would he integrated with other 37.5 58.3 3.21 
congestion mana(Ternent 111CaSUrCS 
" I -, quity/1'airness of* the urban road pricing scheme 39.1 47.8 . 
1.22 
" The economic impact on the urban area in which urban road 16.7 62.5 3.38 
pricing is introduced 
" The cost ol'implernenting the urban road pricing equipment 25.0 54.2 3.42 
" Fxemption I*or certain groups 25.0 58.3 . 1.40 
" Lifforcemen( of'the urban road pricing scherne 20.8 58.3 3. 
" The reliability and accuracy ol'the urban road pricing equipment 25.0 66.7 3.0 3 
" The need Vor clearly stated of) 
, 
jectives, such as, the regulation of' 
trafTic (Icinand, the achievement of'environniciltal hcriefits and 20.8 75.0 3.7; 
the raising of'revenue Ior investment in transport syslerns 
" The public transport provision once urban road pricing is 12.5 83.3 4.01) 
introduced 
" How the revenue raised fi-oni urban road pricing would he used - 91.7 4.42 
Table 7.8 Plarincrs Vcl 01all 1% 
UHL MR L'I Hcd 
\, L. l v/111irly 
CMICCHMI 
NIc. 111 
" Fact that the introduction of' urban road pricing would meall 111,11 
in congested periods the road uscr would have to pay [or Ilic use 88.2 
of, [lie road 
" Invasion ot'road uscr privacy 58. m 23.5 2.47 
" The impact on delivery vehicles and commercial tralTic 27.8 38.9 3.00 
" The cost of' implementing the 111-hall road pricing, equipment 41.2 52.9 3.12 
" The i-eliahility and accuracy of* the urban road pricing cquipment 17.0 64.7 3.59 
" Excinption l'Or cerlain groups 22.2 77.8 3.07 
Yhe economic impact oil the urhan area in which urban road 5.0 72.2 
pricim, is introduced 
" How urhan road pricing would he inic-rated with other 11.8 S2.4 3.94 
congestion management measures 
" E(lLIiIy/l'ýlil-I1CSS ol'the urhan road pricin. 1 scheme 10.7 77.8 4.06 
" Frilorcernent ol'the urban road pricing scheme - IIM. 0 
" The need l'or c1carly staled of) , 
jectives, such as, the rcgulafion ol' 
wal*fic demand, Ilic achievement ol'ell\, il-()Illllclll: ll hCrICI-Ils and 5. 94.4 T-1 I 
the I-, Iislllz, 7,01-1-cvellue 
f, ()I- investment ill transport SN"Slellis 
" The public transport provision once in-han road pri cing is - 94.4 T; O 
inh-OdUced 
" Flow (lie revenue raised 1'rom in-han road pricing would hc u"ed 6 88.9 . 4.51, 
295 
Tahlc 7.9 Civil Engineers very/litirly Very/fairly mcall 
Unconcemcd concci-ned 
" Iact that tile introduction of' urban road pricing would Inean that 
in congested periods the road user would have to pay tor the use 81.5 14.8 1.89 
of'Ihe road 
" Invasion of'road user privacy 51.9 14.8 2.37 
" The impact on delivery vehicles and commercial tralTic 15.4 57.7 3.35 
" Fxcniption for certain groups 23.1 65.4 3.54 
The cost ol'implemcnting the urban road pricing equipincrit 18.5 77.8 3.67 
" F(juity/1'16mcss ol'the urhan road pricing scheme 15.4 73.1 3.73 
" F111,01-cemcnt ol'the urban road pricing scheme 11.1 77.8 3.93 
" How urban road pricing would he integrated with other 11.1 85.2 4.07 
congestion management measures 
" The economic impact on (he urban arca in which urban road 11.5 76.9 4.12 
pricing is introduced 
" Thc public transport provision once urban road pricing is 11.5 88.5 -4.27 
introduced 
" The reliability and accuracy of* the urban road pricing equiplimit 7.4 88.9 4.30 
" How the revenue raised l*rom urban road pricing would he used 3.8 92.3 4.62 
" The need I'Or clcarly stated ohiectives. such is, the regulation of' 
tralTic dcmand, the achievement of'environniental bellefits and - 96.2 4.65 
(lie raising of'rcvcnue_f'or investment in transPort sYsterns 
I Tahle 7.10 Road User Interest Groups vclOillllý vcf. y/llkil-lv NIL-all 
LIlICoIICCI M'd C(II)CCI lit'd 
ract (hat the introduciion ol' urban road pricing would nican 1hat 
in con, ested periods the road user would have to pay lor the use 57.1 14.3 2.29 
ol'ilic road 
Invasion of' road user Privacy 28.6 57.2 
0 The economic impact Oil the Urban area in which urban road - 71.5 4.14 
pl-icing is introduced 
0 F(juity/1"In-ness of' the urban road pricing scheme 14.3 85.8 4.14 
0 The impact on delivery vehicles and commercial tralTic - 71.4 4.21) 
0 1 low urban road pricing would be inicgi-ated with other 85.8 4.21) 
congestion management nicasures 
a The cost ol, implenicilting file urban road pricing equipment 85.7 4.42 
0 The reliability and accuracy ol'the Lu-ban i-oad pricin1g, equipment 85.7 4.43 
0 1 ý'nforccmcnt of* the udian road pricing scheme - 85.7 4.57 
0 1 ýxcinption l'oj- certain groups 14.3 85.7 4.57 
a [low the revenue raised 1rom urban road pricing would be used - 85.7 4.57 
0 The public transport provision once urban road pricing is 100.0 4.71 
introduced 
The need I, Or c1carly stated ohiectives, such as, [Ile regulation of' 
irýdf'ic demand. the achievenmit o[environnicntal hencl-its and 10 1). 4.71 
the raising of' revenue lor investment In transp()rt "vs1cin's 
'96 
I 
Tablc 7.1 1 Environmentalist GI-OLIJIS vci-\, /I, Iil ly Vcry/fairly mcall 
LIIICOIICCrIIC(I c0licel"lled 
" Fact that the introduction of' urban road pricing would ineall that 
in congestcd periods the road user would have to pay lor tile use 100.0 1.00 
ol'the road 
" Invasion of'road user privacy 100. 2.00 
" The impact oil delivery vehicles and commercial tralTic - 3.00 
" How urban road pricing would be integrated with other 3.00 
congestion managcnicrit measures 
" Tile cost ol'implementing the urban road pricing equipmcnt 4.00 
" Equity/f'airness ol'the urban road pricing scheme 4.00 
" Eril'orccrimit ol*the urban road pricin,, sclicine 100.0 4.00 
" Fxemption Im certain groups - 1 4.00 
" The economic impact oil file urban area in which urban road - 1 0.4.00 
pricing is in(roduced 
" The reliability and accuracy ol'the urban road pricing cquipment - 100.0 4.01) 
" How the revenue raised from urban road pricing would be used - I () 0.0 4.00 
" The public transport provision once urban road pricing is - 100.0 5.1) 
introduced 
" The need f'or clearly stated objectives. such as, the regulation of' 
tralTic dcniand. the achievcnient of* environmental bcnel-Its and 10 1). 5.00 
tile raising of'revenue l'Or investment in transport systems 
I Table 7.1'21 Professional Bcdies and Associations Vc rv/ I ri \'e v/lai ii y\ Ic 
Ti (( ill CI' TTTC( I() Ii CC I I1C( I 
Fact that the introduction Of urban road pricing would mean that 
in congested periods the road uscr would have to pay Ior [lie use 100.0 1.33 
OF I lie road 
Invasion ol'road uscr privacy 66.7 16.7 2.110 
How urban road pricing would be integratco-I with othcr 50.0 50.0 3.17 
congestion management measures 
" Fxcniption for certain groups 20.0 40.0 3.40 
" The impact on delivery vehicles and commercial tralTic 10.7 5 1). 1) 3.1) 
" FILluily/1'airness ol'the urban road pricing scheme 33.3 66.7 
" The economic impact on the urban arca in which Urban road 16.7 06.7 3.07 
pricing is iIIII-OdUCCd 
" The reliahility and accuracy ol'tlic urban road pricing C(jUil)IIICIII 16.7 83.3 3.07 
0 The cost ol'implementing the urban road pricing equipment 16.7 66.7 3.07 
0 Fifl'orcement ol'the urban road pricing scheme 16.7 66.6 3.83 
0 The need for clearly staled ob , 
jectives, such as, file regulation of 
tralTic demand, the achievement ofenvironmenial benefits and 16.7 83.3 4.17 
the raising, of'revenue for investment in transport systems 
0 The public transport provision once urban road lvicing is - 100.0 4. 
introduced 
HOW the I-CVCuLIc ralsed from urlmn road pricing would be used IM1.0 4.07 
-I 
() -", 
Table 8 Acceptability of various methods of urban road pricing: Disaggregated 
by stakeholder group. 
Table 8.1 County 
Officials 
Totally 
Unacceptable 
Not Very 
Acceptable 
Neither Accept 
Nor Unaccept 
Fairly 
Acceptable 
Tot. 111Y 
Acceptable 
" Cordon Chal-C which is C, 
levied each tillic a vehicle 12.2 46.3 12.2 29.3 
enters a dcsignatcd urban 
area 
"A daily, weekly or 
mon(hly Area Licence 9.8 29.3 24.4 34.1 2.4 
which once purchased 
allows You to drive within 
a designated urhan area 
"A incler installed in the 
motor vellicle which 
monitors journcys 17.1 29.3 22.0 29.3 2.4 
undertaken in the 
desi-nated urhan area. Ali 
i(emised hill is then sent 
to lhe vehicles owner 
"A meter installed in the 
motor vehicle which 
accepts a smart card 22.0 26.8 22.0 26.8 2.4 
which is purchased in 
advance in(] from 
monctary units are 
deductco-I when averago: 
speeds jor examp1c) fall 
beneath a selected 
Illreshold 
29S 
Table 8.2 County 
Councillors 
Totally 
Unacceptable 
Not N'crv 
Acceptable 
Neither Accept 
Nor Unaccept 
Fairiv 
Acceptable 
Tol. 111N, 
Accuplable 
Cordon Charge which is 
levied each tilue a vehicle 13.2 55.3 31.6 
enters a desionatcd urban 
area 
A daily, weekly or 
mondily Area Licence 15.8 42.1 13.2 26.3 2.6 
which once purchased 
allows ou to drive within y 
a designated urhan area 
"A meter installed in the 
motor vehicle which 
monitors journeys 18.4 28.9 13.2 39.5 
undertaken in the 
desiumated urban area. Ali 
acmised bill is then sent 
to the vehicles owner 
"A meter installed in the 
motor vehicle which 
accepts a S111,111 Card 
which is purchased in 28.9 42.1 5.3 21.1 2.0 
advance and From 
monetary unius are 
dc(lucled when aver. we 
speeds (for example) 1'. 111 
hCrIcath a selected 
(111-C. "'hold 
Table 8.3 Metropolitan 
Borough Officials 
Totally 
I inacceptable 
Not Very 
Acceptable 
Neither Accept 
Nor (Inaccupt 
Fairi. v 
AcCeptable 
Totaliv 
Accupla 1)14. 
" Cordon Charve which is 
levied cach time a vellicle 10.7 64.3 111.7 14.3 
enters a designated urban 
area 
"A daily, weekly or 
monthly Area Licence 4; 3.6 7.1 39.3 
which once purchased 
allows you to drive within 
a designated urban area 
"A meter installed in tile 
Inotor vellicle which 
monkors journeys 17.9 57.1 10.7 111.7 3. o 
undertaken in tile 
designated urban area. Ali 
itenlised bill is thell sent 
to tile vehicles ownef- 
A meter installed in [tic 
motor vehicle which 
ýIcccpls a S111,11"t Card 7.1 39.3 21.4 28.6 3. o 
which is Purchased in 
advance and from 
monetary units are 
deducted when avera. -c 
,; peeds (1,01- example) 1,1111 
hc1le"Ith a sclcCtcd 
threshold 
, ý)(j 
Table 8.4 Metropolitan 
Borough Councillors 
Totally 
Unacceptable 
Not Verv 
Accýptallýlle 
Neither Accept 
Nor Unaccept 
Fairly Totally 
Acceptable Accul)(able 
0 Cordon Chargc which is Z, 
levied cach time a vehicle 13.6 50.0 13.6 22.7 
civers a desi-nated urban 
"A daily, weekly or 
monthly Area Liccrice 13.6 -17.3 13.6 4 5. .5 
which once purchased 
allows ou to drive within y 
,i desi gnated urban area 
"A meter installed in (fie 
motor vehicle which 
monitors journcys 18.2 63.6 4.5 13.6 
undertaken in the 
designawd Urban arca. An 
iternised bill is then sent 
to the vehicles owner 
"A meter installcd in the 
Inotor vehicle which 
ýicccpts a smart card 27.3 40.9 9.1 22.7 
%Nhich is purchased in 
; tdvancc and from 
monetary UnitS M-C 
dedLICtcd when avcra, -, c 
speeds (for example) 1'. tll 
beneath a selected 
threshold 
Table 8.5 London Borough 
Officials 
Totalb, 
I ýIiacceptable 
Not Very 
Acceptable 
Neither Accept 
Nor I Inaccept 
Fail-IN, Totall% 
Acceplaw'. kcCeptabit. 
" Cordon Charge Which Is 
levied each time a vchicle 9.1 50.0 18.2 22.7 
cnters a cle. sionaled L11-111111 
area 
"A daily, weekly or 
monthly Area Licence 411.9 22.7 36.4 
\vhich once purchased 
allows you to drivc Within 
a deskmated urhan arca 
"A meter installed in the 
Inotor vehiclc which 
111011itors. iournevs 13.6 40.9 13.0 31.8 
undertakcii in Ilic 
designated L11-han area. An 
itcluiscd hill is then ý, Cnl 
to the vehicles ownei 
"A metcr installed in the 
motor vehicle which 
accclils a smart card 22.7 36.4 22.7 1.4.0 4.5 
which is purchased in 
ýIdvance and front 
monctary units are 
deducted when avcra,, c 
speeds (for example) fal I 
hencalli a sclcctc(l 
ducsliold 
Table 8.6 London Borough 
Councillors 
Totally 
Unacceptable 
Not Very 
Acceptable 
Neither Accept 
Nor Unaccept 
Fairly Totalk, 
Acceptable Accepta'ble 
" Cordon Charge which is C 
levied each time a vehicle 18.8 6.3 25.0 50.0 
enters it dcsi, -, nated urban 
"A daily, weekly or 
month1v Area Licence 25.0 31.3 37.5 6.3 
which once purchased 
allows you (o drive within 
a deskmatcd urhan area 
"A meter installed in the 
motor vehicle which 
monitors. journeys 18.8 37.5 18.8 25.0 
undertaken in the 
desiunalco. ] urban area. An 
itcmised hill is then sent 
to (lie vchiclcs owner 
"A meter installed in the 
motor vehicle which 
accepts a smart card 31.3 12.5 12.5 43.8 
which is purchased in 
advance and from 
monetary units are 
dcducted when averwc 
- example) fal I speeds (I'm 
hCuicath a selected 
threshold 
Table 8.7 Economists Totally 
I Inacceptable 
Not Very 
Acceptable 
Neither Accept 
Nor Fnaccept 
Fairl), 
Acceptable 
Totall) 
"Acceptablt - 
" Coi-don Char',, c which is 
- 
Icvied cach tinle a \, Clliclc 13.0 34.8 4.3 4 3.5 4.3 
enters a desi-nated ui-ban 
"A daily, weekly ot- 
monthly Ai-ca Liccnce 4.3 26.1 17.4 52.2 
which oncc purchased 
allows you lo d6vc within 
,I designated m-han area 
"A meter installed in Ifie 
Ino(or vellicle which 20.8 20.8 10.7 41.7 
mollitol-Sjoul-licys 
undei-takcii in the 
desiunated m-ban area. An 
itenlised hill is thell sent 
(() the vchicles ownci- 
0A metci- installcd in llic 
molor vchicic Nvhich 
ýIcccpts a smart cal'd 8.3 2.5.0 20.8 29.2 10.7 
v"llich is pul-chased III 
advance and from 
monetai"y units aiv 
deducted when avci-agc 
speeds (1,01- example) fzll I 
Imicath I sclec(cd 
(III. C. Shold 
Table 8.8 Planners Totally 
Unacceptable 
Not Very, A 
Acceptable 
Neither Accept 
Nor Unaccept 
Fairly 
/ýýý 
Tot. 111v 
Acceptablv 
" Cordon Charge which is 
levicd each time a vchicle 11.8 29.4 23.5 35.3 
enters a desi-nated urban 
M'CýI 
"A daily, weekly or 
mondflY Arca Licence 5.9 11.8 11.8 64.7 5.9 
which once purchased 
allows You to drive Within 
s gnated urhan area 'I desi 
"A meter installed in the 
motor vehicle which 11.8 35.3 11.8 35.3 5.9 
111011 itors. journeys 
undertaken in the 
designated Urban area. An 
itcmiscd hill is then sent 
to the vehIcIcs owner 
"A meter installed in thc 
motor vehicle which 23.5 11.8 29.4 35.3 
acccpts a smart card 
which is purchased in 
advance and from 
monetary units are 
deducted when averwe 
speeds (for example) 1'. 111 
hencath a selected 
threshold 
'I', ible 8.9 Civil Engineers Totally 
tI nacceptable 
Not Very 
Acceptable 
Neither Accept 
Nor Unaccept 
FairlY 
kýfahllv 
Tolall 
*v 
: ýýIablv 
" Cordon char"'e which is 
levied each little a vellicle 18.5 37.0 18.5 22.2 3.7 
enters a desi(mated urban 
area 
"A claily, weekly or 
monthly Area Licence 11.1 29.6 18.5 37.0 3.7 
WhiCh OIICC IlUrchased 
allows You to drive within 
a designated urhan area 
41 A meter installed in the 
Inotor \, Clliclc which 19.2 30.8 11.5 23.1 15.4 
monitors journeys 
undertaken in (tic 
desi-nated urhan area. An c 
i1clilised hill i's then scilt 
to the vehicle's owner 
A meter installed in the 
inotor vehicle which 
"Iccepts a S1111111 Card 22.2 33.3 7.4 29.6 7.4 
\vhicli is purchased in 
advance and from 
monetary units are 
deducted when average 
,; [)Cc(ls (1,01. example) kill 
hene'all a selected 
threshold 
2 
Table 8.10 Road User 
Interest Groups 
'rotaiiy 
Unacceptable 
Not Very 
Acceptable 
Neither Accept Fairly TotallY 
Nor Unaccept Acceptable kcceptable 
" Coi-don Clmr-c whicli is 
levied eacli time a veldcle 14.3 57.1 28.6 
enters a desi-nated ubmi 
M'Cýi 
"A daily, weekly oi- 
monthly Area Licence 14.3 57.1 14.3 14.3 
which once pui-chased 
allows vou to di-ive within 
a desi gnated mhan area 
"A niclei- installed in dic 
motoi- vehicle w1iich 
monitoi-s jotu-ncys 14.3 57.1 28.6 
undei-taken in the 
designated in-ban area. An 
itemised bill is Ilien sent 
to the vellicles owncl- 
"A metu installed in the 
1110tol- vclIicIc w1licl) 
accepts a smart card 
which is pui-cliased in 14.3 57.1 28.6 
advance and 14-0111 
monetary units m-c 
deducted Mien am-aue 
speeds (I'm example) fall 
hencatli a selected 
[III-esilold 
Table 8.11 Totally Not Very NeitherAccept Fail-IN, Totalh 
Fn vi ronmenta list Groups Unacceptable Acceptable Nor I Inaccept Accvpt! kflhý xt CV21able 
" Coi-don Chm-ge which is 
levied each tinle a vehicle 
cntcI-s a (Icsi"nated ul-ball 
"A daily, weekly un- 
monthly Ai-ca Licence 10 0.0 
which once put-chased 
ýIIIOWS YOU 10 dl'iVC Within 
a Cicsic'natcd ul-han al-ca 
"A incter installed in the 
motot- vehicle which 
monitorsJoui-neys 11) 0.0 
undertaken in the 
desiLmated m-han ai-ca. Ali 
itcmised hill is (lien sent 
lo tile vClliclCs Owncl- 
"A meta installed ill tile 
motor vehicle which 
accepts 11 smal-t cal-d 
\, Nlllicll is pul-chascd ill 
advance and from 
monetary units are 
deducted when avei-a(, e 
speeds (for example) I'lill 
hencalli a ScIccled 
1111-c"llold 
Table 8.12 Professional 
Bodies/Associations 
Totaliv 
Unacceptýablle 
Not Very 
Acceptable 
Neither Accept 
Nor I Jnaccept 
Fairl 
,v 
Totally 
Acceptable 
" Coi-don Charge which is 
levied each time a vehicle 33.3 66.7 
entas a dcsionatcd urhan 
"A daily, weekly or 
monthly Area Licence 51111.0 16.7 33.3 
which once purchased 
allows you lo drive within 
'I designated urhan area 
"A meter installed in (lie 
motor vehicle which 
monitors Journeys 50.11) 16.7 33.3 
undertaken in the 
dcsiunaled urhan area. An 
itcmised hill is then sent 
to the vehicles owner 
"A meter installed in the 
motor vehicle which 
accepts a smart card 
Mdch is purchased in 16.7 16.7 16.7 50.0 
advance and from 
monetary units are 
deducted when averwe 
speeds (1,01. example) 1,1111 
beneath a Selected 
threshold 
Table 9 An extensive trial ofan urban road p ricing scheme is needed in (be K 
Croup Stf-oll"IV A-ree Aoi-ec Noi- 1) Isikill'CL, 
Avi-ce Disagi-Ce 
COLIIHý' OITICMIS 34.1 53.7 73 2.4 2A 
Comity Comicillors -15.6 28.2 20.5 7.70 17.9 
Metf-01)OIltall 1301-OLI"ll 21S. 6 46.4 17.9 7.1 
official", 
Metl-01)01 Rill) BOI-OLl, "Il 13.0 21.7 7 20.1 
Coullcillors 
Lmidoil Borough 10.4 56.5 8.7 - 
Officials 
Loiidoii Boi-ough 25.0 31.3 12.5 12.5 IS'S, 
Comicillors 
Ecoiiomists 64.0 20.0 - 12.0 -1.0 
Plaimers 47.1 23.5 - 17.6 11 IN' 
Civil E'iigincci-s 61.0 25.9 
. 
1.7 7.4 
Roal LJ. wr Imercst Grp 57.1 42.9 
r1m, li-mmmitallst Gj-oup 100.0 - 
Bod/Assoclatimis 66.7 33. 
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Appendix 4 Congestion metering in the city of Cambridge: Additional 
selected quotes from Councillors and Officials 
A. 4.0.0 A concept in the right place 
A. 4.0.1 The level of congestion 
" Traffic congestion is just increasing all the time, year by year it is getting worse and worse 
and worse" - Labour County CouncilIor 
"Pretty bad" - Liberal Democrat County Councillor 
it pretty horrendous" - Conservative County Councillor 
"It is serious, in fact it is getting worse" - Liberal Democrat City Councillor 
air quality, principally nitrogen oxide levels, are at quite a dangerous level in some 
streets, so if we use that as an indicator of congestion and the product of congestion then the I 
situation isfairly serious" - City Council Official 
A. 4.0.2 A protagonist 
"The then director of transportation was very involved on a personal level with developing 
the system in conjunction with Newcastle University. He declared his interest in the proper 
way and didn't take any part in the decisions on whether to fUnd it or not" - Labou r 
County Councillor 
"The reason it got put high on the agenda was because of the personal preferencefor it of the 
Director of Transportation who had a personal financial interest in it" - Labour City 
Councillor 
"Brian Oldridge was a consummate politician actually and he actually realised that his best 
chancefor getting some supportfor his scheme, congestion metering, was to link it into other 
things that people were fighting for, he eventually came round to linking road pricing with 
305 
park and ride as part of an overall strategy to deal with congestion" - Labour City 
Councillor 
A. 4.0.3 A sympathetic council 
It was "interesting and something that should certainly be followed up and possibly bought 
up to trials if it could be "- Conservative County Councillor 
"worthy of consideration" - Liberal Democrat County Councillor 
, "a good 
idea" - Conservative County Councillor 
was reasonablyfavourable towards it" - Liberal Democrat County Councillor 
A. 4.1.0 Proposition 1 
A. 4.1.1 Congestion is not bad enough 
, 
"I don't think it has got much worse, I don't think it has got as bad as some peopleforecast it 
would have become" - Liberal Democrat County Councillor 
am not sure that the situation has got worse in the lastfive years I think it tended to level 
oy' - Labour City CouncilIor 
A. 4.1.2 The level ofpollution 
"I think one of the problems is that the people who realise there is a pollution problem are 
mainly city residents who do things like walk their children to school in the city centre so say 
you lived on Alpha Street, Hertford Road, Shelly Road, you could walk your children to 
school at Park Street you know there is a pollution problem. But if you live in village and 
drive in, drive your children to school and drive off again you probably won't realise". - 
Liberal Democrat City Councillor 
think that pollution is the only thing that does unify public opinion and is a better way 
forward than congestion because all solutions to congestion are based on shifting to cost to 
someone else and I don't think you get long term consensus like that. Pollution and health are 
closely connected, people can see the connections already, I don't think there any kind of 
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further public opinion change needed there, especially parents" - Liberal Democrat City 
Councillor 
"There was also. the question about congestion, whether congestion was the real problem, 
now I am not sure whether congestion is the real problem, pollution is probably the real 
problem and if you startfirom that question, what is the public interest, what is the market 
failure, its not clear to me that congestion is a marketfailure its simply a cost of travel, its a 
private cost as well when you have people joining the queue its a long queue so it takes them 
longer to get wherever they are going so they are imposing costs on other people by joining 
the queue since there is a marginal effect of doing that so I suppose there is some kind of 
market failure, but the market failure of pollution seems to be far greater and far more 
important, imposing health costs on other people who can do nothing about it at all. This is 
all after thefact, this is what I think now rather than what I thought at the time, what I think 
now is you have got to startfirom the beginning and say to yourself what's the problem and if 
they think the problems pollution rather than congestion and reducing congestion is only a 
side effect of reducing pollution then congestion metering isn't what you want to do, its 
pollution monitoring if you want anything at all" - Liberal Democrat City Councillor 
A. 4.2.0 Proposition 3 
A. 4.2.1 Discourages driving into the central area 
"the more I thought about it the more I believed that if you really were serious about 
controlling traffic you would have to come down to that sort of measure" - Conservative 
County Councillor 
A. 4.2.2 Raises revenue 
"You need to earmark or hypothecate the revenues from it and have some plans as to what 
you would do with those revenues like improve the bus service and having done that you call 
then start tightening the screw in terms of the restraint and then create a benign circle where 
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you generate more revenue improve the public transport and things spiral upwards - City 
Council Official 
A. 4.3.0 Potential disadvantages 
A. 4.3.1 The complexity and acceptability of the technology 
"I'm an advocate of road pricing ...... it (congestion metering) just seemed far to complex a 
way of doing things to actually give road pricing a good name" - City Council Official 
"I am in favour of road pricing as a good idea. When I learned what it was I was slightly less 
impressed because that version of road pricing there are a number of difficulties with it" - 
Liberal Democrat City Councillor 
"I'm an advocate of road pricing, I first came across it when I was a traffic engineering 
student in 1971 where I came across Smeeds work which was done in 1963 and sort of put 
into a context of general traffic management I thought wow this is it this is obviously what's 
going to happen, 25 years later we really haven't got there. But when it came up as a 
proposal in Cambridge I thought this could actually be it this could be the time when Smeeds 
work actually comes through but then when I saw the system Ifelt it was sort of sprung too 
soon and in to a high tech a way on people "- City Council Official 
A. 4.3.2 Equity 
became more aware of the social impact of it and on those people who happen to be poor 
then would be particularly disadvantaged" - Labour City Councillor 
A. 4.3.3 Safety 
"Its disadvantages were cost, of installation, massive, various technological questions about 
whether things actually work. There were all sort of particular problems such as what 
happens when there is a particular accident, or road works and there were supposed to be 
technological fixes for all those, you could tum it off or something but the question was 
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nobody knew whether that would work at all and because of that there were still worries 
about safety" - Liberal Democrat City Councillor 
A. 4.3.4 Public relations andpoliticalfallout 
"I can just see some poor old lady who gets stuck in a traffic queue for an hour, we were 
never told how much it was going to cost I think that was up to the Council to decide but 
clocking up pounds and pounds and it would be on the front page of the Cambridge Evening 
News because all they want is a headline, like the tow away, so they pick out the worst cases 
they don't pick out the good cases where it helped to get people into town. They just want the 
one bad news headline. One bad headline and the Council begins to tremble a bit. They are 
sensitive over bad publicity" - Liberal Democrat County Councillor 
"In principle all change is a vote loser. Anyone who proposes any change is taking a political 
risk. Then the next problem is that if you propose anything which isn'tfully worked out you 
look silly so congestion metering has that problem. The toll system is politically divisive 
rather than anything else, in that it divides the city from the suburbs, so its a vote winner in 
the city, its probably politically neutral, slight winner, in the suburbs it must be a vote loser 
because you are telling people it is going to cost them more to do what they are doing now. 
The offsetting gains are gains in public transport and you can try to sell it to people on those 
grounds, in fact that fits with what you are trying to do which is to reduce pollution in the 
city. One way you do that is by having public transport and people are in theory in javour of 
public transport but I doubt whether they are really very much in javour when it comes to the 
voting, and again the difficulty is that public transport at the moment is so bad that the 
degree of improvement you need to make people feel it is a good substitute for their cars is 
enormous so the amount of change involved is enormous and therefore people wont believe it 
is going to happen, they will think its probably not going to be that good. They probably think 
well we will see some improvement in public transport but it wont be enough to make tip for 
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the extra inconvenience we are going to suffer. So I would have thought that politically it is 
not a winner, but then all change is not a winner, unless there is a very very obvious problem 
which every body disagrees with its existence and they can see a better way forward" - 
Liberal Democrat County Councillor 
"I think this sort of measure is a good idea in theory but it is a bit draconian". Conservative 
County Councillor 
"dubious when the scheme wasfirst announced, but as I got more involved, talked to experts, 
I did start to actually look at the problem from other angles and I gradually became 
convinced that it was going to be the best system and a workable system. The only problem I 
could see would be public reaction, which turned out to be the case" - Conservative County 
Councillor 
A. 4.4.0 Proposition 4 
A-4-4-1 Visitors and exemptions 
"There would have been alot of problems that went with it, did you actually charge 
commercial vehicles and this sort of problem, and if you had you would have put the price of 
goods up and all the problems which went with that, and we never really did address those 
problems, we didn't getfar enough down the road to actually address those problems, what 
level do you set the charges at, its got to be at the right level, its got to be spot on, otherwise 
you had the problem of people could not afford to get in when they needed to or if it was too 
cheap everyone wouldjust go in anyway, so it had to be right so it was enough to encourage 
people to use the buses but if people really did need their cars they could manage it and theft 
there was the problem of residents and disabled people and alot of problems which we never 
got round to address" - Conservative County Councillor 
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A. 4.4.2 How the technology works 
"I began to wonder if the technology was up to it" - Conservative County Councillor 
"To begin with it was a kind'of idea where you said that sounds good lets see whether it is 
going to work, became this aint going to work unless someone persuades me otherwise. So I 
think the idea was good in principle but unsound in practice and the unsoundness in practice 
aspect of it became more and more important as time went on. So I was pro road pricing but 
I was against congestion metering and especially as it turned out to be designed in the 
particular case" -Liberal Democrat CRY Councillor 
A. 4.4.3 The cost of installation 
"As it became clearer about the type of details about operational matters that were involved 
in it, the costing and how it would actually work then I got more and more oppossed to the 
scheme" - Labour County Councillor 
A. 4.5.0 Proposition 5 
A. 4.5.1 Simple Scheme 
Road pricing was something well worth looking at as part of the strategy but approaching it 
in an incremental way gofor a simple systemfirst, perhaps just a permit system or whatever, 
something which didn't require cars to be tinkered around with, a system which probably in 
economic terms was imperfect, you weren't giving this degradation in charging for actual 
external costs but in practical terms you could actually sell to the public get that established" 
. City Council Official 
"So in terms of the otherforms of road pricing supplementary licences and tolls the question 
is do they have similar effects- on traffic reduction, I think they probably do, and the question 
is are they simpler to implement, the answer is they certainly are, far simpler to implement" 
- Liberal Democrat City Councillor 
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A. 4.6.0 Why was the concept of congestion metering not continued beyond the field trial 
A. 4.6.1 Unpopularl no political push 
"There was also a view expressed that it might have been the case that Brian Oldridge (the 
Director of Transportation) had some financial gain to make, which meant that those who 
were arguing against the whole concept used that as well as the fact that the technology had 
not been properly developed" - Conservative County Councillor 
A. 4.6.2 The technology 
"You need to think about it over a period of time rather than its just a wam bang 
technological fix where tomorrow every car is equipped with this and wow its wonderful" - 
City Council Official 
A. 4.6.3 All alternatives had not been exhausted 
"Well trying to anticipate the reaction there would be at the public meeting I would imagine 
people would say 'yes we accept that the traffic is bad in Cambridge but why don't you 
examine more park and ride, increasing public transport and some would say build more car 
parks. They would want anything else but this. We would be attackedfor not doing what we 
should have done in thefirst place. I think it would be very difficult to get the public to accept 
it" - Conservative County Councillor 
A. 4.6.4 Before its time 
"If I am honest, at the time I thought it was very much ahead of its time" - Labour County 
Councillor 
A. 4.7.0 The acceptability of congestion metering 
A. 4.7.1 Disquiet amongst the public 
would have to get so bad before people were prepared to do something about it" - 
Liberal Democrat County Councillor 
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"Well my view on what will really control traffic congestion is what motorists are prepared 
to tolerate" - Labour City Councillor 
A. 4.7.2 Lack of a scheme elsewhere 
"Well I think it was presented perhaps to the panel and to the public without any background 
at all I think that was the difficulty. There was no proven scheme anywherefor anyone to look 
at so you were really in the hands of people telling you well it will do this and it will do that 
but with no real basic background at all. So I think that if they had presented something that 
had been investigated more thoroughly then it would have been more acceptable to 
councillors" - Conservative South Cambs. District Council 
A. 4.7.3 Political timing 
"My initial reaction to the proposal of congestion metering was that hear was Cambridge 
trying to do something new, something novel, something brave and something bold, much to 
be encouraged and also I think it was giving something to the transport planning and the 
economics professions. It was just trying to take the academic debate a stage further and was 
marvellous but unfortunately there are no prizes for being the first in any sort of field" - 
County Council Official. 
"Well it was very difficultfor officers to work out how much money they would actually raise 
from congestion metering they came out with variousfigures but they were always dependent 
on ifs and puts, there was no reality about the amount, it was very difficult for officers to 
forecast how much money they would make from congestion metering "- Labour County 
Councillor 
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